

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SPEECHES

IN PARLIAMENT,

OF

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM WINDHAM;

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

SOME ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE,

BY THOMAS AMYOT, ESQ.

" —— ut civem, ut senatorem — ut virum denique cùm prudentiâ et diligentiâ, tum omni virtute excellentem, probo; orationes autem ejus valdè laudo."

CICERO.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

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
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SPEECHES


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SPEECHES

OF

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM WINDHAM.

November 4, 1801.

ON the preceding evening, the following address had been moved by Sir Edmund Hartopp, was seconded by Mr. Lee (M. P. for Dungarvan), and passed the House of Commons without a division, viz.

"*That an humble address be presented to His Majesty, thanking His Majesty for being graciously pleased to order the preliminaries of peace with France to be laid before this House; — to assure His Majesty of the just sense this House entertains of this fresh instance of his paternal care for the welfare and happiness of his people; — and to express their firm reliance that the final ratification of those preliminaries will be highly advantageous to the interests, and honourable to the character of the British Nation.*"

In the course of the debate, the terms of the peace had been censured by Mr. T. Grenville, Lord Temple, and Dr. Lawrence, and defended by Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Banks, Mr. Pitt, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Addington. Mr. Fox also expressed his satisfaction that a peace had been effected. Mr. WINDHAM *being unwell, reserved himself for the evening of the 4th, when, on the report of the address being brought up, he addressed the chair in the following speech:*

SIR,

IN the present stage of this business, and in a house so little numerous, I am not disposed to take up the subject in the way in which I should have wished to consider it, had I been able with tolerable satisfaction to myself, to deliver my sentiments in the debate of last night. Something, however, I wish to say, founded in a great measure on what then took place.

All that I heard, and all that I saw, on that occasion, tends only to confirm more and more the deep despair in which I am plunged, in contemplating the probable consequences of the present Treaty.

Notwithstanding some lofty talk which we heard of dignity and firmness, and which I shall be glad to see realized, and a happy quotation, expressive of the same sentiments, from my honourable Friend not now present (Mr. Pitt), the real amount of what was said, seems to be little more than this:—that France has, to be sure, the *power* of destroying us, but that we hope she will not have the *inclination*;—that we are under the paw of the lion, but that he may happen not to be hungry, and, instead of making a meal of us, may turn round in his den, and go to sleep.—This is not stated in so many words: but it will be difficult to shew, that it is not the fair result of the arguments.

That I should have lived to see the day, when such arguments could be used in a British House of Commons!—that I should have lived to see a House of Commons, where such arguments could be heard,

with patience, and even with complacency!—The substance of the statement is this. We make Peace, not from any necessity* actually existing, (my Honourable Friends, with great propriety, reject that supposition), but because we foresee a period, at no great distance, when such a necessity must arise; and we think it right, that provision for such a case should be made in time.—We treat, or, to take at once the more appropriate term, we capitulate, while we have yet some ammunition left. General Menou could do no more. General Menou could do no more in one sense; but in another he did, I fear a great deal more:—a point to which I must say a word hereafter;—he did not abandon to their fate those whom he had invited to follow his fortunes, and to look up to him as their protector. Both, however, capitulated; and upon the plain and ordinary grounds of such a proceeding, namely, that their means of resistance must soon come to an end, and that they had no such hopes of any fortunate turn in their favour, as to justify a continuance of their resistance in the mean time. The conduct of both in the circumstances supposed, was perfectly rational: but let us recollect, that those who stand in such circumstances, be they generals or be they nations, are, to all intents and purposes, *conquered!* I know not what other definition we want of being conquered, than that a country can say to us, "we can hold out, and you cannot; make Peace, "or we will ruin you:" and that you, in consequence,

* See Appendix A.

make Peace, upon terms which must render a renewal of hostilities, under any provocation, more certainly fatal than a continuation of that War, which you already declare yourselves unable to bear.

If such be the fact, we may amuse ourselves with talking what language we please; but we are a *conquered people.* Buonaparte is as much our master, as he is of Spain or Prussia, or any other of those countries, which, though still permitted to call themselves independent, are, as every body knows, as completely in his power, as if the name of *department* was already written upon their foreheads. — There are but two questions, — Is the relation between the countries such, that France can ruin us by continuing the War? and will that relation in substance remain the same, or rather will it not be rendered infinitely worse, by Peace, upon the terms now proposed? — If both these questions are answered in the affirmative, the whole is decided, and we live henceforward by sufferance from France.

Sir, before we endeavour to estimate our prospects in this new and honourable state of existence, I wish to consider for a moment, what the reasonings are, that have determined our choice, as to the particular mode of it; and why we think that ruin by War must be so much more speedy and certain, than ruin by Peace. And here I will take pretty much the statement given by the Honourable Gentlemen who argue on the other side.

I agree, that the question is not, whether this Peace be good or bad, honourable or dishonourable, adequate or inadequate; whether it places us in a

situation better or worse, than we had reason to expect, or than we were in before the War. All these are parts of the question, and many of them very material parts; but the question itself is, whether the Peace now proposed, such as it is, be better, or not, than a continuation of hostilities? — Whether, according to a familiar mode of speech, we may not go farther and fare worse? — Whether, to take the same form in a manner somewhat more developed and correct, the chances of faring better, compared with the chances of faring worse, and including the certainty of the intermediate evils, do not render it adviseable upon the whole, that we should rest contented where we are.

This I take to be the statement of the question, on the present, and on all similar occasions: nor do I know of any addition necessary to be made, except to observe, that in estimating the terms of Peace in the manner here proposed, you are not merely to consider the physical force, or pecuniary value, of the objects concerned, but also the effect which Peace, made in such and such circumstances, is likely to have on the character and estimation of the country; a species of possession, which, though neither tangible nor visible, is as much a part of national strength, and has as real a value, as any thing that can be turned into pounds and shillings, that can be sold by the score or hundred, or weighed out in avoirdupoise. Accordingly a statesman, acting for a great country, may very well be in the situation of saying, — I would make Peace at this time, if nothing more were in question, than the value of the objects now offered me,

compared with those which I may hope to obtain; but when I consider what the effect is, which Peace, made in the present circumstances, will have upon the estimation of the country; what the weakness is which it will betray; what the suspicions it will excite; what the distrust and alienation it will produce, in the minds of all the surrounding nations; how it will lower us in their eyes; how it will teach them universally to fly from connexion with a country, which neither protects its friends, nor seems any longer capable of protecting itself, in order to turn to those, who, while their vengeance is terrible, will not suffer a hair of the head to be touched, of any who will put themselves under their protection; — when I consider these consequences, not less real or permanent, or extensive, than those which present themselves in the shape of territorial strength or commercial resources, I must reject these terms, which otherwise I should feel disposed to accept, and say, that, putting character into the scale, the inclination of the balance is decidedly the other way.

Sir, there is in all this nothing new or refined, or more than will be admitted by every one in words; though there seems so little disposition to adhere to it in fact. — If we refer to the practice of only our own time, what was the case of the Falkland Islands and Nootka? Was it the value of these objects, that we were going to War for? The one was a barren rock, an object of competition for nothing but seals and seagulls: the other a point of land in a wilderness, where some obscure, though spirited, adventurers

had hoped that they might in time establish a trade with the savages for furs. Were these, objects to involve nations in Wars? If there was a question of their doing so, it was because considerations of a far different kind were attached to them, — considerations of national honour and dignity; between which and the objects themselves, there may often be no more proportion, than between the picture of a great master, and the canvas on which it is painted.

If I wished for authorities upon such a subject, I need go no further than to the Honourable Gentleman, [Mr. Fox,] who has recurred to a sentiment, produced by him formerly with something of paradoxical exaggeration, (though true in the main,) namely, that Wars for points of honour, are really the only rational and prudential Wars in which a country can engage. Much of the same sort is the sentiment of another popular teacher, JUNIUS, who, upon the subject of these very Falkland Islands, says, in terms which it may be worth while to quote, not for the merit of the language, nor the authority of the writer, — though neither of them without their value, — but to show, what were once the feelings of Englishmen, and what the topics chosen by a writer, whose object it was to recommend himself to the people: "To depart, in the minutest article, from the nicety "and strictness of punctilio, is as dangerous to "national honour, as it is to female virtue. The "woman who admits of one familiarity, seldom knows "where to stop, or what to refuse; and when the "counsels of a great country give way in a single

" instance, when they are once inclined to sub-
" mission, every step accelerates the rapidity of their
" descent!"

We are not therefore, according to the present fashion, to fall to calculating, and to ask ourselves, what is the value at market of such and such an object, and how much it will cost us to obtain it. If these objects alone were at stake, I should admit the principle in its full force; and should be among the first to declare, that no object of mere pecuniary value could ever be worth obtaining at the price of a War: but when particular points of honour are at stake, as at Nootka or the Falkland Islands, (without inquiring, whether in those cases the point of honour was either well chosen, or rightly estimated;) and still more, where general impression, where universal estimation, where the conception to be formed of the feelings, temper, power, policy, and views of a great nation are in question, there to talk of calculating the loss or profit of possessions to which these considerations may be attached, by their price at market, or the value of their fee-simple, is like the idea of Dr. Swift, when he is comparing the grants to the Duke of Marlborough, with the rewards of a Roman conqueror, and estimates the crown of laurel at two-pence.

The first question for a great country to ask itself, —the first in point of order, and the first in consequence, —is this: Is the part which I am about to act consonant to that high estimation which I have hitherto maintained among the nations of the world?

Will my reputation suffer* ? — whether that reputation relate to the supposed extent of its means, to the vigour and wisdom of its counsels, or to the uprightness of its intentions. If, in any of these ways, the country is to sustain a loss of character; if the effect of what is proposed be to render it less respected, less looked up to, less trusted, less feared; if its firmness in times of trial, its fidelity to its engagements, its steady adherence to its purposes through all fortunes, are to be called in question; it must be a strong necessity indeed, stronger than any which I believe to exist in the present instance, that ought to induce it even to listen to counsels liable to be attended with any of these consequences. It must be a weighty danger, that, in the scales of a great country, can be allowed to balance the loss of any part of its dignity. What then shall we say of a country, which, abandoning from the outset every consideration of this sort, will not wait till it becomes insecure by ceasing to be respectable, but becomes unrespectable by ceasing to be secure? Which drops at once at the feet of its rival? Which begins by a complete surrender of its security; and suffers fame, character, dignity, and every thing else, to go along with it?

Whether such is the situation of this country, we shall judge better by taking a short view of the terms of the proposed Peace. The description of these is simple and easy: — France gives nothing, and, excepting Trinidad and Ceylon, England gives every thing.

* See Appendix B.

If it were of any consequence to state what in diplomatic language was the basis of this treaty, we must say, that it had no *one* basis; but that it was the *status quo*, on the part of England, with the two exceptions in its favour, of Ceylon and Trinidad; and the *uti possidetis*, with the addition of all the other English conquests, on the part of France. But what may be the technical description of the treaty, is, comparatively, of little importance. It is the result that is material, and the extent of power and territory, now, by whatever means, actually remaining in the hands of France. The enumeration of this, liable indeed in part to be disputed, but upon the whole sufficiently correct, may be made as follows:

In Europe.—France possesses the whole of the Continent*, with the exception of Russia and Austria. If it be said, that parts of Germany, and the Northern courts of Denmark and Sweden are not fairly described as being immediately under the controul of France, we must balance this consideration by remarking, the influence which France possesses in these governments, and the commanding position which she occupies with respect to Austria, by the possession of Switzerland and Mantua, and those countries which have been considered always, and twice in the course of the present War, have proved to be, the direct inlet into the heart of her dominions.

In Asia,—Pondichery, Mahé, Cochin, Negapatam, the Spice Islands.

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* See Appendix C.

In Africa, — the Cape of Good Hope, Goree, Senegal.

In the Sea that is enclosed by these three continents, which connects them all, and furnishes to us in many respects our best and surest communication with them, — the Mediterranean, — every port and post except Gibraltar, from one end of it to the other *, including the impregnable and invaluable port of Malta; so as to exclude us from a sea, which it had ever before been the anxious policy of Great-Britain to keep in her hands, — and to render it now, truly and properly, what it was once idly called, the Sea of France.

In the West-Indies, — St. Domingo †, both the French and Spanish parts, Martinico, St. Lucie, Guadaloupe, Tobago, Curacao.

In North America, — St. Pierre and Miquelon, with a right to the fisheries in the fullest extent to which they were ever claimed; Louisiana, (so it is supposed ‡,) a word dreadful to be pronounced, to all who consider the consequences with which that cession is pregnant, whether as it acts northward, by its effects upon the United States, or southward, as opening a direct passage into the Spanish settlements in America.

In South America, — Surinam, Demerary, Berbice, Esseqnibo, taken by us and now ceded; — Guiana, and by the effect of the Treaty, fraudulently signed by France with Portugal, just before the signature of these Preliminaries, a tract of country extending to the

* See Appendix D. † See Appendix E.
‡ See Appendix F.

river Amazon, and giving to France the command of the entrance into that river. Whether, by any secret article, the evils of this cession will prove to have been done away, time will discover *. In fact, (be that as it may,) France may be said to possess the whole of the Spanish and Portuguese settlements upon that Continent. For who shall say, that she has not the command of those settlements, when she has the command of the countries to which they belong; — *cum custodit ipsos custodes?* She has, in truth, whatever part of the Continent of South America she chooses to occupy; and as far as relates to the Spanish part, without even the necessity, a necessity that probably would not cost her much, of infringing any part of the present treaty.

Such is the grand and comprehensive circle to which the New Roman Empire may be soon expected to spread, now that Peace has removed all obstacles, and opened to her a safe and easy passage into the three remaining quarters of the globe. Such is the power, which we are required to contemplate without dismay! under the shade of whose greatness we are invited to lie down with perfect tranquillity and compoſure! I should be glad to know, what our ancestors would have thought and felt in this situation? what those weak and deluded men, so inferior to the politicians of the present day †, the Marlboroughs, the Godolphins, the Somerses, the King Williams, all those who viewed with such apprehension the power of Louis XIV.;

* See Appendix G. † See Appendix H.

what they would say to a Peace, which not only confirms to France the possession of nearly the whole of Europe, but extends her empire over every other part of the globe. Is there a man of them, who would not turn in his coffin, could he be sensible to a twentieth part of that which is passing, as perfect matter of course, in the politicks of the present moment?

But to all these mighty dangers we have it seems one great security to oppose; not that degrading and bastard security to which I have before adverted, and to which, I fear, I must again recur, — that France is *lassata* if not *satiata;* that having run down her prey, she will be content to spare it, and be willing for awhile to leave us unmolested; — but a rational, sober, well-founded security, applicable to the supposition that she may not be wanting in the will to hurt us, but will happily not possess the power. This great security, we are told, is our wealth. We are, it seems, so immensely rich, our prosperity stands on so sure and wide a basis, we have such a pyramid of gold, so beautifully constructed, and so firmly put together, that we may safely let in all the world to do their worst against it; they can never overturn it, and might spend ages in endeavouring to take it to pieces. We seem to consider our commercial prosperity, like those articles of property, timber, marble, and others of that sort, which, however valuable, may be safely left unguarded, being too weighty and bulky to be carried away.

Sir, the first circumstance that strikes one in this statement, is, that odd inconsistency, by which a

country that makes Peace on account of its poverty, is to rest its whole hope of security in that Peace, upon its wealth. If our wealth will protect us, it is a great pity that this diſcovery was not made long ago; it would have saved us many years of painful ſtruggle; have kept in our hands a great additional portion of theſe very means of protection; and have lessened considerably the dangers against which such protection is wanted. But wealth, I fear, abstracted from certain means of using it, carries with it no powers of protection, either for itself or others. Riches are strength, in the same manner only as they are food. They may be the means of procuring both. But we shall fall into as great a folly, as in the fable of Midas, if we suppose that when we have laid down our arms, and surrendered our fortresses, our wealth, alone, can afford us any protection. I cannot therefore, for my own part, understand what is meant by this, unless it be, that by superiority of capital, and priority of market, of which I allow the effects to be immense, we might, if things were left to themselves, in a fair competition, in a fair race, still keep a-head of our competitors, in spite of all the multiplied advantages which France will now possess. This might be so; though it is by no means clear that it would. But the competition will not be left to its natural course*. This game will not be fairly played. Buonaparte is a player, who, if the game is going against him, will be apt to pick a quarrel, and ask us, if we can draw

* See Appendix I.

our swords. — And here, perhaps, it is time to remark the singular fallacy, which has run through all the reasonings of Gentlemen on the other side; that, namely, of supposing that in discussing the present question, the Peace, such as it is, is the state which is to be contrasted with the continuance of the War. — They forget, or choose that we should forget, that this Peace may, at any moment, at the mere pleasure of the enemy, be converted into a new War; differing only from the other, by the ground which we in the mean-while shall have lost, and the numerous advantages which the enemy will have acquired. There is not the least reason why this Treaty, if the enemy should so please, should be any thing more than a mere piece of legerdemain, by which they shall have got possession of Malta, have established themselves in all their new colonies, have perhaps re-entered Egypt, have received back twenty or thirty thousand seamen, and have otherwise put themselves into a situation to recommence the War, with new and decisive advantages. If they do not immediately take this course, it will be, simply, because they will hope to succeed as well without it; or, because they choose to defer it till a more convenient opportunity: the means will, at every moment, be in their power.

Two suppositions are, therefore, always to be made, and two comparisons to be instituted, when we talk of the merits of this Peace: 1st. That the enemy will choose to adhere to it, or, 2dly, that they will break it: and the two comparisons to be formed in consequence

are, 1st. The comparison between a continuation of the War and a state of Peace, such as Peace will be under the present Treaty; and 2dly, a comparison of the War, so continued, with such a War as France may revive at any moment after the present Treaty shall have taken effect.

What the condition and feelings of the country would be, in this latter case, namely that of a renewed War, I need hardly point out. The dread in fact of what they would be, will operate so strongly, that the case will never happen. The country will never bear to put itself in a situation, in which the sense of its own folly will press upon it in a way so impossible to be endured. At all events, with its present feelings and opinions, the country never *can* go to War again, let France do what she will: for, if we are of opinion, that War, continued at present, must be ruin in the course of a few years, what do we suppose it must be, when, to replace us, where we now are, we must begin by the recovery of that list of places, which the present treaty has given up? France, therefore, will be under no necessity of going to War with us; and nothing but her own intemperance and insolence, and an opinion of our endurance and weakness, beyond even what they may be found to deserve, can force upon us that extremity. She has much surer and safer means of going to work, means, at the same time, sufficiently quick in their operation to satisfy any ordinary ambition: — she has nothing to do but to trust to the progress of her own power in Peace, quickened, as often as she shall see occasion, by a smart

threat of War. I cannot conceive the object, which a judicious application of these two means is not calculated to obtain. A Peace, such as France has now made, mixed with proper proportions of a seasonable menace of war, is a specifick, for the undoing of a rival country, which seems to me impossible to fail. — Let us try it in detail. — Suppose France, by an arrangement with that *independent* power, Spain, similar to the arrangement which, in violation of the treaty of Utrecht, produced the surrender of Louisiana, and of the Spanish half of St. Domingo, should obtain the cession (which would be in violation of no treaty *) of all the Spanish settlements in America: would you consider that as an occasion of war? Suppose Portugal, the integrity of whose possessions is in some sense or other guaranteed to her, but who is not prevented, I presume, by that guaranty from parting with any of them that she pleases, should choose, in kindness to France, to make over to her any of those settlements which she, Portugal, still retains, — would that, again, be a cause of war? By these two ways, without the infraction of any Treaty, which by any act could be construed to be an aggression, much less which we should be inclined to treat as such, might France render herself completely mistress of the Continent of South America. Is there any commercial claim, then, that France could set up, any commercial regulation which she could introduce, either in her own name, or that of her allies, of a nature the most in-

* See Appendix K.

jurious and fatal to our commerce, which we should make a case of resistance, and think of magnitude enough to involve the nation in another war? — The augmentation of her marine, to which professedly she means to direct all her efforts, and the increase of her establishments to any amount that she pleases; these are objects which it would be perfectly ridiculous to talk of, or to suppose that we should make the subject even of the most friendly remonstrance. Indeed, according to the modern doctrines of not interfering in the internal concerns of another country, I do not understand upon what pretence the armament of a state can ever become a subject of representation, since nothing surely is so completely an internal concern, as what any nation does with its own military or naval forces, upon its own soil, or in its own harbours. But setting aside these *smaller* objects, suppose France was to re-invade Egypt; was, without waiting even for the form of a surrender from the Order, to take forcible possession of Malta; was to land a body of troops in Greece, and either in that way, or by succours to Paswan Oglow, was to overset the government of the Porte; — would you be able, on any of these occasions, to satisfy those by whose opinions it is now the fashion to guide the counsels of states, that an interest existed sufficiently strong to call for the interference of this country, to prevent the mischief, much less to redress and vindicate it when done? Why, Sir, we know that in the present state of opinions and feelings, and upon the principles on which the present Peace has been made, not only no

one, but hardly all of these put together, would drag the country into a renewal of hostilities, though, as is evident, its very existence might depend upon it. The consequence is, that France is our mistress; that there is nothing she can ask, which she must not have; (she has only to threaten war, and her work is done;)—that all the objects of interest and ambition which France can have in view, lie open before her, to be taken possession of whenever she pleases, and without a struggle: her establishments will accumulate round us, till we shall be lost and buried in them; her power will grow over us, till, like the figures in some of Ovid's Metamorphoses, we shall find all our faculties of life and motion gradually failing and deserting us:

——— *Torpor gravis alligat artus;*
Mollia cinguntur tenui præcordia libro.

If, in this last extremity, we should make any desperate efforts and plunges, that might threaten to become troublesome, and give us a chance of extricating ourselves, she will call in the aid of her arms, and with one blow put an end at once to our sufferings, and our existence.

Sir, are these idle dreams, the phantoms of my own disordered imagination? or are they real and serious dangers, the existence of which no man of common sense, let his opinions of the Peace be what they may, will attempt to deny? The utmost that any man will pretend to say, is, that he hopes, (and so do I) that the evils apprehended will not happen; and that,

great as the risk may be, he thinks it preferable to those risks, which would attend a continuation of the War. None but the most weak or inconsiderate, if they are not disaffected, or absorbed and lost in the sense of some immediate personal interest, will feel, when they shall well understand the subject, that there is any cause of joy or rejoicing.

Here it is then, that I must advert again to that topick of consolation, (miserable indeed must our state be, when such are our topicks of consolation,) to which, in order to make out a case not perfectly hopeless, we are willing to have recourse, and which, more I believe than any reliance upon our wealth, does really support us, in the situation to which we are reduced. This is the idea, that from some cause or other, from some combination of passions and events, — such as no philosophy can explain, and no history probably furnish an example of, — the progress of the Revolution will stop where it is: and that Buonaparte, like another Pyrrhus, — or rather like that adviser of Pyrrhus, whose advice was *not* taken, — instead of proceeding to the conquest of new worlds, will be willing to sit down contented in the enjoyment of those which he has already.

Sir, the great objection to this hope, to say nothing of its baseness, is its utter extravagance. On what possible ground do we believe this? Is it in the general nature of ambition? Is it in the nature of French ambition? Is it in the nature of French revolutionary ambition? Does it happen commonly to those, whether nations or individuals, who are seized with the spirit

of aggrandizement and acquisition, that they are inclined rather to count what they possess, than to look forward to what yet remains to be acquired? If we examine the French Revolution, and trace it correctly to its causes, we shall find that the scheme of universal empire was, from the beginning, that which was looked to as the real consummation of its labours; the object first in view, though last to be accomplished; the *primum mobile* that originally set it in motion, and has since guided and governed all its movements.

The authors of the Revolution wished to destroy morality and religion. They wished those things as ends: but they wished them also, as means, in a higher and more extensive design. They wished for a double empire; an empire of opinion and an empire of political power: and they used the one of these, as a means of effecting the other. What reason have we to suppose, that they have renounced those designs, just when they seem to touch the moment of their highest and fullest accomplishment? When there is but one country, that remains between France and the empire of the world, then is the moment, when we choose to suppose that all opposition may be withdrawn, and that the ambition of France will stop of its own accord. — It is impossible not to see in these feeble and sickly imaginations, that fatal temper of mind, which leads men to look for help and comfort from any source rather than from their own exertions. We are become of a sudden great *hopers*. We *hope* the French will have no inclination to hurt us; — we

hope, now Peace is come, and the pressure of War, as it is called, taken off, that the French Empire will become a prey to dissensions, and finally fall to pieces; — we *hope*, that the danger to have been apprehended from the example of the Revolution, is now worn out; and that Buonaparté, being now monarch himself, will join with usin the support of monarchical principles, and become a sort of collateral security for the British constitution. One has heard to be sure, that *magni animi est sperare;* but the maxim, to have any truth in it, must be confined, I apprehend, to those hopes which are to be prosecuted through the medium of men's own exertions, and not be extended to those, which are to be independent of their exertions, or rather, as in the present instance, are meant to stand in lieu of them.

Of this description are all those expectations which I have just enumerated; one of which is, that the French will fall into dissensions. — Why, Sir, they have had nothing else but dissensions from the beginning. But of what avail have such dissensions been to the safety of other countries? One of their first dissensions was a war of three years, called the war of La Vendée; in which, according to some of their calculations, the Republic lost, between the two sides, to the number of 600,000 souls. This was surely pretty well, in the way of dissension. Yet when did this interrupt for a moment, even if it might in some degree have relaxed, the operations of their armies on the frontiers, and the prosecution of their plans for the overthrow of other countries? As for changes of

government, they have been in a continued course of them. Since the beginning of the Revolution, the government has been overturned at least half a dozen times. They have turned over in the air, as in sport, like tumbler-pigeons; — but have they ever in consequence ceased their flight? The internal state of the country has been in the most violent commotion. The ship has been in mutiny; — there has been fighting in the waist and on the forecastle; — but in the midst of the confusion somebody has always been found to tend the helm, and to trim the sails; the vessel has held her course. — For one, therefore, I have no great confidence in the effect of these internal commotions; which every day become less and less likely, in proportion as the power of the present government becomes more confirmed, and as the people of France become more and more bound together by the common feeling of national glory, and by the desire of consolidating the empire which they have seen established. Such commotions may undoubtedly happen, and may of a sudden, when it is least expected, bring about some change that is favourable to the world. But it is curious to hear these chances gravely brought forward, as the best foundation of our hopes, and by those too, who a few weeks ago, while the War continued, would never hear of them, as entering, at all, into calculation. It seems, that the chapter of accidents, as it is called, which could do nothing for us in War, may do every thing for us in time of Peace. Whereas I should have thought just the contrary; that chances, such as are here in-

tended, were not only more likely to happen in war, but, what is a little material, might then be better improved and turned to account. While War subsists, while armies are ready to act, while confederacies are in force, while intelligences are going on, while assistance may be lawfully and avowedly given, every chance of this sort may, if properly improved, lead to consequences the most decisive. In Peace, all that fortune can do for us, falls dead and still-born. Nobody is ready, nobody is authorized to move a step, or stretch forth a hand, to rear and foster those chances, however promising, which time and accident may bring forth. It is not an answer to say, that such never *have* been improved. In regulating plans of future conduct, we must consider not what men have done, but what they may and ought to do. The only rational idea that I could ever form of resistance to that power, which unresisted must subdue the world, was, that it must be the joint effect of an internal and an external war, directed to the same end, and mutually aiding and supporting each other. All the powers of Europe could not subdue France, if France was united; or force upon it a government, even were such an attempt warrantable, really in opposition to the wishes of the people. On the other hand, no internal efforts, unassisted by force from without, seemed capable of rescuing the country from the yoke imposed upon it, so long as the several factions that governed in succession, could find means of securing to themselves the support of the armies. We are now required to believe, that what has hitherto

failed to be performed by both these powers together, is to be effected by one alone: and that with respect to any hope of a change of government in France, the War that has been carrying on for nine years has proved only an impediment! — Such is the state of our hopes and opinions on that side.

But we have another hope, founded on rather a contrary supposition, namely, that Buonaparté, now that he is a King himself — and a King he is so far as power can make one, — will no longer be an encourager of those absurd and mischievous doctrines, which, however they may have helped him to the throne, will be as little pleasing to him, now that he is fairly seated there, as to any the most legitimate Monarch. Sir, I agree, that Buonaparté, like other demagogues and friends of the people, having deluded and gulled the people sufficiently to make them answer his purpose, will be ready enough to teach them a different lesson, and to forbid the use of that language towards himself, which he had before instructed them in, as perfectly proper towards others. Never was there any one, to be sure, who used less management in that respect, or who left all the admirers of the French Revolution, within and without, — all the admirers of it, I mean, as a system of liberty, — in a more whimsical and laughable situation. Every opinion for which they have been contending, is now completely trodden down, and trampled upon, or held out in France to the greatest possible contempt and derision. The Honourable Gentlemen *on the Opposition Benches* have really great reason to complain of

having been so completely left in the lurch. There is not even a decent retreat provided for them.

But though such is the treatment, which the principles of "the Rights of Man," and of the "Holy Duty of Insurrection," meet with in France, and on the part of him who should be their natural protector, it is by no means the same, with respect to the encouragement which he may choose to give them in other countries. Though they use none of these goods in France for home-consumption, they have always a large assortment by them ready for foreign markets. Their Jacobin Orators are not to be looked for in the clubs at Paris, but in the clubs of London. There, they may talk of *cashiering Kings*, with other language of that sort: but should any orator more flippant than the rest choose to hold forth in that strain, in the city where the Great Consul resides, in the metropolis of liberty, he would soon put him to silence, in the way that we see adopted in the sign of the Silent Woman. Buonaparté, being invested, in virtue of the Rights of Man, with despotick power, can afford to sanction the preaching of those doctrines in other countries, of which he will not suffer the least whisper in his own. While he is at the head of an absolute monarchy in France, he may be the promoter and champion of Jacobin insurrections every where else. The abject as well as wicked nature of Jacobinism in this country, which, while it would rebel against the lawful authority of its own government, is willing to enslave itself to France, finds no difficulty of allowing to him these two oppofite characters: and I know no

reason why we should suppose him disinclined to accept them.

I must confess, therefore, that I see as little hope for us on this side, as I do on the other. In fact, if I could believe, in spite of all probability, that there was any remission of that purpose, which has never yet ceased for an instant, — the purpose of destroying this country, — such belief, however produced, must be instantly done away by a view of the conduct of France, in the settlement of this very treaty. There is not a line of it, that does not either directly point to the destruction of this country, or, by a course a little circuitous, but not less certain, equally tend to the same object. What can France want with any of the possessions which she has compelled us to surrender, but with a view of rivalling our power, or of subverting it, or of removing out of our hands the means of controuling her further projects of ambition? — Of the first sort are all her stipulations for settlements in South America and the West-Indies: of the second, her demand of the Cape and Cochin; and of the last, that most marked and disgraceful condition on our part, the surrender of Malta. What upon earth could France have to do with Malta, but either as a means of humbling us in the eyes of all the world, by the surrender of it, or of depriving us of a port in the Mediterranean that might stand in the way of designs which she is meditating against the countries bordering upon that sea? The miserable pretexts which are formed to palliate this surrender, and the attempt to cover it, in part, by the show of delivering

that fortress to the Order, though much the greater part of the Order are now living in the dominions of Buonaparté, and many of them actually serving in his armies, are wholly insufficient, either to conceal our shame, or to disguise the purpose of the French in making this demand. But the circumstances of the negotiation, not less than the treaty resulting from it, shew, in another way, the folly of those hopes, which are founded upon the supposed intentions or characters of the persons with whom it is made. It does not augur very favourably for the intentions of a party in any transaction, that there appear in every stage of it the clearest proofs of duplicity and fraud. — What do we think of the artifice, which signs a treaty with us, guaranteeing the integrity of Portugal; but previously to that, at a period so late, as to make it sure that the knowledge of the transaction shall not reach this country in time, signs another treaty, totally altering the nature of that guaranty? What shall we think of the candour and fairness, which, in a treaty with us, proposes, as a joint stipulation, the evacuation of Egypt, at a time when the proposers knew, though we did not, that every soldier of theirs in Egypt was actually a prisoner to our troops? Where was their good faith to the Turks, when, in the same circumstances, they knowing the fact and the Turks not, they took credit from the Turks for this very evacuation? Why, Sir, it is a fraud upon a level with any of those practised at a lottery-office. They insure the ticket, at the moment when they know it to be drawn. And are these the people, to

whose generosity and forbearance, to whose good intentions towards this country, and above all, to whose good faith, we are to deliver over, bound hand and foot, the interests of the British Empire, to be destroyed or saved, as they, in their good pleasure, shall think fit?

I say nothing here on a topick, however closely connected with the present subject, the character of the First Consul himself* — a character hitherto as much marked by frauds of the most disgraceful kind, as by every other species of guilt; but pass on to the question, which meets us at every turn, and seems to stop the progress of all argument, the great question — "What are we to do? The danger is great, but how "are we to avoid it? War cannot be eternal, and "what prospect have we of reaching a period, when "it may be terminated in circumstances upon the "whole more favourable than the present†?"

Sir, the word, eternal, which in any use of it is sufficiently awful, will undoubtedly not be least so, when associated with the idea of War. But I must beg leave to remind the House of a circumstance, of which they and the country seem never to have been at all aware, that the question of eternal War, is one, which it is not left for us to decide. It is a question which must be asked of our enemies: and is not less proper to be asked, if we could hope that they would answer us, at the present moment, than it was before the signature of the preliminaries. The War depends neither upon conventions to be entered into between

* See Appendix L. † See Appendix M.

the two governments, nor upon acts of hostility which may be committed between the two people, by land or on the high seas; but on the existence or non-existence of that fixed, rooted, determined purpose, which France has hitherto had, and which we have no reason whatever to think she has relinquished — of accomplishing the final overthrow of this country. While that purpose exists, and shall be acted upon, we are at War, call our state by what name you please: and the only question is, whether France cannot work as effectually to her purpose in Peace; and if Peace is made in a certain way, infinitely more effectually than she can in what is professedly and declaredly War. I would really wish to ask, whether Gentlemen have never heard of a people called the Romans, a set of republicans who conquered the world in the old time; and whom the *modern Romans* take as their model in every respect, but in none more than in what relates to the overthrow of this country? Among the nations that fell under the Roman yoke, there were but few whom they were able to fetch down at a blow, — to reduce in the course of a single War. All their greater antagonists, particularly the state whose fate is chosen as a prototype of our own, were not reduced till after repeated attacks, till after several successive and alternate processes of War and Peace: a victorious War preparing the way for an advantageous Peace; and an advantageous Peace again laying the foundation of a successful War. This was at least the conduct of a great people; a people not to be put aside from their

purposes by every transient blast of fortune. They had vowed the destruction of Carthage; and they never rested from their design, till they had seen it finally accomplished. The emulators of their fortune in the present day, are, in no less a degree, the emulators of their virtues; at least, of those qualities, whatever they may be, that give to man a command over his fellows. When I look at the conduct of the French Revolutionary rulers, as compared with that of their opponents; when I see the grandeur of their designs; the wisdom of their plans; the steadiness of their execution; their boldness in acting; their constancy in enduring; their contempt of all small obstacles and temporary embarrassments; their inflexible determination to perform such and such things; and the powers which they have displayed, in acting up to that determination; when I contrast these with the narrow views, the paltry interests, the occasional expedients, the desultory and wavering conduct, the want of all right feeling and just conception, that characterize so generally the governments and nations opposed to them, I confess I sink down in despondency, and am fain to admit, that if they shall have conquered the world, it will be by qualities by which they deserve to conquer it. Never were there persons, who could show a fairer title to the inheritance which they claim. The great division of mankind made by a celebrated philosopher of old, into those who were formed to govern, and those who were born only to obey, was never more strongly exemplified that by the French nation, and those who have sunk, or are sinking, under their yoke. Let us

not suppose, therefore, that while these qualities, combined with these purposes, shall continue to exist, they will ever cease, by night or by day, in Peace or in War, to work their natural effect, — to gravitate towards their proper centre; or that the bold, the proud, the dignified, the determined, those who *will* great things, and will stake their existence upon the accomplishment of what they have *willed*, shall not finally prevail over those, who act upon the very opposite feelings; who will "never push their resistance beyond their convenience;" who ask for nothing but ease and safety; who look only to stave off the evil for the present day, and will take no heed of what may befal them on the morrow. We *are* therefore, in effect, at War at this moment: and the only question is, whether the War, that will henceforward proceed under the name of Peace, is likely to prove less operative and fatal, than that which has hitherto appeared in its natural and ordinary shape. That such is our state, is confessed by the authors themselves of the present Treaty, in the measures which they feel it necessary to recommend to the House. When did we ever hear before of a military establishment necessary to be kept up in time of Peace? The fact is, that we know that we are not at Peace; not such as is fit to be so called, nor that in which we might hope to sit down, for some time at least, in confidence and security, in the free and undisturbed enjoyment of the blessings which we possess. We are in that state, in which the majority, I believe, of those who hear me, are in their hearts more desirous that we should be, than, in our present prostrate and defenceless situation,

they may think it prudent to avow — in a state of armed truce; and then the only questions will be, at what price we purchase this truce; what our condition will be while it lasts; and in what state it is likely to leave us, should it terminate otherwise than as we are willing to suppose.

This brings us at once to the point. If we are to come at last only to an armed truce, would it not have been a shorter and better course, to turn our War into an armed truce, into which in fact it had pretty much turned itself, rather than to take the round-about way which has been now adopted, of making Peace by the sacrifice of all the means of future War, in order afterwards to form an armed truce out of that Peace? Let us state the account, and consider the loss and profit on either side.

The evils of War are, generally speaking, to be comprized under three heads: the loss of lives and the consequent affliction brought upon friends and families; the loss of money, meaning, by that, money expended in a way not to be beneficial to the country that raises it; and the loss of money in another sense, that is to say, money not got; by which I mean the interruption given to national industry, and the diminution of the productions thence arising, either by the number of hands withdrawn from useful labour, (which is probably however but little material,) or by the embarrassments and restraints which in a state of War impede and clog the operations of commerce. I do not mean, that there are not in War, evils which may be said not to be included properly under any

of the above heads; among which may be numbered, the distress arising from sudden changes of property, even when the persons who lose, and those who acquire, are equally parts of the same community. This, however, is an evil that will be more felt at the beginning, than in the later periods of a War; and will in fact be likewise felt, though in a less degree, by a transition even from War to Peace. The enumeration, now made, however, may be sufficiently correct for the present purpose. And, with this in our hands, let us consider, in what so very violent a degree, the present armed truce, or Peace, if you choose to call it so, differs from what might have been our state, in the case so much dreaded and deprecated, of a continuation of the War.

To take the last first, — the loss of national wealth by the interruption given to commerce and industry; such is the singular nature of this War, such the unexampled consequences with which it has been attended, that it becomes a question, and one in itself of the most anxious and critical importance, on which side of the account the consequences of Peace in this respect are to be placed; whether, instead of balancing the dangers of Peace, if such there are, by accessions which it will bring to our wealth and commerce, we are not rather called upon to prove some great advantages which Peace will give us in respect of security, in order to balance the diminution likely to be produced by it in our commercial opulence. That our commerce will suffer at the long run, admits, I fear, of no doubt. If my apprehensions are just, it is

in the diminution of our manufactures and commerce, that the approaches of our ruin will first be felt: but is any one prepared to say that this may not happen in the first instance? We have at present, subject to the inconveniences which War produces, nothing less than the commerce of the whole world. There is no part of the world to which our goods do not pass freely in our own ships; while not a single merchant-ship, with the enemy's flag on board, does at this moment swim the ocean. Is this a state of things to be lightly hazarded? Does the hope of bettering this condition, even in the minds of those most sanguine, so much outweigh the fear of injuring it, that these opposite chances can upon the whole be stated otherwise than as destroying each other; and that of consequence, in the comparison of War and Peace, the prospect of increased industry and commerce, which in general tells so much in favour of Peace, must not here be struck out of the account? On this head the question between Peace and War stands, to say the least of it, evenly balanced.

The next of these heads, the first, indeed, in point of consequence, but the next in the order in which it is here convenient to consider them, is the loss of lives, and the effect which War is likely to have on private and individual happiness. No man can pretend to say, that War can continue upon any footing, however restricted the circle of hostilities, without the lives of men being liable to be sacrificed; and no such sacrifice can be justified, or reconciled to the feelings of any one, but by that which must justify every

such sacrifice, however great the extent — the safety and essential interests of the State. But if ever there was a War in which such sacrifices seemed likely to be few, not as an effect of any choice of ours, but by the necessary course of events, it was that which we should have had to carry on in future with the Republick of France.

The great and destructive operations of War, the conflict of fleets or armies, or the consumption of men in unwholesome climates and distant expeditions, had ceased of themselves. I know not what expeditions we should have had to prosecute, unless new cases should have arisen, similar to that of the ever-memorable one of Egypt; where, the same motives existing, we should be sorry indeed not to have the means of acting upon them. But in general, our fleets would have remained quietly at their stations, and our armies have lived at home: the whole question reduces itself to a mere question of expense; and that again pretty much to a mere question of establishment. — The great heads of war expenditure, the army extraordinaries, would, in most parts, have ceased; and in the rest, have been greatly reduced. The chief question will be, not between an ordinary Peace establishment and a War, such as, from circumstances, ours has hitherto been, involving expeditions to all parts of the globe; but between a Peace establishment, such as that which is now declared to be necessary, and a War, which had become, and was likely to continue, merely defensive; in which we should have had nothing to do, but to maintain a competent

force, with little prospect of being obliged to make use of it. The advocates for the present Peace must find themselves always in an aukward dilemma, between economy and safety. We make Peace in order to save our money: if we reduce our establishments, what becomes of our security? if we keep up our establishments, what becomes of our savings? Whatever you give to one object, is unavoidably taken from the other. The savings of the present Peace, therefore, can be looked for only between the narrow limits of a high Peace and a low War establishment; or, to state the case more correctly, between a high Peace establishment and a War, reduced in the manner that I have described. I wish that a correct estimate were formed of the difference, in point of expense, between these two states; recollecting always that among the expenses of Peace are to be counted the provisions necessary against the new dangers brought by the Peace itself; the new dangers for example, with which Jamaica, and all our West-India Islands are threatened by the establishment of the French in Saint Domingo, and other parts in that quarter of the world; the new dangers to which our empire in the East is exposed, by the re-entry of the French into the peninsula of India, and the cession to them, for such in effect it is, of the Cape and Cochin: in general, by the free passage now given to their ships and armies into every part of the world, and the establishment of them every where in the neighbourhood of our most valuable possessions.

Against all these dangers War provided, as it were,

by its own single act. The existence of our fleets upon the ocean, with an Admiralty order "to burn, sink, and destroy," shut up at once, as under lock and key, all those attempts, which are now let loose, and require as many separate defences as there are parts liable to be attacked. A fleet cruising before Brest, therefore, was not to be considered as so much clear expense, to be charged to the account of the War; without deducting the expence of additional troops and additional ships, which the absence of the fleet might require to be kept, for instance in the West-Indies.

With respect to home defence. Considering the little reliance to be placed upon the Government in France, now subsisting; the still greater uncertainty with respect to any future Government (such as may arise at any moment); and the increased defence necessary on land, in proportion to the diminution of our force by sea; I know not, how we can remain secure with a military establishment much less considerable, than that which we should have had to maintain here in the case of War. — So much for the expenses of Peace.

On the other hand, we must consider, what the reductions are that might be made in the expense of War, beyond those, which the very scheme and shape of the War itself would unavoidably produce.

The expenses of our army, as at present established, are excessive: but what should hinder us from adopting some of those expedients, by which a country not more considerable than Prussia, under the regu-

lations introduced by a former great monarch, is made capable of maintaining a military establishment superior to that of Great Britain? — The chief of those expedients, and that which we could best imitate, is, the putting at all times the half of the army upon the footing of militia, to be exercised only for a month or two, and to be at home for the remainder of the year. Other expedients might be suggested, if this were the proper occasion for discussing them.

It is true, as may be observed, that such a reduction of expense, if it can be at all effected, may be applied not less in time of Peace than in time of War; and in a comparison, therefore, between the two, must be counted on both sides. But that circumstance, as is plain, does not do away the effect of what is here stated. If both sides are reduced, and reduced at all proportionably, the absolute difference, which is what we are here considering, will be reduced alſo; not to mention that, with a view to what will be the effect of the measure in other ways, such a reduction may be better applied to a large establishment, than it can to a small one. If an army of 80,000 men, for instance, may, for the moment, be reduced to half, because the remaining 40,000 will still be a sufficient force, it is not to be concluded, that a proportionate reduction might be made in an army of only half that number, when the remainder, left on an emergency for the defence of the country, would be no more than twenty thousand. Consider, therefore, when the reductions capable of being made, or certain of themselves to happen, in a state of War, such as War might

be expected to be if continued from the present time, and the new and extraordinary expences incident to this Peace, shall have been fairly calculated, to what the difference between the two states will amount; and taking then this difference at its utmost, compare the money so saved, with all the evils and dangers which Peace, as now proposed, will give rise to: Or, if the modern fashion is to prevail, and money alone to be considered, compare the value of the Sinking Fund created by this saving, with the difference, in point of mere expence, of the circumstances in which we shall be placed at the commencement of any future War, should France chuse to put us under this necessity. By the result of these comparisons, must the question be decided.

Should it so happen, (and who shall say, that it will not?) that our commerce, instead of increasing, or remaining where it is, should fall off; that our manufactures should decline; that, from these and other causes, — such as a great emigration, and considerable transfer of commercial property; — and above all from the great loss of territorial revenue, the income of the state should be lessened, to a degree equal only to this proposed saving, then we shall have incurred all the dreadful difference to be found in our situation in case of the renewal of War, and all the no less serious dangers during the continuance of Peace, absolutely for nothing.

I select this only as the case which may be considered as the most probable. In argument, to be sure, having already agreed to take at par, our prospects

with respect to the increase or decrease of our commerce and manufactures, I am not at liberty to insist on this case, or upon the still more fatal one of a greater and more extensive decrease, without allowing those who argue on the other side, to avail themselves of the supposition, that the sources of national wealth may possibly be in a great degree augmented.

At all events, however, and whatever be the extent of these expected savings, and the improvement to be made in consequence in our finances, we are to estimate the evils and dangers which are to be placed in the opposite scale, the chief of which I have endeavoured to point out, though in a very hasty and summary manner, in the observations, with which I have already troubled the House. They may be classed, generally, under three heads: — The ascendancy, which it is feared, France may in time acquire, even in those sources of greatness, which we seem inclined to consider as a substitute for all others, our manufactures and commerce; supposing, as I am here doing, that Peace continues without interruption, and even without any great advantage being taken, of the threat of a renewal of hostilities. Secondly, the effect to be produced, in a Peace so constituted, by the continued use of this menace, — an engine of which it is difficult to calculate the force, applied, as it may be, to every point on which the interests of the countries are opposed, and for the accomplishment of every object, which France may wish to attain. Thirdly and lastly, War itself; begun of course at such moment, as France shall judge most advantageous to

her, and when by a due improvement of the preceding period of Peace, Great Britain shall have been placed in a situation to be least capable of resisting its effects. On these points, having spoken to each already, as far as the occasion seems to admit, though far short of what the subject demands, I shall detain the House no longer, but leave to every Gentleman to form his own judgment on the extent and reality of these dangers, and finally to settle the comparison between these (with others connected with them) and the continuance of the War, such as War from this time might be expected to prove. The only head of danger, to which I wish now to speak, is one of a quite different nature; but so serious, so certain, so imminent, so directly produced by the Peace itself, that I must not omit to say a few words upon it. This is, the danger now first commencing; and which may be conveyed in a single word, but that, I fear, a word of great import — Intercourse. From this moment the whole of the principles and morals of France rush into this country without let or hindrance, with nothing to limit their extent, or to controul their influence. While the War continued, not only the communication was little, or nothing, but, whatever contagion might be brought in by that communication, found the country less in a state to receive it. The very heat and irritation of the War was a preservative against the infection. But now that this infection is to come upon us in the soft hour of Peace; that it is to mix with our food; that we are to take it into our arms; that it is to be diffused in the very air we breathe; what hope, can

we suppose, remains to us of escaping its effects? — This, I used formerly to be taught, before the weight of taxes had lessened our apprehensions of French fraternity, was one of the consequences most to be dreaded in Peace, in whatever form it should come, short of the restoration of some Government, not founded on jacobinical principles. But somehow or another, the very idea of this danger seems long since to have vanished from our minds. We are now to make Peace in the very spirit of peace, and to throw ourselves without reserve into the very arms of France. With respect, indeed, to one part of the danger, the principles of France, — meaning by that the political principles, — we are told, that all danger of that sort is at an end; that in this country, as every where else, the folly of the revolutionary principles is so thoroughly understood, that none can now be found to support them. Jacobinism is, as it were, extinct: or, should it still exist, we shall have, as our best ally against it, Buonaparté himself.

Sir, I have already stated what my confidence is in that ally. I know that neither he personally, nor any other of the *free* governments that have subsisted in France, have ever suffered these doctrines of Jacobinism to be used against themselves. But I must again ask, on what grounds we suppose, that France has renounced the use of them, with respect to other countries? We have heard less, indeed, of late, of her principles, because we have heard, and felt, more of her arms. For the same reason, we may possibly hear little of them in future. But do they therefore

cease to exist? During the whole course of the Revolution, France has sometimes employed one of these means, and sometimes the other. Sometimes the arms have opened a way for the principles, at others the principles have prepared the object, as an easy conquest to the arms: — In the flight of this chain-shot, sometimes one end has gone foremost, and sometimes the other, and at times they may have struck their object at once: but the two parts alike exist, and are inseparably linked together.

Nothing, therefore, can, in my mind, be more idle than this hope of the extinction of Jacobinism, either as an instrument to be used by France, should her occasions require it, or as a principle ever to be eradicated out of any community, in which it has once taken root. However true it may be, that the example of France ought to serve as the strongest antidote to its poison, and that it does so, in fact, in the minds of many; yet it is equally true, that, in another view, and to many other persons, it operates in a directly contrary way, — not as a warning, but as an incitement. What I am now speaking of, is, however, not the danger of the political principles of France, but the still surer and more dreadful danger, of its morals. What are we to think of a country, that having struck out of men's minds, as far as it has the power to do so, all sense of religion, and all belief of a future life, has struck out of its system of civil polity, the institution of marriage? That has formally, professedly, and by law, established the connexion of the sexes, upon the footing of an unrestrained concu-

binage? That has turned the whole country into one universal brothel? That leaves to every man to take, and to get rid of, a wife, (the fact, I believe, continues to be so,) and a wife, in like manner to get rid of her husband, upon less notice than you can, in this country, of a ready-furnished lodging?

What are we to think of uniting with a country, in which such things have happened, and where for generations the effects must continue, whatever formal and superficial changes prudence and policy may find it expedient to introduce in the things themselves?

Do we suppose it possible, that, with an intercourse subsisting, such, as we know, will take place between Great Britain and France, the morals of this country should continue what they have been? Do we suppose that when this *Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes*, when that 'revolutionary stream,' the Seine, charged with all the *colluvies* of Paris, — with all the filth and blood of that polluted city, — shall have turned its current into the Thames, that the waters of our fair 'domestick flood' can remain pure and wholesome, as before? Do we suppose these things can happen? Or is it, that we are indifferent, whether they happen or not: and that the morals of the country are no longer any object of our concern?

Sir, I fear, the very scenes that we shall witness, even in the course of the present winter, will give us a sufficient foretaste of what we may expect hereafter; and show, how little the morals of the country will be protected by those who should be their natural guardians, the higher and fashionable orders of so-

ciety. In what crowds shall we see flocking to the hotel of a Regicide Ambassador, however deep in all the guilt and horror of his time, those, whose doors have hitherto been shut inflexibly against every Frenchman; whom no feeling for honourable distress, no respect for suffering loyalty, no sympathy with fallen grandeur, no desire of useful example, — and in some instances, I fear, no gratitude for former services or civilities, have ever been able to excite to show the least mark of kindness or attention to an emigrant of any description; though in that class are to be numbered men, who in every circumstance of birth, of fortune, of rank, of talents, of acquirements of every species, are fully their equals; and whom the virtue that has made them emigrants, has, so far forth, rendered their superiors! A suite of richly furnished apartments, and a ball and supper, is a trial, I fear, too hard for the virtue of London.

It is to this side, that I look with greatest apprehension. The plague with which we are threatened, will not begin, like that of Homer, with inferior animals, among dogs and mules, but in the fairest and choicest part of the creation; with those, whose fineness of texture makes them weak; whose susceptibility most exposes them to contagion; whose natures, being most excellent, are, for that very reason, capable of becoming most depraved; who, being formed to promote the happiness of the world, may, when "strained "from that fair use," prove its bane and destruction; retaining, as they will still do, much of that empire which nature intended for them, over the minds and

faculties of the other half of the species *. "The woman tempted me, and I did eat," will be to be said, I fear, of this second fall of man, as it was of the first. Sir, we heard much last year, of the necessity of new laws to check the growing progress of vice and immorality. I suppose we hardly mean to persist in any such projects. It will be too childish to be busying ourselves in stopping every little crevice and aperture, through which vice may ooze in, when we are going to open at once the flood gates, and admit the whole tide of French practices and principles, till the morals of the two countries shall have settled at their common level.

I must beg here, not to be told, that of this kind of argument the only result is, that we should never make Peace with France at all, until the monarchy should be restored. The argument implies no such thing. That no kind of Peace with France will be safe, till then, I am not in the least disposed to deny: but the nature of human affairs does not admit of our getting always what we may think most admirable. We must take up often with what is far short of our ideas, either of advantage or safety. The question at present is, whether in either of those views, we ought to take up with the present Peace: and among the evils incident to it, and immediately resulting from it, I state one, which, in conjunction with others, is to be weighed against its advantages; namely, the havock likely to be made by it in our principles and morals.

* See Appendix N.

If any one should be of opinion, that this consideration is of so much weight, that War, almost upon any terms, is preferable to Peace with a state, founded upon a declared Atheism, and filled with all the abominations and pollutions certain to result from such an origin, it is not my business to dispute with him: but that is not the way in which the argument is applied here; nor is it indeed applied in any way, otherwise than as a consideration, making part of the case, and to which every body is to allow what weight he shall think proper. The misfortune of the country has been, that it has never seen, and felt, fully, the extent of its danger. The country, — speaking of it in general, and not with a view to particular places, or classes of people, upon whom the pressure of the War has borne with peculiar severity, — has been so rich, so prosperous, so happy; men have enjoyed here in so superior a degree, and with such perfect freedom from molestation, all the blessings and comforts of life, that they have never been able to persuade themselves, that any real harm could befall them. Even those, who have clamoured most loudly about the dangers of the country, and have given at times, the most exaggerated representations of them, have really, and when their opinions come to be examined, never described this danger as any thing truly alarming. For *their* danger has always been a provisional and hypothetical danger, such as we should be liable to, if we did not conform to such and such conditions: but as these conditions were always in our power, and are now, as we see, actually resorted to, our real and absolute

danger was, in fact, none at all. "You will be ruined, "if you continue the War; but, make Peace, and "you are safe:" and unquestionably, as there can hardly have been a period, when a Peace, such as the present, was not in our power, — if such a Peace can give us safety, there never was a period, when we could properly be said to have been in danger. We had a port always under our lee; so that if it came to overblow, or the ship laboured too much, we had nothing to do, but to put up our helm, and run at once into a place of safety. But my ideas of the danger have always been of a far different sort. To me it has ever seemed, that the danger was not conditional but absolute: that it was a question, whether we could be saved upon any other terms; whether we could weather this shoal upon either tack. The port appeared to me to be an enemy's port; where, though we might escape the dangers of the sea, we should fall into the hands of the savages, who would never suffer us to see again our native land, but keep us in a state of thraldom, far more to be dreaded than the utmost fury of the waves.

I have never pretended to say, that there were not dangers in War, as unquestionably there are great evils; I have said only that there were evils and dangers, not less real and certain, in Peace, particularly in a Peace, made on such terms as the present. For terms of Peace, in spite of what we hear talked, *have* something to do with rendering our situation more or less secure, even in those respects, in which they are

supposed to operate least. In general, though terms, however advantageous, would not secure us against the mischiefs of French fraternity, and the infusions of French principles and morals, yet they would make a little difference, I apprehend, as to the effect which Peace would produce in the feelings of Europe; as to the air of success and triumph which it would give to the enemy, and of defeat and humiliation, which it would impress upon us; as to the consequences resulting from thence, even with respect to the propagation of French principles, but certainly as to the confirmation of French power; and, above all, as to the situation in which we should stand, should France choose to force us again into a War. The port of Malta, strong as it is, would not, literally, serve as a bulwark to stop the incursions of Jacobinism; figuratively, it would not be without its effect in that way: yet there would be some difference, I conceive, at the beginning of a War, whether we were in possession of Malta or not; and in the mean while, the knowledge of that difference, in the minds of the enemy, and of ourselves, would be quickly felt, in any discussions which might take place between us, in time of Peace.

The dangers of Peace, therefore, are augmented a hundred-fold by terms at once so degrading and injurious, as those to which we have submitted: on any terms on which it could have been concluded, it would have had its dangers, and dreadful ones too; France remaining a revolutionary government, and

being, as it is, in possession of Europe. Whether that evil must not ultimately have been submitted to; whether the hopes of change, either from coalitions without, or commotions within, might not have become so small, and the evils of War, however mitigated, so great, that we must have made up our minds, after taking the best securities against those dangers that we could, finally to have acquiesced in them, is a separate question, which I will not now discuss. But the time, in my opinion, was not come when such unqualified acquiescence on our part was requisite; when we were to cease to enquire what those securities were; or when we ought to have taken up with such securities, if securities they can be called, as are offered by the present treaty. The great misfortune has been, that this question of Peace has never yet been fully and fairly before the country. We have been taken up with the War; that was the side of the alternative next to us; —and have never yet, till it was too late, had our attention fairly directed, or, I must say, fairly summoned, to the dreadful picture on the other side. If we had, we should never have heard, except among the ignorant and disaffected, of joy and exultation through the land, at a Peace such as the present.

Here, Sir, I have nearly closed this subject. One only topick remains, a most important one indeed, but which I should have been induced, perhaps, on the present occasion, to pass over in silence, if in one part of it I did not feel myself called upon, by something of a more than ordinary duty.

When a great military Monarch of our time * was at the lowest ebb of his fortunes, and had sustained a defeat, that seemed to extinguish all his remaining hopes, the terms of his letter, written from the field of battle, were — "We have lost every thing, but our honour." Would to God, that the same consolation, in circumstances liable to become in time not less disastrous, remained to Great Britain! I should feel a far less painful load of depression upon my mind, than weighs upon it at this moment. But *is* our honour saved in this transaction? Is it in a better plight than those two other objects of our consideration, which I have before touched upon, our dignity and our security? I fear not. I fear that we have contrived to combine in this proceeding, all that is at once ruinous and disgraceful; all that is calculated to undo us, in reputation as well as in fortune, and to deprive us of those resources, which high fame and unsullied character may create, "even under the ribs of death," when all ordinary means of relief and safety seem to be at an end. I am speaking here, not of the general discredit that attaches to this precipitate retreat and flight out of the cause of Europe, and of all mankind; but of the situation in which we stand with respect to those allies, to whom we were bound by distinct and specifick engagements. I must be very slow to admit that construction, which considers as a breach of treaty any thing done by a contracting power, under a clear *bonâ fide* necessity, such as the other party itself does

* See Appendix O.

not pretend to dispute. If an absolute conquest of one of the parties to an alliance does not absolve the other from the obligation which it has contracted, so neither can a timely submission, made in order to avert such conquest, when the remaining party itself shall not be able to describe that submission as injurious either to her own interest, or to that of the common cause. If we were not in a state to say to Sardinia, that it was better for *us* that she should continue her resistance, rather than accept the terms offered her; then, I say, we are not in a state to consider her submission as a forfeiture of the claims which she had upon us. We have left Sardinia, however, without an attempt to relieve her, without even a helping hand stretched out to support or to cheer her, under that ruin which she has brought upon herself, with no fault on her part, while adhering faithfully to her treaty with us. I must call that adherence faithful, which has continued as long as we ourselves could say, that it was of any use. — The case of Sardinia is, with no great variation, the case of Holland also. Both powers were our allies; both are ruined, while adhering to that alliance; both are left to their fate. But Sardinia and Holland are two only of our allies; and placed in circumstances of peculiar difficulty. There were others, it may be said, more capable of being assisted, for whose security and protection every thing has been done, that the most scrupulous fidelity could require. Naples, Portugal, and Turkey, will attest, to the end of time, the good faith of Great Britain; and shew to the world that *she* is not a power,

who ever seeks her own safety by abandoning those with whom she has embarked in a common cause. Sir, if I were forced to make a comparison between the instances, in which we plainly and openly desert our allies, and those in which we affect to protect them, I should say, without hesitation, that those of the former class were the least disgraceful of the two; because our protection is in fact nothing else but a desertion, with the addition of that ridicule which attaches upon things, that endeavour to pass for the reverse of what they really are.

The protection which we yield to these unfortunate powers, is much of the same sort with that which Don Quixote gives to the poor boy, whom he releases from the tree; when he retires with perfect complacency and satisfaction, assuring him, that he has nothing more to fear, as his master is bound by the most solemn promise not to attempt to exercise against him any further severity. We know, Sir, what respect was paid to this promise, as soon as the knight was out of sight; and it is not difficult to foretell, what respect will be paid by Buonaparte, (without waiting even, I am afraid, till my Honourable Friends shall be out of sight,) to this solemn stipulation and pledge, by which we have provided so *effectually* for the security of the dominions of our good and faithful allies.

The ridicule of this provision, which in any case would be sufficiently strong, has, undoubtedly, in the case of Turkey, something of a higher and livelier relish; Turkey being the power, in whose instance, and with respect to precisely the same party, the total

insufficiency and nullity of such engagements has been so strikingly manifested, and is still kept so fresh in our memories, by the very operations with which the War has closed.

So much as to our conduct towards those powers, with whom we stood in the relation of allies, according to the usual diplomatick forms; and whom the common policy of Europe had been accustomed to consider under these and similar relations.

But there was another body of allies, not ranked indeed among the European powers, nor possessing much, perhaps, of a corporate capacity, but who, as men, acting either separately or together, were equally capable of becoming objects of good faith, and in fact had so become, though by means different, in point of form, from those which engaged the faith of the country, in any of the instances above alluded to:—These persons were, the Royalists of France, wheresoever dispersed, but particularly that vast body of them which so long maintained a contest against the Republic, in the West; where they formed the mass of the inhabitants of four or five great provinces, far exceeding, both in extent and population, the kingdom of Ireland*. I mention these particulars of their force and numbers, not because they are material to the present purpose, but because they serve to obviate that delusion of the understanding, by which things, small in bulk, and filling but little space in

* See Appendix P.

the imagination, are apt to lose their hold on our interests and affections. The mention of them may, moreover, not be unnecessary in this House, where, I fear, from various causes, all that relates to the Royalists is a perfect *terra incognita*, as little known or considered, as the affairs of a people in another hemisphere. The Royalists were, however, a great, numerous, and substantive body, capable of maintaining against the Republick a War, confessed by the Republicans themselves to have been more formidable and bloody, than most of those in which they had been engaged; and of terminating that War by a Peace, which showed sufficiently what the War had been, and what the fears were, which the Republick entertained, of its possible final success. But let the numbers and powers of the Royalists have been what they might; had their affairs been still less considered; had they been more disowned, discountenanced, and betrayed, than in many instances they were; had more such garrisons as those of Mentz and Valenciennes been suffered to be sent against them*; had they been less the real, primary defenders and representatives of that cause, which the Allies professed to support; still there were our formal Proclamations, issued at various periods, not expressly engaging indeed to make stipulations for them in case of a Peace, but calling generally for their exertions, and promising succour and protection, to

* See Appendix Q.

all those who should declare themselves in favour of the ancient order of things, and of their hereditary and rightful Monarch. What I am to ask, is, have we acted up to the spirit, or even the letter, of our own proclamations? or to the spirit of that relation, in which the nature of the War itself, independent of any proclamations, placed us with respect to these people? I am compelled to say, (I say it with great reluctance, as well as with great grief,) I fear we have done no such thing. I fear, that a stain is left upon our annals, far deeper than that, which, in former times, many were so laudably anxious to wash away, in respect to the conduct of this country towards the Catalans. The Catalans were not invited by any declarations more specifick than those which we have made to the Royalists: their claim upon us was in some respects more doubtful. Yet, so far were they from being passed over in silence in the terms of the Peace; so far were they from being abandoned to their fate, left to the merciless persecution of their enemies, that a stipulation was made for a full and complete amnesty for them; and, far more than that, a provision, that they should be put upon the same footing, and enjoy the same privileges, with that province which was in fact the most favoured under the Spanish monarchy. Yet, because *more* was not done; because they were not placed in the situation of enjoying *all* that they asked; — much of it, perhaps, having more of an imaginary than a real value; — because in a part, where their claim was more disputable, per-

fect and entire satisfaction was not given them; did a large and respectable majority of this House think it necessary to institute a solemn inquiry, — the intended foundation of proceedings still more solemn, — in order to purge themselves and the country, as far as depended on them, from the shame of what they deemed a breach of the national faith.

By what purgations, by what ablutions, shall we cleanse ourselves from this far deeper and fouler blot, of having left to perish under the knives of their enemies, without even an effort to save them, every man of those whom we have *affected*, as it must now appear, to call our friends and allies; with whom we were bound, by interests of far higher import than those of a disputed succession; who were the assertors with us of the common morality of the world; who were the true depositaries of that sacred cause, the very priests of that holy faith; with whom we had joined, as it were, in a solemn sacrament; and who, on all these grounds, but chiefly for the sin of having held communion with us, are now, as might be expected, doomed by the fanatics of rebellion, to be the objects of never-ceasing hostility, to be pursued as offenders, whose crimes can only be expiated by their destruction?

I agree with what has been said by my Honourable Friend [the Chancellor of the Exchequer*], that Peace once made, all communication with this, or any other,

* Mr. Addington.

class of people, hostile to the French Government, must completely cease. Whatever the Government is, or whatever its conduct may be with respect to us, if we think fit to make Peace with it, that Peace must be religiously kept. I am not for curing one breach of faith, by another. But was nothing to be done, in the final settlement of that Peace; and still more during the time which has elapsed since the first commencement of the negotiations? I wish a satisfactory answer could be given to those inquiries. I wish it were true, that, for months past, numbers had not been perishing throughout the Royalist provinces, the victims of their loyalty and honour; —(men hunted down, like wild beasts, for acts, which that Government may call crimes, but which we, I hope, have not yet learned so to characterize;) — simply for want of such means, as might have enabled them to effect their escape, and, after the loss of every thing but what their own minds must bestow, to have sought an asylum in some foreign land.

Sir, I would gladly draw a veil over these facts. But our shame is too flagrant and glaring, to be concealed: the cry of this blood is too loud to be stifled. I beg to wash my hands of it. The share which I have happened to have in the affairs of this illustrious and unfortunate people; the interest which I have always taken in their cause; make me doubly anxious to vindicate myself from any participation in the guilt of having thus abandoned them. I wish I could vindicate, in like manner, the Government and the

Country. Among all our shames, it is that of the most fatal nature, and of which, possibly, we shall longest rue the effects.*

Sir, I have done. I have stated, as I thought it my duty to do, what my apprehensions are, as to the nature and consequences of the present Peace. If the evils which I impute to it, are not to be found there, if the dangers which I apprehend should not come to pass, no one will more rejoice in my error than myself: those who differ from me will have nothing to complain of; I shall have alarmed myself; I shall not, probably, even have to reproach myself with having succeeded in alarming them. But if any there should be (there are none I am sure in this House), who should say, that my fears are *not* imaginary; that they think of this Peace as I do; that they apprehend it *will* ruin the country; but that they hope the country may last long enough to serve their turn; that being traders, they think the trade of the country may be lost; that, being manufacturers, they believe its manufactures may decline; but that for this they care but little, provided the Peace in the mean time shall prove advantageous to *them*; — to all such, if any there can be, there could be but one answer, — that they are a disgrace to their country and to their species; and that he must be as bad as they, who, upon such terms, could seek to merit their good

* See Appendix R.

opinion, or could solicit their favour. I trust, however, that no such men are to be found; but that all who rejoice in the present Peace, do it under a persuasion, that the good which they may hope to derive from it, individually, is not to be obtained by the sacrifice of the final welfare and safety of their country.

The arguments contained in the above Speech were supported by Dr. Laurence, Mr. William Elliot, and Mr. C. Wynne, and replied to by Mr. Wilberforce, Mr. Yorke (Secretary at War), and Mr. Addington (Chancellor of the Exchequer); — after which the address was carried without a division.

APPENDIX

TO THE FOREGOING SPEECH.

A.—Page 3.

It would have been too much to have urged the plea of poverty in a country, which was at that moment exciting the envy and jealousy of all the world by its exorbitant wealth.

B.—Page 9?

The answer to be given to this question, in the case of the present treaty, will be best ascertained perhaps by recurring to what happened when the terms of the treaty were first declared. It was some time before any body could be found to believe them. The first reporters, when they stated that every thing was given up, except Ceylon and Trinidad; that Demerary, Cochin, the Cape, Malta, all were gone; were treated as persons who were joking, or who were themselves the dupes of some idle joke put about by the Opposition. Nobody could believe that the terms of the treaty were in reality such as that description represented them.

On the Continent, where the speculations are apt to be more refined; after some time given to disbelief, the difficulty was solved by the supposition of secret articles. 'Some great advantages were to be secured to Great-Britain of

another kind?' 'Buonaparté was to abdicate:' 'Louis the XVIIIth was to be restored:' &c. &c. It never entered the thought of any one, that the state of things was finally so prove, what it appeared in the first instance; and that from mere impatience of contest, from sheer impotence of mind, Great-Britain had thus suddenly stopped in her career, dropped down as in a fit, and, abandoning all her means of defence, was rolling herself in the dust at the feet of her adversary, regardless of what in future was to become of her, and looking to nothing but such temporary respite, as 'the satiate fury' of the foe, or some feeling still more degrading to her, might happen to yield.

C.—Page 10.

This position will not be thought to have become less commanding by the completion of an event, which, lost as this country is to all feeling of its situation, does seem to have produced some slight sensation, namely, the extinction of the Cisalpine Republick, and the reproduction of it under the new form and title of the Italian. Those who before doubted, to what degree Buonaparté was master of Europe, may find here wherewithal to settle their opinion. It is not the mere assumption of so much new territory, or of so much new dominion at least, over a territory already dependant; nor the new danger arising from thence to Austria; (either of them circumstances, that, in former times, would have set the Continent in a flame,) but what the state must be of the Powers of Europe, whoever they are, when they can sit quiet spectators of this proceeding, without daring to stir a step to prevent it. The assumption of this territory, though it be only a change in the form of the dominion exercised over it, must by no means be considered as of little importance. As has been

well observed, (vide Cobbett's Register, page 114) the use to be made of a country, in any state of independence, however nominal, is by no means the same, as when that country is placed at once in the hands of the governing power. France is mistress, it is true, of Spain and Prussia, and of Holland, Switzerland, Genoa, Tuscany, and all the south of Italy: but not to the same degree of the two former countries, as she is of the others; nor of the others, in the same manner as she is of the new Italian Republick. There may be a difference of several weeks.

D.—Page 11.

AMONG the posts and ports included in this description, we must not omit to particularize the Island of Elba, with its port, Porto Ferrajo. This little island, small in extent, but not small in consequence, and rendered nobly conspicuous at the close of the day, by the last parting rays of British glory, which fell upon it, was supposed by the provisions of the Treaty of Luneville to have been left indirectly only in the power of France; inasmuch as it was expressly stipulated, that it was to form part of the territories of the new king of Etruria,—a king made by France; in the wantonness of her malice, and as a mockery of the ancient sovereigns of Europe. The possession of the Island, however, in this way was not thought sufficient; and therefore, that nothing might be wanting to mark that perfect contempt of good faith which has never failed to be manifested by the Republick in all her transactions with other countries, Elba was to be obtained by a secret treaty with the King of Spain,—the chief of the house of which the King of Etruria was a member. The consequence was, that when Austria in the Treaty of Luneville, and England in the late Preliminary Treaty, thought that they had left this island, such as it had

always been before, *part* and *parcel* of the dutchy of Tuscany, they found it, to their great surprize, rising up against them, as a separate possession in the hands of France, ready to be employed for the more easy subjugation of Naples, and for whatever other purposes France might have to prosecute in that quarter of the world. — It is not easy to conceive an instance of more contemptuous imposition on one side, nor of more forlorn and pitiable acquiescence on the other.

E. — Page 11.

GREAT doubt seems to be entertained at this moment, whether France will or will not finally obtain possession of St. Domingo; and great exultation to be felt in consequence by those, who, a few months ago, upon the ground that the conquest of St. Domingo, by France, was necessary for the security of our own islands, had consented to so extraordinary a measure as the sending out an immense armament, from the enemy's ports, in the interval between the Preliminary and the Definitive Treaties. The probability is, that France will succeed, so far at least as to keep possession of part of the island: but should she not, then all the terrors affected to be felt at the establishment of a Black Empire, will return with ten-fold force; for the Blacks will remain masters, — and masters after having tried their powers in a regular contest with European troops, — not to mention the hostility which they may well be suspected to conceive against us, who after various treaties and negotiations, the nature of which may require hereafter a little examination, finally lent our assistance to the sending out a force, intended for the purpose of bringing them back to slavery. Should the other event happen, and France obtain possession of St. Domingo, it may then well be a question, how long we shall remain in possession of Jamaica. So little can ordinary

men, enter into that profound scheme of policy, which would give to your enemy at a peace, or even before peace was concluded, what you had yourself been attempting to acquire during the war, at the expense of more than ten thousand men, and probably of twice as many millions of money.

F. — Page 11.

WHAT is here supposed is now found to be the fact. By a secret treaty settled with Spain, on the 21st March, 1801, but not to be declared till after peace with England, or till ministers should be found, who previously to peace would suffer France to do what she pleased, Spain cedes to France the possession of Louisiana, and with it, as is supposed, that of the two Floridas. It is impossible to pretend that this event was one which could not have been foreseen. It was foreseen by the treaty of Utrecht; it was foreseen by the fears of every reflecting American; it was pointed out to the people of America, nearly six years ago, not only as an event likely to happen, but as likely to happen in the very mode which we have now seen. (Vide Cobbett's Register, page 199.) Putting foresight out of the question, the *fact* must have been known, had the Ministers here either dared to question France, or instead of allowing France to negotiate for her allies, insisted on treating directly with those powers themselves.

Dreadful is their responsibility, by whom these precautions have been neglected, and by whom these things have finally been suffered to happen. But the crime or madness of those who have caused these evils, is less to us than the evils themselves. France has hitherto reckoned her progress by states and kingdoms: she may now count by continents: she has established herself in the new world. By the possession of these countries, placed as they are, and combined

with those which before belonged to her, she will hold, as by a sort of middle handle, the two great divisions of this quarter of the globe, and will brandish these continents like the blades of that tremendous instrument, which did such signal service in the *patriot* hands of Lord Edward Fitzgerald.

The consequences of this acquisition in one of the two hemispheres (North America) are well detailed, in different parts of the work above referred to. (See p. 44, 199, 253, and 265). France planted now in the same continent with the United States, cutting them off from some of their richest districts, extending her settlements behind them, gradually but not slowly, till the mouths of the Missisippi shall be united with the sources of the St. Lawrence, will soon make them feel the want of that security which they have hitherto derived from an intervening ocean: and against a new and unconsolidated mass of states will finally effect that, which it required only ten years to accomplish against the old and well-compacted governments of Europe. In the mean-while we may employ ourselves in considering, what is likely to be her controul over the conduct of America as respecting this country; what the danger to Canada, and to that portion of our trade, which is carried on with those countries; what the effect of a French establishment in Louisiana and the Floridas, joined to what France will have in St. Domingo, Martinique, and Guadaloupe, upon the whole of our West-Indian interests and possessions.

But it is on the other side, and towards the South, that the scene is most awful; where we behold the whole wealth of the new world lying exposed in goodly prospect, and France, with no other point to settle than the moment when it may suit her convenience to take possession of it. Buonaparté, established in Louisiana, has as ready an access to the treasures of the Spanish mines, as any banker has to his

strong box. Thanks to those who have given him the key of them. The wealth of Spain will from henceforward, directly and immediately, and with no necessity for any intermediate process, be the wealth of France: and let no man flatter himself with the hope, that it will become in her hands, what it was in those of its former possessors, the means of enfeebling strength, and relaxing industry and exertion. In succeeding to the riches of Spain, there is no ground to hope, that France will succeed to her weakness or folly. She will better profit by the example of her predecessors, and will keep her wealth in a due and perfect subordination to the higher and dearer interests of her ambition. Her mines will be only the store-house of her power. She will see, in these dark repositories, nothing but a magazine of future wars; which, like winds from the cave of Æolus, will rush forth to sweep the earth, and level whatever may yet be found to oppose the final accomplishment of her wishes.

> Unà Eurusque Notusque ruunt, creberque procellis
> Africus, et vastos volvunt ad litora fluctus.

An open boat in the Bay of Biscay, with all the storms of heaven raging for its destruction, does not present an image of more unequal conflict, than Great Britain struggling with a power, which combines against her the old world and the new; which, to the force of nearly the whole continent of Europe, to something in Asia, to much in Africa, and more in the West-Indies, adds the naval resources of the continent of North America, and the wealth of the Spanish mines.

All these latter dangers, be it remembered, are created solely and exclusively by the peace. While war continued, these resources could never have gone to the enemy; they might, at any moment when necessity had been pressing, or

hope in Europe had become extinct, have been secured to ourselves. The fear of this was probably the cause which preserved so long to Spain and Portugal the nominal independence which they have enjoyed. But these advantages (we shall be told) could only be obtained by war; and war is ruin. — Not exactly indeed to every country; because to France it has proved the means of empire and greatness; and even in Great Britain, up to the period of the ninth year of war, the progress of ruin did not seem to be very alarming. We shall know, before long, what the efficacy is of that provision, which grave and sober men have made for the happiness and safety of their country, in peace.

G. — Page 12.

THERE is no chance that the evils of the Peace in this respect will be done away, whatever may become of the particular cession here alluded to. Between the boundary settled by the treaty of Madrid and the boundary now contended for, in whatever treaty this latter is to be found, the difference is so small as hardly to be worth disputing. Either will give to France the command of the river Amazon. In this view the French may possibly concede the point: unless indeed the assurances given by our ministers, that they meant to do so, may be a reason with them for maintaining it.

H. — Page 12.

THERE have always been, in the House of Commons, some half dozen or dozen sensible men, who having found out, that Great Britain was an island, have been of opinion, that all continental connexions are injurious, and calculated

only to fill the pockets of those, who, in return for English guineas, had nothing to give but the valour and military talents of their subjects. As the progress of reason is slow, this party had remained for a century or more in a very obscure minority, opposed by all who for their wisdom or talents, or supposed knowledge of public affairs, had figured at any time in the history of the country. But oppressed as the party had long been, they have lived to see the day, when their opinions are at length triumphant; and when the ministers of the country, with the full approbation of Parliament and of the Nation, are settling a treaty of peace upon a formal recognition of their principle, and declare in substance, that Great Britain has no longer any concern or interest in the affairs and situation of the Continent. It is only unfortunate, that time has not yet been given to evince the truth of this principle by experience. When it shall be seen that this renunciation of foreign connexions, and retreat into our insular resources shall have produced no harm, but that, on the contrary, the power and prosperity of Great Britain shall have risen higher than before, then will this doctrine have received its full and final confirmation.

I. — Page 14.

See *Etat de la France*, by Hautrive, a work published at Paris, in 1800, immediately under the direction of the French Government, and universally understood to be intended as a sort of manifesto of their sentiments. See also the various regulations introduced for the prohibition of our manufactures, even in the interval between the Preliminary and Definitive Treaties.

K. — Page 17.

A FEW weeks before the above discourse was delivered this would have been a mistake: for the treaty of Utrecht equally provided against the cession of any of these settlements, as against the cession of St. Domingo: but it is one of the distinguishing characters of the late preliminaries, — and a most alarming one it is — that contrary to the almost uniform practice, they revived no former treaties; so that the treaty of Utrecht, as respecting this country and France, may be now considered as abrogated.

L. — Page 29.

THE topick here alluded to is so closely connected with this subject, that the argument is evidently defective without it. An opinion indeed prevails, and is insisted upon by persons of much apparent wisdom and gravity, that any inquiry into the conduct and merits of the First Consul is unbecoming and improper; unsuited to the dignity of a great assembly, and incapable of being made conducive to any useful purpose. To many, however, it may seem, that just the contrary of this is the fact: that in the history of the world, an instance can hardly be found of any one, whose personal qualities were so much a subject of general concern, and consequently so proper an object of inquiry; and that the occasion of all others, when such inquiry must be most proper and necessary, was that in which we were preparing to sign a treaty of peace with the person in question, founded expressly upon our confidence in his character, and entrusting to the issue of our judgment in that respect, the whole of the interests, welfare, independence, and even existence of a great empire.

Without inquiring generally into the history of the person thus confided in, let us recur only to a few of those passages of his life, which apply most immediately to the trust, which we are here reposing. A detailed and most masterly exposition of these is to be found in Mr. Pitt's speech of the 3d of February, 1800, in which among other particulars, an account is given of his proceedings towards the people and governments of the several states of Milan, Modena, Genoa, Tuscany, the Pope, Venice, and Egypt. Of all of these it may be said generally, and as it should seem without exception, — such was purposely the profusion of engagements, and such the uniform and systematick breach of them, — that not a single act was done, which was not in violation of some engagement, and certainly not a single engagement contracted, or profession made, that was not, in every part of it, grossly and in most cases instantly violated. The French rulers have, throughout, evidently acted upon the principle, that he who could divest himself at once of all moral feeling, and release himself from all moral controul, must for the time have an immense advantage over those who should remain under the old constraints, and who might not be sensible immediately of the change which had taken place, or, when they were, might be long incapable either of adopting it into their own conduct, or of so correcting their ancient feelings and habits (the habit for instance of relying in some degree on men's assurances, yielding something to their professions, believing in part what they should solemnly assert), as to make themselves proof against its effects. Nobody has entered more fully into these views, or pursued them to greater extent, than the person of whom we are here speaking; whether when employed in the service of others, as in the instances which we were proceeding to state, or when he afterwards set up for himself, and turned 'these instructions' 'to plague the

inventors,' — the people who now find themselves under his yoke.

In Lombardy, a proclamation, issued immediately upon his entrance into the country, and containing assurances the most solemn, of 'respect for property, respect for religious opinions,' — principles, which he declared to be those of the French Republick, as well as of the army which he commanded, — was followed instantly by a succession of exactions, amounting to many millions sterling, and by such violations of every religious opinion and feeling, as could be intended only to produce, what they at last accomplished, the driving the people to something like resistance, and thus furnishing a pretext, (unsupported as it was to the last, even by the insurrection which had been provoked,) of murdering eight hundred of the inhabitants of a single town, and delivering over the country to military plunder and execution.

In Modena, the proceedings, though upon a smaller scale, were of the same cast and character.

In Tuscany, to the breach of the general rights of neutrality, (that neutrality so prudently observed, as was declared in the House of Commons,* by the wise Prince who governed that country); to the breach of a treaty made the year before by the Republick, was added that of a positive engagement made a few days before by himself. In spite of all these rights, and treaties, and engagements, and for the sake of an act, which was in itself the grossest violation of one of them, viz. the seizing an enemy's property in a neutral port, he marched into the country with as little ceremony as if he had been taking up his quarters in a part of the Republick; and having completed his work, agreed indeed to retire, but not till he had exacted from this unfor-

* By Mr. Fox.

tunate, though *wise* Prince, certain conditions as the price of his departure, and among others a large pecuniary contribution, for the expenses which the French had incurred in thus invading his territories.

In Genoa, these breaches of treaty, and violations of faith, were diversified by a happy mixture of those measures, by which protection to the independence of states, is made to signify a forcible change of their governments; and defence of the rights of the people, the establishing over them a foreign and military tyranny. But as these proceedings, though equally a breach of faith with the others, seem to belong more peculiarly to the class which we have just noticed, we will say no more of them here; and for the same reason, as well as from the inutility of citing separate instances, where the whole proceeding from beginning to end is nothing but one continued instance, we will forbear to dwell upon all the flagitious violences, and cruel and scandalous outrages, which attended the invasion of the Pope's states, in which, though breach of faith had no less a share than in any of the transactions before enumerated, it is lost and merged as it were, in the various other sensations of indignation and disgust, which the events of that period are calculated to call forth.

The last scene of these proceedings of the First Consul, comprized within the period of his Italian command, lay in the states of Venice; and, as it happens commonly at the close of the piece, the incidents here seem to have become more numerous, and to possess something of a higher and stronger interest. The general description of them is, however, the same, 'a perpetual renovation of hope, and a perpetual disappointment;' professions of friendship followed by instant acts of hostility; assurances of protection serving only as a prelude to every species of violence; and a solemn treaty of peace, engaging to preserve to the country

its government and laws, ending in the subversion of both, either by the immediate hand of him who signed the treaty, or, as happened in this instance, by the transfer of the country 'to the iron yoke' of that very power, the delivery of it from which was the professed object of his interference, and the ground on which all his proceedings were to be justified.

What happened on these occasions in Italy, was renewed afterwards, so far as respects fidelity to treaties and sincerity in negotiation, in all the transactions of a similar nature, in which Buonaparte was concerned, either as a commander acting with large discretionary powers, or, as placed himself, at the head of the Republick. The detail of these would shew, that mere change of time and place made no change in the character of the person, or of the system pursued. It appears by all, that good faith passed for nothing; that deceptions the most gross, artifices unheard of in diplomatic proceedings, were practised without shame or scruple. When a party was once engaged in a negotiation, and placed in a situation in which he could no longer help himself, it was in vain to expect that any regard would be paid to the professions, in which the negotiation began, or to declarations which occurred in the course of it. Any old engagement was set aside, or any new one foisted in, as suited the wishes, original or incidental, which France happened to entertain. Of all this proofs will be found, more or less, in each of the negotiations and conferences, which took place during the period here considered; that is to say, from the close of the campaign in Italy in 1797, to the final settlement of what is called the peace of the continent; particularly in what passed at Luneville respecting the security to be enjoyed by Naples, and in the convention with the Archduke at Steyer, relative to the armistice between Generals Brune and Bellegarde;

But it is in Egypt, that the character of the First Consul is to be seen to greatest advantage. It is there that we are to look for it in its highest and most perfect state. It is in the rich and fertile plains of Egypt, under the heat of those more ardent suns, that his virtues seem to shoot forth with most luxuriance, and to acquire a spirit and flavour, unknown in the colder regions of Europe. We will say nothing here, of that gigantic contempt of good faith and public morality, which first conceived the project of the expedition; of the outrages which followed in the train of it; of the happy inversion of all right and justice, which treated as rebels, and consigned to instant execution, those of the inhabitants who presumed to defend their country against a foreign invader — an invader, whom none of them had offended, and whom half of them had never heard of, till they found him seizing upon their property, and putting to death all who dared to oppose him: We will pass over the massacre of three thousand prisoners, in cold blood, at Jaffa, and will consent to treat as doubtful the strange though hardly less authenticated fact, of his causing poison to be administered to the sick of his own army. The circumstance which most forces itself upon the attention, which most attracts the eye of the connoisseur in the midst of this vast and splendid collection, is that singular combination of all that is great and all that is little, — all that is great in guilt and mischief, all that is little and despicable in the means of its execution, — the pretence of having become a convert to the Mahomedan Faith, and the use to be made of that pretence for the purpose of committing an act of the most complicated fraud and treachery. Nobody conceives of course, for a moment, that faith, or religious opinion, had any thing to do in this proceeding from one end of it to the other. The case exhibits nothing but a renegade Christian, who is affecting not to be an Atheist, only in the

hope that he may pass for a Mahomedan. The whole was a pretence, for the purpose of robbing an allied prince of his dominions. In this act, however, it is not the mere fraud and imposture that most excites attention: instances of that sort, in our police offices and criminal tribunals, are familiar to us every day. It is not even the horrid and blasphemous impiety of it: we have heard of Dutch schippers trampling upon the crucifix. What most characterises the transaction, what is its true distinctive property, is the singular and utter shamelessness of it; the total abandonment of all regard for character or decency, which could commit such an act in the face of day, with all Europe spectators and witnesses, but placed only, as he hoped, at such a distance, that they could not interpose in time, could not cry "stop thief," so as to put the parties upon their guard, and prevent the robbery from being completed. Buonaparté knew, that what he did in Egypt must be known in six weeks to all Europe. He knew, that in Europe there was not a human being, man, woman, or child, who would be the dupe of this pretended conversion, or who would see in it any thing but a shocking and base contrivance to strip the Turks of Egypt. But he was content, that the transaction should be so seen. He thought, that this cheating the Turk would be considered as a clever trick, a droll artifice; that the *galleries* in Europe would laugh at this, just as the galleries in our theatres do, when any piece of successful knavery is going on upon the stage, — when Filch in the Beggar's Opera picks Mrs. Di's pocket. And, to say the truth, he does not appear to have been in the wrong in this expectation. Such is the deplorable baseness of mankind, such the abject homage which men are willing to pay to crimes attended with success, to wickedness united with power, that none of the acts committed at any time by the agents of the French government, seem at all to have

hurt their reception in the world, either collectively or individually. Their oppressions and cruelties excite no indignation; their low and scandalous frauds no contempt; their treacheries no distrust. In the case of the person here in question, you would swear, that his perfidies became him, and that, like one of Horace's mistresses, the more false and faithless he shewed himself, the greater was his train of followers among the admiring and adoring governments of Europe.

——— Tu, simul obligasti
Perfidum votis caput, enitescis
Pulchrior multò, juvenumque prodis
Publica cura.

There is a perfect contest for the honour of being betrayed by him. The examples of those unfortunate and confiding countries, who have been already seduced and undone, produce no caution, inspire no terror.

After the remark, made at the beginning of this note, it will hardly be asked, of what use is it to notice these facts? It is of some use to know betimes, the character of the person, who is in a fair way of becoming our master, and who, in fact, is so already, as far as relates to a perfect ascendancy over those who direct our counsels. But it is of great use in another view, to point out to notice, such parts of the history of the First Consul, as those which we have been speaking of. It is of consequence to know, who it is that particular persons admire. If it be true, that a man is known by his company (*noscitur a socio*) it is equally true, that some judgment may be formed from those whom he extols and looks up to. What, it has been asked, must be the priest, where a monkey is the god? What must be the admirer, where the object of admiration is a person capable of such a proceeding as the pretended conversion to Mahomedanism? It will be admitted, probably, that this is

not to come in, in the *heroick* part of the character. But I wish to know, with respect to a large class of his admirers, — the enthusiasts of liberty, the assertors of rights, the respecters of the independence of nations, the abhorrers of War, the lovers of Peace and pacifick arts, the exploders of military fame, — what in their estimation *is* the heroick part, or what they would point out as the subject of their panegyrick? Is it possible, that *they* can hold out to us, as an object of admiration, the character of a man, whose merit, whatever its amount may be, must in kind be that of a soldier and a conqueror; whose sole occupation has been War; the foundation of whose fame and power was laid wholly upon military exploits; who unites in himself, all that these persons would profess to abhor in an Alexander and a Cæsar; who has been at once the conqueror of foreign nations, and the subverter of the liberties of his own? These things shew, beyond a doubt, what, for the greater part, these eulogiums on the character of the First Consul really are. — They are, either the base abject homage paid by the generality of mankind to successful crime; or the insidious praises of men, who, under the mask of liberty, patriotism, and respect for rights, are seeking to gratify their own spleen or ambition, and preparing the downfall of their country. Whatever credit may be due to him for military talents, and whatever certainly *is* due to him for decision, boldness, vigilance, address, capacity for great though wicked enterprizes, it will be difficult to account otherwise than is above done, for the sort of praises which we hear, and the quarters from which they come.

M. — Page 29.

THE manner, in which people seem to have posed themselves with this question, has been the ruin of the country. They never seem to have got the length of discovering, that

if France was bent upon their destruction, they were and must be, in an eternal war, unless either France should change her purpose, or they would submit to be destroyed. With all their fears and complainings, they have never been sensible to above half their danger. They seem always to have supposed, that like the contests in use among our common people, (till the *wisdom* of magistrates extinguished those remains of rustick chivalry,) they could terminate this war at any time, by only declaring, that they had had enough.

N. — Page 47.

See on this subject the important facts and excellent reflexions contained in chap. 2. towards the end, and in other parts of Professor Robison's valuable work, published in 1797, and entitled "Proofs of a Conspiracy," &c.

O. — Page 52.

Though it was Francis I. who, after the battle of Pavia, originally expressed himself in this dignified manner, the King of Prussia adopted and repeated the sentiment, upon occasion of his memorable defeat at Schweidnitz. See Ann. Reg. for the year 1761.

P. — Page 55.

The population of these provinces is by no means stated with exaggeration, when it is said 'far to exceed the population of the kingdom of Ireland.' It might be described with truth, as 'nearly, if not altogether, equal to the population of Great Britain.' From Caen to Bourdeaux, without comprising more in breadth than belongs properly to the

royalist country, there is a population, according to the statement of Mr. Necker, of little less than 9,000,000. In ascertaining the proportions of this population which may be considered as royalist, we must distinguish between those who were only royalists in their affections; those who actively, though secretly, favoured the cause; and those who, at different times, openly appeared in arms. By the numbers of the last of these classes, by the manner in which they maintain themselves, and by the effects which they produced, we may form, perhaps, the surest judgment, though possibly a very inadequate one, of the general sentiments and dispositions of the country. If those, who have been most engaged in these scenes, and have at least the best means of knowing, may be relied on, it was a small portion of the inhabitants indeed, and those confined almost exclusively to the towns, who were not royalists in their hearts. But facts, and the inferences resulting from them, may after all be considered as the best criterion, especially to those who may not have the means of resorting to the testimonies which we have alluded to, or of appreciating the degree of credit, that may be due to them. Of these facts the principal lie open to the observation of every body, and are of a nature little liable to be mistaken or misrepresented. They are — the length of time during which the royalist war subsisted; the armies which it obliged the Republick to employ; the nature of the pacifications which took place in different parts of it; the anxiety which it evidently excited in the government, during the whole of its continuance; the interruption which it gave to the communication between the metropolis and the principal sea-ports — the transport of goods and passengers, and letters between Paris and Brest being sometimes stopt for a fortnight, requiring at times an immense escort, and being at all times attended with considerable danger, insomuch that officers going to

join their ships often preferred a passage by sea, even at the risk of being taken by our cruizers; — these are facts, which rest on no authority of individuals, and may afford some measure for judging of the degree and extent, to which the sentiment of royalism prevailed in this part of France. For facts of a description somewhat different, though of a character and magnitude not to be much concealed or disguised, such as the nature and progress of the war; the armies, which the royalists were able to bring into the field; the manner in which they employed them; the resources which they possessed; the energy which they displayed; for these, or other similar ones, the reader would do well to have recourse to an Account (published here in 1796 and since translated) of Campaigns in the Vendée, by the republican General Turreau, the same, probably, who is now employed in something of a similar service in Switzerland, and who, though interested in some degree in magnifying the force of an enemy, whom he was employed to combat, and requiring in that respect, as well as in several others, to be read with some reserve and caution, may yet be relied on for the general substance of his narrative, and the principal representations which accompany it: and will afford to those, who may be new to the subject, much valuable information on the history and circumstances of this most extraordinary and affecting war.

Q. — Page 56.

In the early stages of the war of La Vendée, before the republicans had had recourse to the system of laying waste and burning the country, and had brought the war to a footing, in which no quarter was given on either side, whatever prisoners were taken by the royalists, were released upon the condition of not serving again, either against them, or

against *the allied powers;* the royalists having imagined, for some reason or another, that the allies and they were engaged in a common cause, and that the neglect which they might seem till then to have experienced, was owing wholly to the precautions taken by the enemy for preventing any communication with them. When, therefore, they heard, in the year 1793, that the garrisons of Mentz and Valenciennes were marching against them, knowing that these garrisons had surrendered upon terms, and that one of the terms was, that they should not serve again till exchanged, they concluded that this was a new instance of republican treachery, and that these troops, a numerous and most formidable body, the garrison of Mentz alone being reckoned at twelve thousand, could not be employed in this service, without some scandalous breach of engagement, such as would excite in the breasts of the allies no less resentment, and indignation, than it did in those of the royalists. What then were their sensations, when they found, that this was no treachery on the part of the republicans, but that the allies themselves in framing their capitulations, and providing that these garrisons should not serve against the other parties in the war, had wholly neglected or forgotten, to extend this provision to the case of the royalists; who with an army of immense force in point of numbers, perfect in the mode of its composition, animated by the most heroick courage, headed by officers of great ability and experience, but still weak to a great degree by the extreme deficiency, and often total want of all the ordinary means of war; were left to prosecute as well as they could, the desperate and unequal contest in which they were engaged, disowned and abandoned by all the world. When they found this, their feelings were indeed acute, and their constancy almost shaken. They did not despair: it was not their nature to do so: but left thus to themselves, abandoned

to their own resources, without aid, without co-operation, proclaimed, as it were, to all Europe, as not even belonging to that confederacy, of which they might, without presumption, have hoped, that they should have been placed at the head; they felt that their prospects were truly gloomy, and such as might well have excused them for relinquishing from that instant every thought of further resistance. That they did not so relinquish their hopes; that they long maintained the contest with unabated vigour; that the war broke out afterwards with fresh violence; that it never ceased to be renewed at every favourable opportunity, till the last of the continental powers had submitted and made its peace; that the elements of it remain entire to this day; — these are truths, which ought to be known and remembered for the credit of those concerned, though they yield but little consolation in the retrospect, and can now unhappily afford no ground of hope for the future.

R. — Page 60.

THOSE who may before have thought, that such a vindication was necessary, will not be less of that opinion, when they shall be told, that within the last twelve months, more than three hundred royalist officers have been taken and put to death, in the western provinces, and that of these all but forty or fifty have suffered since the date of the preliminary treaty. In the name of all that is sacred, what justification can a government or a country offer for such conduct? Three hundred men, or at least a great proportion of them, sacrificed to the vengeance of their enemies, simply because we neglected, or refused to listen to their solicitations to be allowed an asylum in this country, when in consequence of the peace which we were making,

their service could be no longer useful in their own! Do we mean to say, that these persons had no claim upon us to the extent of what they asked? Or that we could not afford the expense of receiving, and providing for so many additional emigrants? Monstrous as either of these allegations would be, they would still be better than what alone remains, — the direct and unqualified confession, that we did not dare to admit into this country men, to whom we were bound by every tie to furnish a place of refuge and safety, lest by so doing we should give offence to our enemies. In what a state must the probity of a great country be, when, in a case like the present, such a motive can be made a principle of action? to what must the mind of a country be reduced, when it can bear, that such a motive should become manifest to the world?

It may not be thought a trifling aggravavation, (if in such a mass of shame aggravations were worth thinking of,) that, just at this moment, a condemned, though pardoned traitor, Napper Tandy, is released from prison, and allowed to sail to France, yielded, we presume, as an act of grateful attention, — a kind of marriage present, — to the first Consul. Napper Tandy, be it remembered, was not a person to whom the faith of the French government was pledged by any publick declaration, unless it shall be contended, as perhaps it ought, that their decree of the 19th of November 1792 still continues in force: he was not a person engaged in one of those civil wars, of which history may furnish examples, wherein the rights and pretensions of the parties were so equally balanced, as to make it doubtful, on which of the two sides the crime of commencing hostilities and breaking up the public peace ought in justice to be charged. He was a traitor in the common sense of the word, and upon the clearest evidence of the thing, and was condemned according to the established principles, on which

the lives of such persons have become forfeit at all times, and in all countries. The first Consul however, as is supposed, thought fit to ask his release; and the government here complied with his request. Such was the state of the intercourse between the two countries on the subject of persons of *this* description. But the royalists of France, persons who had been acting in conformity to, perhaps in consequence of our proclamations; whose objects we had declared to be substantially our own; of whose assistance we had a right to avail ourselves, according to every principle of the law of nations; who are not to be confounded, as is often wickedly or ignorantly done, with rebels and traitors, the subverters of their respective governments, but were on the contrary the upholders of the constitution of their country in opposition to such rebels and traitors; to these royalists we refused an asylum, lest we should offend the irritable majesty of an usurper, and indispose him to grant such terms of peace, as those by which the safety of the country is now so happily secured. If these things do not disgrace and dishonour a country, I am at a loss to know, what the disgrace and dishonour of a country is. We seek to conciliate the favour of an imperious and vindictive enemy, by the desertion of our friends, and the sacrifice of our national faith and honour. Our enemy, we may rest assured, will only despise us the more, without our deriving from that feeling any relaxation of the motives, which have long led him to resolve on our destruction.

ARMY OF RESERVE.

June 20, 1803.

THE following Speech was delivered by Mr. Windham, in the House of Commons, in disapprobation of the plan proposed by the Ministers for raising 50,000 *men in England, Scotland, and Ireland, by way of ballot or military conscription. The plan described by the Secretary at War was as follows: A body of* 50,000 *men, to be called the* Army of Reserve, *was to be immediately raised by ballot, according to the following quotas: — the counties of England and Wales* 31,000, *London and the Tower Hamlets* 3000, *Scotland* 6000, *and Ireland* 10,000. *The conscripts were allowed to find substitutes, and the term of service was four years, with an extension, as to place, to any part of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Islands of Jersey and Guernsey. The Officers, to be commissioned by the King, were to come from the half-pay list of the Army, from the Marines, from the East India Company's Service, from persons who had served as officers in Volunteer Yeomanry Corps in Ireland during the late Rebellion, and, if necessary, from the Recruiting Staff. Such were the outlines of the plan to which Mr. Windham made the objections that will be found in the following Speech:*

MR. SPEAKER — SIR,

THE Honourable Gentleman has introduced this measure in a manner perfectly suitable to the solemnity of the occasion, and to the impression which such an occasion was likely to produce on his mind. — I wish the measure itself had been equally suitable to the man-

ner of its introduction, or to the circumstances out of which it has arisen. But, alas! it has fallen miserably short both of the occasion and of the expectation which I had allowed myself to form of it. Instead of helping us out of our difficulties, it serves only to confirm a most material part of them, and for the rest, to give us but very imperfect and inadequate assistance. This grand measure, of which so much expectation has been raised, turns out, at last, to be nothing more than a mere addition to the Militia, with all the evils incident to that system, perverted and misapplied as it has been for a period of several years past. In addition to 70,000 men raised or raising according to that system, upon the population of Great Britain, and of 18,000 so raised in Ireland, we are now to have 10,000 more for Ireland, and 40,000 for Great Britain, making in the whole the number of 138,000, of which 18,000 (the original militia in Ireland) are to be raised by bounty in the first instance, and the rest to be raised by ballot, with the privilege of exemption from personal service, on the condition of finding a substitute. Does any man dream after this, that it is possible for Great Britain to have an army? The hope is utterly childish. The recruiting of the British army has, as every body knows, long stood still. An army not recruited must, by degrees, waste away. In spite of all the hopes, which some may indulge of transferring men hereafter by new bounties from the force thus raised to the regular army — a most uncertain and ineligible method — the army must unavoid-

ably stand still for the present, and one may venture to say, under the influence of such a system, is not likely to be again put in motion.

This, therefore, is my great, leading, and fundamental objection to this measure, that it destroys all hope, now and hereafter, of a force truly regular — that it completely cuts up the army. This it effects, not so much by the raising of so many men — a measure which at the present moment I am not prepared to object to; but, by admitting the principle of substitution. That a compulsory levy cannot be made without a power of commutation of some sort or other, I am ready to allow. — The grievance would be utterly intolerable. But I hoped, as the Hon. Gentleman knows, that another mode might have been adopted, namely, that of commutation of service for a fixed fine; which fine should be paid not into the hands of the corps for the purpose of being laid out in providing a substitute, with all the effect which such an additional demand must have in raising the rate of the bounty, but should be paid to Government, to be employed by them in any way they should think proper, or, if you choose to give it an appropriation, for the providing a recruit for the *army*. The great point is to abolish the present competition, under which it is impossible that the army can stand; and with this view, my meaning would certainly be, not merely to abolish this competition so far as it would arise from the body now proposed to be raised, but universally for the whole of the militia, old or new. There should be no recruiting but for the army.

The militia, and every force raised by ballot, should consist of nothing but the balloted men, so far as they would go. To insure the service of them, as far as I could, or as far as they were of a description to make their service desirable, I would impose a fine, greater or less, as might ultimately be thought right; but I would sooner leave the service incomplete, than, in order to complete it, introduce that fatal principle of substitution; wrong in a constitutional view, if that were now worth attending to, but far more wrong and perfectly fatal from the effect which it must have of destroying all possibility of recruiting the army.

That it is the militia system, extended as it has been of late years, and changed, as it is, in its nature and character, that has eat out the army, nobody can reasonably doubt. What is there in the condition of this country that should make it incapable of having an army in some degree, at least, proportionate to its population? or prevent its having now what it has had in all former times? That the militia system, as carried on of late, would and must prevent this, is perfectly obvious. I want to know what ground there is for concluding that there are any other causes, if these were removed, which must equally produce the same effect? When we say, therefore, that we can get no men for the army, the answer is that we have never fairly tried. Let the experiment be *bonâ fide* made. Abolish the competition: and in order to meet the effects of the change thus produced, begin now, what the Honourable Gentleman says must be begun some time or other, and put your army on that new footing,

which, without being necessary for its improvement, for I know not what improvement it wants, may be necessary to maintain its numbers. The first of these measures, as it has always appeared to me, is to change the condition of service from life to term of years ;— a measure on which, if I cannot say, that military men are unanimous, I may safely say, that they are nearly so, and to which I certainly have never heard any objection that could at all be set in competition with the advantages to be expected from it. Its advantages indeed, if they really exist, are of that sort which must take place of every other consideration. The first merit of a book, says a great critic, is to make itself read. The first merit in the constitution of an army is to provide that it should continue an army. — Let the army, therefore, at this moment, and not at any time of future peace, and with a view to wars that may then be future, be put upon that footing, in which, in conjunction with other changes, it may hope to be recruited as it has heretofore been, and may release us from this dreadful and unheard-of state of being engaged in a war, without an offensive and disposeable force. With all the disadvantage which the very memory of the bounties heretofore given, will not fail to produce even when the bounties themselves, to this inordinate amount, shall be given no longer, I should not despair of seeing our army gradually restored, and the service again go on, as it did in all former times.

It is in conformity to these views that my judgment must be regulated upon the present measure. As a levy of so many men on the principle of ballot I may

submit to it, government declaring it to be necessary, because the urgency of the case seems to leave me no option, and hardly time to consider the question. But as a ballot including the further principle of substitution, I muſt formally protest against it, because it tends to produce effects, which no consideration of present advantage could, perhaps, justify the incurring; but which, likewise, in my opinion, render the measure perfectly ill-calculated to meet even the present danger. I may accept the ballot for the sake of the immediate force which it will produce, however disadvantageous I may think it in various other respects; but I must at least endeavour to disarm it of its chief mischief, by recommending that the terms of exemption from service should be a fixed fine, as I would, for the same reason, extend that principle to every other part of the Militia.

But here I must make my formal complaint of the Government, which, by its neglect, its delays, its total want of all foresight and precaution, has brought us to a state in which no measure that is presented to us, can be fairly judged of. We are in straits in which we have no room to turn ourselves. The danger presses upon us so immediately, that we have not time to consider what is best: we must take up with what is first presented to us. Why has this measure been delayed to the present time? Why has it only now been discovered that a force of the sort here proposed would finally become necessary, and why, if such necessity was foreseen, has the time and manner of raising it only now been submitted to this House?

Above all, why was the country reduced to its present defenceless state, immediately upon the signature of the Treaty of Amiens, in spite of what must have been obvious, one should have thought, to every common observer of what the Ministers now tell us, they themselves saw; namely, that the peace which they had made was no peace; but was open, at every moment, to such a rupture as that which has now happened. In this state did they think it right to dismantle our fleets, to reduce considerably our army, to discharge troops, which, in six weeks after, they wished to have back, or which, if they did not wish to have back, as the Hon. Gentleman's gestures would seem to indicate, it is only a new proof how little they understood the real nature of their situation. All this was done for the miserable purpose of deluding the people with the false idea of the blessings, as they were called, of Peace, and of the money they were to save by thus parting with all the means of safety.

Leaving these reflections for the present, though I trust never forgetting them, let us turn to the consideration of the measure immediately before us: and this, perhaps, we cannot properly judge of without taking into our view the larger principles on which measures of this sort must depend. We are in a new and unprecedented state of things, in which new dangers exist, and new modes of resistance must be resorted to if we would hope not to be overcome by them. If we proceed in the old beaten course, if we think that what saved us heretofore must be sufficient to save us now, our destruction is inevitable.

The great desideratum which we have to make good, the great problem which we have to propose to ourselves, is to find the means by which that natural force, which, in this as in all similar instances, is on the side of those attacked, may be so applied as to overcome the superior advantages of another kind which may be found on the side of the enemy. — If the enemy could bring with him an army not more considerable than that which we should have to oppose him, great as the object is at stake, much as I should advise that even in that case no precautions should be omitted, yet such is my confidence in the excellence of British troops, such are the proofs which they have given of their capacity to contend with and to overcome upon any thing like equal terms the troops with whom they would have to deal, that even without those subsidiary aids, which yet it would not be right to neglect, I should feel perfectly at ease about the event.

But we are to calculate upon the supposition, a supposition far from inconsistent with the probability of the fact, that the enemy may be able to land an army in this country greater either than the whole of our regular force, or at least than that part of it which could immediately be collected to oppose them. The question then is, how shall this deficiency be supplied? And here we have, as the foundation of our hopes, this leading fact, that in the case of every invaded country, but certainly of every invaded island, the physical force is always on the side of the invaded. No country, probably, was ever invaded by a force superior in number to the portion of the inhabitants

of that country capable of bearing arms. It certainly will not happen to us to be so. Were the enemy to find the means of putting on shore in different parts, a body of a hundred thousand men, a supposition not likely, but by no means to be rejected as impossible, the population of this very town would yield a force that ought to make no difficulty of contending with them. — There is no question therefore of the sufficiency of physical force: but, though we are abundantly satisfied of this truth, to a degree indeed that leads us often into a childish and boastful confidence, let us not overlook another truth, not less important and certain, that in the conduct of human affairs it is rarely the physical force which determines the event. If it did so, no country, as appears by what is just said, would ever fall a prey to invasion. Hanover would at this time be an independent country. It was not for want of inhabitants capable of bearing arms that that country yielded up without a blow, its laws, its government, its liberties, its property, to the handful of men, comparatively speaking, who marched against it under General Mortier. It is thus, in other instances. A battle is fought, a fortress is taken, and the country submits. If we have a mind to pursue this truth, in cases of a different sort, — by what means do all the governments of the earth subsist? By possessing the physical force? Quite the contrary: The physical force is always on the side of the governed. Governments, with all their establishments of senates and magistrates, and ministers and officers, and even with the armies which they may have at their disposal, are

nothing, in point of numbers, compared with the inhabitants at large: yet thus weak in physical force, these governments are able, fortunately for the peace and happiness of the world, to hold in subjection those inhabitants, and that not only in countries where the general sentiment may be supposed to go with the government, and the submission of consequence to be voluntary, as in these happy realms, but in countries such as that of France at this moment, where of 50 or 60 millions or more, whom Bonaparté may have at his disposal, there are not probably as many thousands who really wish him well or submit to his government on any other principle than that of fear. This truth, therefore, the jacobinism of modern times chose as the foundation of all its operations, the scope and object of which was to apply the physical force of every country to the subversion of its government.

We are in circumstances, when we must prosecute a similar enquiry for a very opposite purpose; and must endeavour to find out how the physical means of a great country may be employed, not for the overthrow of its government, but to save itself from the incursion of foreign armies. And we may venture to say, that if these means can be gradually discovered and brought into use, the discovery will form an epoch in human affairs hardly less important, and certainly much more satisfactory, than that which was produced by the discovery above alluded to, of the art of overthrowing governments.

We are now in the state of being compelled to try what can be done towards effecting this great *desidera-*

tum; in which if we cannot succeed better than has been done in most of the countries of Europe, in Hanover, in Holland, in Flanders, in Italy, in Switzerland, the fate of this country will hang on nothing but chance. We must form our judgment of the present measure by its tendency to carry those endeavours into effect.—The general course of the proceeding, in the minds of his Majesty's Ministers, seems to have been this—A regular force, a force consisting of troops of the line, is confessedly the best; but circumstances, and above all the urgency of the case, will not allow of this being obtained in time. Not being able therefore to obtain the best, you must do what the law directs in the case of evidence, you must get the next best. This next best is a Militia, or a force raised upon the principles now proposed. There will therefore be three species of force in the country, 1st, the Regulars, 2dly, the Militia, and 3dly, the Volunteers, and other corps of that description; and these being to be taken, in point of preference, in the order in which they are here enumerated, the Regulars being to be considered as better than the Militia, and the Militia than the Volunteers—the masculine more worthy than the feminine, and the feminine more worthy than the neuter; you must do this, as all persons must do in similar circumstances, you must take the second when you cannot get the first, and the third when you cannot get either of the other two.

All this, so stated, is perfectly true. I am willing to admit, not only that the Regulars are better than the Militia, which no intelligent Militia officer will feel

at all disposed to deny; but that Militia, on equal numbers, are better than any other species of force of an establishment still less regular. — But in the application of this to the support of the present measure there is a complete fallacy: for it is not what the option would be between these descriptions of force supposing them all before us, or, putting one out of the question, what would be the choice between the remaining two; but whether you will begin by raising that which you do not consider as best, and thereby produce a state of things in which to obtain the best shall be no longer practicable. From the language held about the comparative value of these objects you would suppose a course to be taken the very reverse of that actually pursued: you would suppose the higher bounty given for the best force; and that it was only when hopes on that side were nearly exhausted, that you laid out your endeavours on a force confessedly less eligible. But just the contrary. You give your fifteen guineas for service in the Militia; and ten or five for service in the army: and then you exclaim, that you are obliged to have recourse to Militia, because you can get no army. — This statement, therefore, when applied thus generally, can by no means be admitted. All that can be said is, that in the mode proposed, and by a continuance of the Militia system, you will, for a time, raise your men faster, and will within that same time produce a greater force. The question will then be, how far the superior quantity will compensate the difference of quality; and how far present advantages must be made to outweigh, in the actual

circumstances, all consideration of objects, even of the highest consequence, in future.

In this view it may be necessary to say a word or two, on the difference that must, for ever, subsist between troops of the line, and every other species of troops serving upon the footing of a Militia. It is as little pleasant to me, as to any other gentleman, to be making comparisons, that can rarely be satisfactory to both parties, and to be marking perpetually to officers of the Militia, that, after all their zeal, all their intelligence, all their honourable sacrifices, all their meritorious exertions, and with all the well-founded vanity which they may feel at the success of their endeavours; a success far exceeding all that the founders of the Militia ever ventured to promise themselves; the service in which they have thus laboured, cannot, by the very nature of it, ever attain to all the qualities which belong to regular troops. It is no reproach to them that this should be so; because it is no reproach to any one that he cannot alter the nature of things; at the same time I do not say that the reflection may not be in some small degree painful: it may be painful to those who have done so much, to think that it should not be possible for them to do every thing; that they must find in the nature of the subject those limits which they do not find in their own zeal or talents. — The difference between the two services, is founded on the eternal difference that must subsist between troops, who always remain at home, and those who are placed from time to time in distant stations; between troops who have seen service, and those who, gene-

rally speaking, have not; between troops commanded by officers, who have never acted with them in difficulties and dangers, who have never shown, because they have had no opportunity of showing, their title to command by the valour which they have displayed, who can pretend to no experience, who can bring no authority from former reputation; — and troops, whose officers possess in themselves all these sources of ascendancy, and all these claims to respect. There is, moreover, a sort of soldier character, arising from a thousand causes, and acquired insensibly in the course of regular service, which will easily be distinguished by discerning eyes, and will furnish in general a marked discrimination between the Militia soldier, and the soldier of the line. These circumstances must of course enter into account when we are regulating our choice between the two services, and founding our measures on the mixed consideration of numbers in each, compared with their respective qualities. — However confident I may feel that our Militia force will prove a most valuable part, should the enemy come, of the national defence, however certain I am that in the day of action Militia regiments will be found who will have distinguished themselves not less than the choicest troops we have, I can never say, generally, that a force of that description is to be put upon a level with that of the regular army.

I have been surprised, therefore, to hear it urged, that while a certain number of men must be kept at home for the defence of the country, it was a matter of indifference whether our army to that amount was com-

posed of Militia or Regulars. I thought I had heard upon other occasions high hopes expressed of the security which the country must derive from the return of those veteran legions, who had so crowned themselves with glory, and established the military fame of the country, in Egypt and other places. But according to this idea, they could do no more for us than any other equal number of troops, who had never seen an enemy. But is even this the only difference between Regulars and Militia, between a disposeable and undisposeable force? Though the circumstances of the war may, at one time, require a force of a certain amount to be kept within the kingdom, the next moment may set a great part of it at liberty; and is it of no consequence that its constitution should be such as to make it incapable of availing itself of that liberty? Nay, if even that should be so, and that in point of fact the power of sending it abroad was one of which no use could be made, is it indifferent whether the enemy is apprized or not of that truth, and whether he is enabled to calculate his plans upon the previous knowledge, that the force existing in the country can, in no case, be sent against him? If the evils with which we have to struggle, if the dangers which threaten us, are ever to end, it must be by some change, from within or from without, which shall be made in that power which has sworn our destruction, and which, till she is destroyed herself, will never cease in her endeavours to accomplish it. And what must be the counsels, and what the situation of this country, if we are voluntarily to place ourselves in a situation, in

which it shall be impossible for us to co-operate to the producing any such change, or the availing ourselves of it, if it should happen by other means? If such is our situation, or such are our ideas, there is no difficulty in predicting that we must ultimately perish.

In every view, therefore, either of what is to be looked to hereafter, or is necessary in the present moment, I must condemn a measure, of which both the immediate effect, and final tendency, is to deprive the country of a regular army, that is to say, of the best means for home defence, and of the only means of effectual and finally successful war. — And here it may not be amiss to advert to another measure of less extent, but of the same general character, and which as far as it goes, is a revival of that system unhappily adopted in the beginning of the last war, and from the effects of which the army has not yet recovered; namely, that of raising men for rank. Notwithstanding all the modifications and temperaments introduced into it by the Honourable Gentleman, the effects of it, as far as the measure extends, will be much the same as in the former instance. No prohibitions will ever restrain officers placed in those circumstances, from giving more than the regulated bounty. In fact, it is notorious that they do give more; the effect of the measure therefore, in this respect, is only to add to the competition against the army already subsisting, and to raise the rate of bounty against the other recruiting parties; against the ordinary recruiting, you may say, of the same regiment. So that it can hardly be considered as adding a man to the army. — On the other hand, if

money is not to be employed in raising these men, money I mean beyond the rate of bounty allowed by the regulation, then what are you to rely upon? — Upon a hope ten times more fatal in the accomplishment of it, in my opinion, than any effect likely to result from the increase of the rate of bounty; namely, that a certain number of British officers forgetting that delicacy of sentiment, and nice sense of honour, which so peculiarly marks the character of officers in our service, and makes them what they are, will become, what is called, able recruiters, that is to say, men versed and expert in the noble art of crimping, one of the most degrading employments, and most inconsistent with all upright and liberal feelings, that can well be conceived.

Such is the state of the measures offered to us at last by His Majesty's government, in this most awful crisis of our affairs, with a view of averting the dreadful dangers with which we have to struggle. I have stated already the changes which I should wish to see introduced into these measures, and the course which I would pursue with respect to those parts of general defence of which we have here been treating. If a body of men must be raised by ballot, of which I do not care to give a decisive opinion, let the numbers be confined to the mere men ballotted, and let the sums paid as penalties for exemption be laid out not for completing these corps, but for augmenting the recruiting fund for the service of the army. — Let the same be done for the militia universally. If government have a mind to procure substitutes, in any in-

stance, for the old militia, let it take the providing these substitutes into its own hands, so as to see that no increase be thence made to what it should fix for the rate of bounty. Let the condition of service in the army be changed so as to make the engagement for term of years instead of for life, with such increasing advantages held out, at the close of succeeding periods, (as well by certain privileges to be then enjoyed, as by bounties and increase of pension,) as might be most likely to ensure a continuance of the service of the men once engaged. — To these changes should be added a total abolition of drafting, not silently introduced, and adopted merely in practice, but so declared before-hand, as that its benefits might be felt in the recruiting. In general, in this as in many other regulations that might be proposed, the maintaining, or rather the creating, an army would be my object, conceiving that even for purposes of mere defence, a small portion of truly regular troops, in conjunction with the undisciplined efforts of the country, may be set in balance against a very large proportion of troops imperfectly formed.

Thus far I have been considering only, what may be called the embodied force of the country. But will this force, increase it, constitute it, how you will, be sufficient? And must not a new and larger fund be resorted to, namely, that which will embrace all the strength, energy, zeal, talents, faculties mental and corporeal, of the country? If we think that we can be protected by any of the ordinary means of war, by trusting our defence to men, dressed as soldiers, and

hired or compelled to defend us, bating the chances, by sea or otherwise, that may interpose to defeat the enemy's projects in the first instance, we are little less than undone. This embodied force, be it good or bad, can go but a very little way. You cannot have it, if you wait to the last moment; to call it forth beforehand, to the necessary amount, would be an evil which the state of society in this country could never endure. This evil will be felt to a fearful extent in the present measure; without, at the same time, any adequate advantage being derived from it. The whole, indeed, of this measure is of that sort of which the examples are so numerous, and which are calculated more for show than use. We hear often of parliamentary grounds, and in cases where parliamentary grounds would seem to be something distinct from grounds of reason and common sense. In the same manner we meet occasionally with what may be called parliamentary measures: that is to say, measures which in skilful hands will make an imposing figure in a statement, particularly when addressed to persons wholly unconversant with the subject; but will never pass upon experienced and intelligent men, and will be found utterly to fail in practice: a sort of show-goods, such as will appear to sufficient advantage in a shop window, but will never bear the eye of a dealer, and will be found wholly unfit for wear. At all events, you must have recourse to other, and more extensive means. You must prepare the country: you must put the country in a situation in which its patriotic zeal, its native courage, its various and abundant

energies may have a way to operate and produce their natural effects.

The general plan, which presents itself to me for that purpose, and on which a thousand others might be engrafted, according as circumstances varied, or future views developed themselves, would be instantly to distribute the country, or such parts of it as you wished immediately to prepare (for one merit, at least, of this plan is, that you may take as much or as little of it as you please) into small divisions of two or three contiguous parishes each, according to the population, stationing an officer in each, with a small deposit of arms and ammunition, and whose office it should be, in concert with all the zeal, intelligence, and influence which he might find in the neighbourhood, to train those who should voluntarily offer themselves, to such parts of military training as they would be alone capable of, and as are, after all, by far the most important. It would never enter into my idea, to introduce into bands of this sort any of the foppery of dress, or any distinctive dress at all; a ribband, or even a handkerchief round the arm, to distinguish those, who were receiving this instruction, from the crowd that might occasionally accompany them, is all that would be necessary. Those essential parts of military training, as they seem to be thought, a fife and a drum, the marching in rank and in file, the wheeling backwards, the eyes right and eyes left, whatever may be their value on other occasions, — a point that I do not presume to meddle with — must here, however reluctantly, be given up. Firing at a mark, learning,

indeed, to fire at all, which (thanks to the game laws) few of our peasantry are acquainted with; some instruction in the manner of cleaning arms, much instruction in the methods of lining hedges, firing from behind trees, retiring upon call, and resuming a new station; these are all the heads of discipline to which I should propose them to be exercised.

It is not, indeed, very well ascertained what proportion these may bear, (a very deficient one no doubt,) to the whole of what is required of soldiers; nor how far much of that which use and prejudice has taught us to consider as essential, might be dispensed with, though possibly not without some disadvantage, even in regular armies. It is not very clear, that troops in the Duke of Marlborough's time, were required in marching to move all of them the same leg at once. Much of the modern practice was introduced under the authority of the great King of Prussia, who adapted his system to his own mode of warfare — the warfare of large armies in open countries — and might himself possibly be aware, that many of its rules, though upon the whole desirable, were not of that importance which his less-informed imitators have since ascribed to them. The French, whose authority at this time it is not for Europe to dispute, have changed back much of what was then introduced, and have got nearer in some respects to what was the old practice, but more nearly perhaps to what was the practice in the late American war: and though with them the eternal difference between trained and untrained; between regular and irregular; (what are called irregular being with them

perfectly regular troops in their own kind) between veteran and disciplined soldiers and hasty levies, is perfectly understood; yet the mode of warfare introduced by them countenances much more than heretofore, the utility of such armed and partially instructed bodies, as that which I have presumed to recommend.

The measure is, at least, good as far as it goes. It draws no man from his home; it puts no man in a state of painful constraint; it stops no man in his business, so as to leave his family to distress, or to become a charge upon the public. It has the further merit of not interfering with any-thing else, so as to prevent any man from entering the army, or navy, or militia, or serving the state in any other way.

Expence I would have none. The pay of the officer, the price of the powder consumed, the hire of the store-house for depositing the arms in cases where the parish church could not be made to serve the purpose, with such an allowance to the men, as was a mere equivalent for their lost time, these would be the whole, or nearly the whole, of the expences incident to the plan, which certainly could not be thought objectionable on that score.

So much as to its negative merits. As to its advantages, it provides for a distribution of arms whenever the time shall come, and it prepares the people in a certain degree for the use of them. It fills the country with powder and ball; and it instructs those in whose custody they are placed, to what hands, when the emergency shall call for it, they may be

entrusted to the greatest advantage and with most safety. The officer, aided by the leading gentlemen, by the clergyman, by the principal yeomen and others, and having continued intercourse with the lower orders, will soon be able to form a tolerable judgment of those on whom he may rely, upon such an occasion, and those who, from feebleness or otherwise, are less worthy of such confidence. But the greatest, possibly, of all the advantages which I should be inclined to hope from this plan is, that it will produce that most important of all preparations, the preparation of the mind. It seems to be almost the only way, (I must think the most effectual,) in which the people will be thoroughly impressed with a conviction of the danger. The present measure will, I confess, prove a powerful instructor as far as inconvenience goes: but inconvenience is, at least, not the pleasantest way of conveying instruction. But the present measure will never instruct the people in this, that it must be on their own exertions, that they must depend for salvation. One main object to the measure is, that its tendency is the direct reverse. In the other way, both a sense of the danger, and a knowledge of the means necessary to be employed against it, will be carried into every farm-house and every cottage. It will be the conversation of the village green, of the church porch, and what is not the least perhaps, of the ale-house. Men will be turning their thoughts to what they can do upon the occasion, will be calling up the memory of former exploits, will be counting upon their newly-acquired means and knowledge, and above all will be familiar,

izing their minds to the object. It is not to be told how much of military knowledge (which is nothing more than the application of common sense to situations, new indeed, but soon capable of being comprehended), will spring up under this cultivation, in situations where apparently it was to be least expected. An officer stationed in this way, if only by promoting military conversation, will become a source of instruction by no means to be despised. Every day of exercise or walk into the fields will be a sort of clinical lecture. If the officer be an intelligent man, and has seen service, he will soon find himself surrounded by people, who will have acquired under his instructions reasonably good military ideas, and have qualified themselves, should the occasion arise, to render him very useful assistance.

This sort of armed force, not confined, like the volunteers hitherto raised, to small troops in towns, and who (without disparagement be it spoken) consist for the most part of persons, who from bodily force, habits, and situation of life, cannot generally be expected to support the fatigues of military service,—this sort of armed force, co-extensive with the active population of the country, though it cannot of itself stop the march of an army, must produce an immense effect, aided by troops of yeomanry, whose utility will be very great, in co-operation with such resistance as we expect from forces of a different description. When we talk of the difference to armies of acting in a friendly or a hostile country, we certainly do not suppose that difference to be less, because the hostile country happens to be prepared and armed.

But every preparation of this sort has hitherto, by His Majesty's ministers, been completely neglected. We are, for aught we know, within two months of invasion, and the measure now just brought forth, is the only measure except the calling out of the militia, which they appear to have thought of.—But they do, it seems, immense things in secret. — True dignity shows itself in calm! Why, Sir, what these measures can be, of which the country knows nothing, it is not very easy to comprehend; and therefore one a little distrusts the nature of this calm. — There are different sorts of calm. There is the calm of confident and complacent hope, and the calm of despair. The calm of men, who having passed the first agitation of danger, have settled their minds to a determined resistance to it; and the calm of those, who are only tranquil, because, from ignorance or insensibility, they are wholly incredulous of its approach. I wish the Honourable Gentlemen's calm may not be that of a wretched lodger, who, hearing a noise below, instead of manfully getting up to resist the robbers, only hides his head in the bed clothes, and hopes they may go off with their other booty without coming into his apartment.

Their secrecy too is altogether as whimsical an idea. They observe, I suppose, that Buonaparté is very secret; and judging him, as they well may, to be a great Captain, they conceive, by imitating his secrecy, that they shall appear to be great Captains themselves. But they forget the difference between attack and defence. A man who means to surprise his enemy does very right to keep his intentions secret; but it is

not altogether so proper on the part of him who means only not to be surprized. An officer who was about to surprise a post by a night attack, would do very well not to tell his soldiers, whither he was leading them; but it would be odd, if the officer on the other side was to say to the next in command, 'I have intelligence that we shall be attacked to night; but remember this is only for yourself. Don't say a word to the guard; secrecy is the very soul of military operations.' — There is another rather material difference, that Bonaparté has nothing to do but to issue his orders with a certainty that they will be punctually obeyed, whether the army like them or not, whether they are called upon to execute them at a longer or shorter notice, or whether they have any conception or not of the general purpose which they are meant to answer. But the army here to be applied to, is the people of Great Britain, who, besides that they may debate a little upon the orders which they receive, must act in a great degree from their own impulse and discretion, and who will never be brought to act at all, if they themselves are not previously made sensible of the danger. — I, for one, will not pay them so bad a compliment as to suppose that they are not fit to be trusted with this secret. I disclaim the notion, I renounce 'as impious and heretical' that 'damnable doctrine,' that to blind the people as to their true situation, to conceal from them the reality of the danger, is the only way to keep up their courage. If this is really their state, then is the country in a deplorable way indeed: but changed as the people of this country

are, by a thousand causes, and under the influence of a sort of language and policy which has prevailed for so many years, I will never believe, that they must be lulled into a false security, be exposed to all the dreadful dangers of a surprise, (the effects of which no man can calculate,) because, to show them their danger, would be to dismay them. How do we combine this with all the vaunting and high-flown compliments, which we are for ever paying them? Are they only brave, when they believe there is no danger? I reject the imputation. Their safety depends upon their exertions; and their exertions must be stimulated, as I am confident they will be stimulated, by a sense of their danger.

In addition to those exertions which the people themselves must make, and on which must rest our chief hopes, there is much that ministers themselves ought to be diligently employed about, but to which I must suspect no attention has been given. Every officer of note and character in the country ought to be called upon for his opinion: not an opinion given in conversation, and with an obliging acquiescence, perhaps, to the presumed notions or wishes of the person he is talking to, but such as must stand in evidence against him, and on which his military judgment and credit will be at stake. Innumerable measures of precaution are likewise necessary, and which would not be the less useful, because they would be attended with no expence or distress to the country. I do not object to the present measure on account of the expence and inconvenience which attend it, great as they

will be. Whatever is necessary must be done, let the hardship be what it will. But I beg that we may not invert the proposition, as many are apt to do, and suppose that whatever is burthensome and oppressive, must therefore be efficacious. I suspect the present measure to be of that character; possibly in all its parts; but unquestionably I must object to it, in that part, which goes in the first instance, and finally, as I believe, to make it impossible for us to have an army.

After a debate in which Mr. Addington (Chancellor of the Exchequer) vindicated the proposed measure, and Mr. Pitt approved the principle of it, but objected to some of its provisions, the address which had been moved by the Secretary at War was put, and carried without a division.

ADDRESS ON THE KING'S SPEECH.

November 23, 1803.

ON the motion for the second reading of the address of the House of Commons, in return for His Majesty's speech, delivered on the preceding day, Mr. Windham rose and addressed the chair as follows:—

SIR;

I OFFER myself to-day to your notice, not with a view of retracting in any degree the assent which I gave yesterday in a former stage of this address, but simply for the purpose of marking more distinctly the grounds of that assent, and obviating a misconstruction which might be liable to arise upon it. I wished the question to pass unanimously yesterday, for the same reasons which make me wish it to pass unanimously to-day; namely, that nothing may seem to call in question the unanimity of our determination to give to His Majesty unbounded support, and to maintain the cause of the country through every possible trial. I should be sorry that any thing should appear on the face of our debates, which, in the mind even of the most rude observer, could create a doubt upon that subject. But while we are guarding against an error of this sort, let us take care not to incur one of an

opposite tendency; that, namely, which would suppose, that unanimity in support of the country was unanimity in support of the ministers.

There may be some possibly, who think; as there are many, undoubtedly, who wish to have it thought; that the greater the dangers and difficulties of the country are, by whatever causes brought on, the greater must our acquiescence be in the ministry of the time being, and the more complete our forbearance of all that is usually called opposition. And if by opposition is meant a captious and vexatious opposition, an opposition on things of doubtful nature or inferior consequences, an opposition for the purpose of impeding ministers and making the government difficult to them, the opinion is certainly well founded. What it would be hard to justify at any time, must be wholly unjustifiable in circumstances such as those supposed. But if there are persons who think, that of the danger here alledged as a reason for supporting ministers, the ministers themselves form the principal part; that the preparations of the enemy, however menacing, would have little terror, if met with wisdom and ability; that the seat of the evil is here rather than abroad; that it is the weakness of the defence, and not the vigour of the attack that constitutes the danger; that Bonaparté and his legions, however terrific, are not half so terrific as the little band which we see before us on the Treasury Bench; if there are persons who hold these opinions, to such persons it would be idle to say, that, for fear of exposing the weakness or lessening the authority of ministers, they were to stand

quiet spectators of what was passing, and were neither to attempt to prevent the mischief, nor point out the source from which they conceived it to proceed. Such is the situation in which I feel *myself* to stand. I have no wish, and in one view certainly have no right, to speak with slight or disparagement of the abilities of the Honourable Gentlemen. Individually considered, they are all men of cultivated minds, of liberal education, of good natural endowments, not unread in the history of their country, not unpractised in its business, not unprovided with those talents and acquirements which are necessary for the conducting of business in this House. But if I am to speak of them collectively, as men forming the council which is to guide the affairs of a great empire, which is to rule the world in a crisis like the present, I must say, from whatever causes it arises, that they are weakness itself. I really believe the country will perish in their hands. I believe the Honourable Gentlemen will fairly see us out; that we shall not outlive their administration; that they will prove, as I believe I once before took the liberty of remarking to them, the *Angustuli* in whose hands the empire will fail. There is an old joke, which we may remember, of Cicero's; — who when some person had ceased to be Consul on the same day on which he had been made, observed, that the person in question might tell of a prodigy which few of his predecessors could boast of, for that the sun had never set during his consulate. I wish that something equally prodigious may not be found in the

history of the Honourable Gentlemen, and that it may not be to be said of them hereafter, that their administration lasted as long as the country. — It is now just two years and a few weeks since I felt myself compelled to say to them in this place, and upon something of a similar occasion, namely, the first day of the meeting of Parliament, "that they had signed the death-warrant of their country *." The affairs of the country have been in their hands, without interruption, from that day to this. And can we venture to say, that the gloomy forebodings then expressed have made no progress towards their accomplishment, or that the Honourable Gentlemen do not bid fairer to put the finishing stroke to the work which they were then supposed to have begun?

With these impressions, it is childish to talk of forbearing opposition, in cases where opposition would otherwise be proper, for fear of impeding the exertions of the Honourable Gentlemen, or exciting a belief that the country was not safe in their hands. Were I to forbear any opportunities of so doing, I am sure it must be from motives far different from those of regard for the safety of the country.

With respect to the address itself, notwithstanding the care which has been taken, and properly taken, to avoid any occasion of difference, objections to it would

* The passage to which Mr. Windham alludes is to be found in the Speech of the 4th Nov. 1801, on the report of the address to His Majesty occasioned by the preliminaries of Peace.

not be wanting, were this the moment for insisting upon them. — In point of taste, I could have wished, that less even had been said, than has been, of the conquests in the West Indies, and the impression thereby made on the enemy. Wretched, indeed, must be our view of things, if, at a moment like the present, we can amuse ourselves with such objects, and not see, that to the contempt in which the enemy holds them, compared with the immense projects which he is meditating, we owe, in great measure, the facility with which they have fallen into our hands. — Upon the subject of Ireland, I agree entirely in the remarks made yesterday by an Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Fox), that the hope expressed is too sanguine, either for the nature of the thing, or for any confidence to be reposed in the testimony, on which we receive it. I agree with him also, in the fears which I understood him to express, — fears very far from being allayed by what we heard subsequently, — that the views entertained respecting Ireland, and seeming in some degree to be indicated in the speech, were far from being of a sort which promised tranquillity or safety to that kingdom. But the part perhaps of the address most objectionable, is that concluding paragraph, which speaks of the issue of the present contest. The language there held has too much tendency to countenance a notion, than which nothing can be more false and foolish, that by the issue of the present contest is to be understood the issue of the invasion; which once past and decided in our favour, all beyond is to be security and glory. We know how

readily the minds of men out of doors will run into such a notion, and we may suspect of not being wholly exempt from it some even of a higher description, and who are within these walls; but nothing could be more disgraceful or fatal than that such a notion should appear for a moment to be recognized by the house at large.

This is all that I wish to say upon the subject of the present address, either generally or in detail.

One word more only, upon a matter of a different sort, and which I am tempted to introduce to-day, principally because it is the first occasion that offers, and because no man can say, in our present circumstances, whether the first occasion may not be the last, nor how soon we may be called away, as was observed by an Honourable Gentleman yesterday, to the performance of duties more active at least, if not more important, than those which we have to discharge in this House. — It will equally with the other subjects which I have touched upon, lead to no debate, nor require from the Honourable Gentlemen opposite to me, even an answer.

I am come, in common with many other gentlemen, from a residence of some time in my own county; and upon the result of that residence, what I have to declare is, that should any great stroke be struck in the county of Norfolk, of the sort that has been pointed out to the Honourable Gentlemen, and for want of those precautions, which have likewise been pointed out to them, I shall, certainly, think, that there will be ground of serious criminal charge against

them; and should the case not be such as, by the very magnitude of the evil, to put an end to all proceedings, to sweep away both accuser and accusation,

'To take at once the poet and the song,'

I shall probably feel it to be my duty to stand forward as the bringer of that charge.

More than this upon the present occasion need not be said, nor could, perhaps, be said with propriety. I had prepared, before I left Norfolk, a representation upon the subject *, and proposed it to a meeting of gentlemen assembled for other county-business, wishing to have transmitted it to government with the advantage of their signatures; but, for reasons, which they, of course, thought satisfactory, which were not explained, as in fact no discussion was invited, and which I shall not presume to guess at, they declined to join in the representation. It was my duty to afford them the opportunity; as I conceive it to have been my duty now to mention the subject in the way that I have done. — The Honourable Gentlemen, opposite to me, will not consider me as bringing a charge against them, at least not one of which it is necessary for them to take notice, as it must rest for the present solely on the authority of the individual who brings it, unsupported by any proof. Even as a menace, the Honourable Gentlemen will be entitled

* The Representation here referred to (a Copy of which is in the possession of the Editor) contains a detailed, clear, and very forcible statement of the situation of the coast of Norfolk, with suggestions for its Defence. EDITOR.

to hold it cheap, if they are confident that no blame can be imputed to them, but that every thing has been done, that can or ought to be done. It is, however, as a menace, that I intend it; as the only means which I now possess of compelling attention to objects, which, in my apprehension at least, require to be attended to.

This is all that I have to say upon this point. Upon the general topick, I trust I have sufficiently explained myself, and shall therefore no longer detain the house from voting the present address, with that unanimity, with which, under the explanation now given, I shall be happy to see it received.

The Address was then read a second time, agreed to, and ordered to be presented to His Majesty by the whole house.

DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY.

December 9, 1803.

MR. BRAGGE, Secretary at War, moved that the House should resolve itself into a Committee of Supply on the Army Estimates, which included, amongst other provisions, the sum of 730,000*l. for the Volunteer Corps of Great Britain. On the question being put on the first resolution,*

MR. WINDHAM began by adverting to the manner in which the business had been opened by the Honourable Secretary, which, he said, though very proper at any ordinary time, and though possibly very proper then, was so different from the view which he felt himself compelled to take of the subject, that his observations, he feared, would appear very little to arise out of the statements which the House had just heard. His view of the subject went to the general defence of the country both present and to come. Under that notion, the difficulty was to know where to begin, or how to confine the discussion within such bounds as he should wish to prescribe to it. It was impossible, in the course of such an inquiry, not to bring forward many points that must bear hard upon the Honourable Gentlemen opposite. He could not

arraign the measures of the time without arraigning the conduct of those, by whom these measures were planned; nor could he suffer his mind to be so engrossed and absorbed, as seemed to be the case with many, by the mere business of defence, as to lose all thought about the conduct and character of those to whom the national affairs were entrusted. This last, though in some respects, a secondary consideration, inasmuch as it must be founded on a previous examination of public measures, was, nevertheless, a very important and necessary one, was connected with every part of the subject, and might serve, perhaps, as well as any that could be chosen, to present the subject in that point of view, in which it was most important to consider it. His own general opinion on this head, he could not better describe, than in some lines which gentlemen might have seen on Inn windows and shutters, where the writer, speaking of the faults of men and women, and allowing that many faults belong to men, concludes, most injuriously and ungallantly,

——————— Poor women have but two:
There's nothing good they say, and nothing right they do:

These lines, however bad the poetry, and however false the sentiment in its original application, were, he was sorry to say, perfectly descriptive of his opinion of His Majesty's present ministers. That he might not seem to say this at random, without foundation or proof, he would beg only to take a short view of their conduct, as applicable to the actual state of things. If he were to proceed strictly in this inquiry, though

by no means unjustly, he should take up their conduct from the moment of the Treaty of Amiens. It was from that period, according to the opinion of many at the time, according to their own opinion, as declared since, that measures of precaution and defence ought to have begun. They who had declared that, from the moment of the signature of that treaty, the conduct of the enemy was a continued series of *violence*, *insult*, and *aggression*; they whose partisans had told us, that he must be 'nature's fool,' and not the Honourable Gentleman's, who could ever believe in the durability of that treaty; *they* certainly could not refuse to accept the Treaty of Amiens, as the period from which the defence of the country ought to have been a subject never absent from their minds. But as he did not wish to deal hardly with the Honourable Gentlemen, as it would be mean and niggardly to be sparing of concessions where the materials of charge existed in such abundance, he would be content to date his examination from a much more recent period, and to leave out all the intervening space between the Treaty of Amiens, and the 8th of March, the day on which His Majesty's message was brought to parliament. He would suppose it to have been perfectly right that, from the moment peace was made, no matter with what circumstances, you were to proceed according to the established rule in such cases, were to reduce your army, dismantle your fleet, dispose of all your stock and implements of war, sell off gun-boats for little more than the value of the old iron, refuse for five guineas men whom you would

be happy now to get back for fifty; discharge others, whom you could not get back at all. All this he would conclude to be right, and that, without the observance of these accustomed forms, ministers would never have been able to persuade the country, or to satisfy themselves, that the peace which they had made was a real peace, and not a mere make-believe. He would consider their conduct only during the period subsequent to the 8th of March. The establishments of the country were then happily brought to the standard at which it is proposed they should remain; all the reductions had been completed; no subsequent alteration had taken place; a vote in parliament might have passed, but nothing more: all the means of defence were as much to be recollected as if the country had never been at war. Giving ministers full credit for the completely defenceless state in which the country then was, he would proceed to consider, what the change was which they had since effected, and what the means which they had possessed for that purpose; so that by a comparison of the means possessed, and the work done, a judgment might be formed as to the degree of blame or merit ascribable to their conduct.

And here he would wish to adopt a method, such as was often employed on other subjects, where, when the *quantum* of objects could not be ascertained with exactness, means were resorted to for assigning at least a *maximum* or *minimum*. He had heard, where in the case of exorbitant election-charges, in a bill for cockades for instance, the candidate had offered to

pay for all the ribbands that could be proved to have been in the shop for the last six months; or, where the charge was for liquor, instead of attempting to calculate the number of drinkers, and the average quantity they might severally have drunk, he had proposed not only to pay for all that had been in the cellar within a certain time, but *to gauge the house*, and to give credit for all that could have been contained in it, supposing it to have been one entire cistern of liquor from the cellar to the garret. He would pursue a course somewhat similar in estimating the merit of the exertions of the Honourable Gentlemen. Instead of saying 'so much ought to have been done in recruiting, so much in completing the militia, so much in procuring defence other ways,' he would rather beg the house to take a general view of the means possessed by the country, of the manner in which ministers had the disposal of these means, of the time they have had to employ them, and comparing the whole with the result, to determine in their own minds, whether the affairs of the country, in this most critical concern of its defence, had or had not been placed in proper hands. Let the several heads of comparison, as he had enumerated them, be considered more in detail. The means of the country, in its first and greatest article, the basis of all the rest, was a population of fifteen millions. The time, as he had agreed to take it, from the 8th of March, was nine months, or three quarters of a year. The wealth of the country was, he must confidently say, for this purpose unlimited. There was nothing that

the country was not willing to do in the way of personal service, or to contribute in the way of money. It was long, indeed, before the Honourable Gentlemen thought fit to call upon them. Whether it was that they feared to alarm the holders of *omnium*, according to their own original account, or whether they distrusted the zeal of the country, according to the explanation given of their intentions, in their second edition, when they had had the assistance of a learned commentator (Mr. Sheridan); whichever of these was the case with respect to them, the result of the fact was, that the country was no sooner told of its danger, and summoned to rouse in its defence, than it obeyed the call with an alacrity which the Honourable Gentlemen have since confessed themselves to have been unprepared for. 'They did not call spirits from the vasty deep,' which refused to answer to their bidding. — On the contrary, the Honourable Gentlemen had no sooner began to *try* for this zeal, had hardly begun to sink this well, before the national feeling rose so fast upon them, that they found themselves in danger of being overwhelmed by it, and begged for God's sake to be pulled up again. They no sooner turned this cock than it spurted in their faces. They had nothing to plead, therefore, on the score, that the country did not second their efforts, that it withheld its assistance, that it kept back its milk, as it were: the country was ready to yield its resources to any amount for which they would have declared it necessary to call for them.

So far as to the means which they *possessed*: But were the means *employed* inconsiderable, or not abundantly sufficient to prove the improvident management of those who had the administration of them? The money expended for the army of reserve alone, and that too in mere bounties, could not be estimated at less than 1,000,000l. For the volunteers, the Honourable Gentleman had just said, that the estimate for the ensuing year must be 700,000l.; and, therefore, for the year now closed, in which if some articles were less, others were considerably greater, could not, he conceived, be less than 1,000,000l. This, as the sum advanced by government to that object; to which, if he was to add, as undoubtedly he must add, the part contributed by individuals, he certainly should be within the mark, when he stated the whole expence incurred for volunteers at not less than 2,000,000l.

Here then was a sum of at least 3,000,000l. expended in little more than the mere *creation* of a force; and that in a way, for the greater part of it, infinitely more oppressive than if raised by a general tax. What then, they were to ask, was the force *created?* And upon this occasion the statement of the Honourable Gentleman had something very grand and imposing, perfectly in the style of many statements, which were heard in that House. The safety of the country was provided for, it might be said, by a vast mass of armed force amounting to not less than 500,000 men. He was far from sure that the numbers might not even exceed these limits. But, of course, it was not

to be supposed, that they were to take this statement merely as it stood in words, without inquiring a little, what this mass, this fabrick consisted of; how much of it was of solid masonry, part of the old standing force of the country; how much was of a later date and less regular construction; how much might be composed of materials still more recently collected, and more hastily put together, and be liable, in consequence, to various cracks and settlements; and what portion of it was mere lath and plaster, not distinguishable, perhaps, by the eye, and seeming to be a continuation of the same front, but no more the same with it in reality, than one of the new temporary barracks, of which they might expect to hear so much soon, was to be considered as a building of the same sort with St. Paul's or Westminster Abbey. It would be found, upon examination, and when this great edifice came to be properly surveyed, that a very small part indeed, was regular army; that a large portion of it was militia; that another less considerable part was army of reserve; but that three-fourths of the whole was the mere levy in mass, moulded into the form, and known under the title, of volunteer corps. This was not what would have been understood, at least without explanation, in a report of the force of France, or Austria, or Prussia, or any other military power. Of the two first descriptions of force here enumerated, it was not necessary to say much. The regular army was what they had always known the regular army to be, and never more known it to be, than during the whole of the period of the late war.

The militia had long been wrought to a high degree of excellence, and was at that time, perhaps, in as great perfection as it was possible for troops to attain, of whom neither officers nor men could have the benefit of actual service. Of the army of reserve the character must be for some time continually changing, according to their progress in training, and according to the manner in which the men were disposed of, either as selected, and incorporated into old battalions; making, however, a very incommodious mixture of men serving upon different tenures; or as put together in battalions by themselves. But in neither way could they be considered, for some time at least, as fit to be classed with the regular troops; nor would it be possible at any time for those so to class them, who refused to admit to the description of a soldier, any man whose engagement of service did not extend to term of life. It would be curious indeed, if those who resisted most pertinaciously, and at the hazard even of having no army, every attempt to change the service of the line from life to term of years, should now find out that soldiers serving both for term of years and for service within the realm only, were entitled to reckon as part of the regular army. But a great portion of these were, for the present, good for no service either without or within the realm. They were men newly collected together with their pockets full of money, or who had only emptied them by a continued course of intoxication, and had not yet got their grass-flesh off, had not got the beer out of their bellies which they had been swilling for weeks, many

of them at the rate of fifty guineas a man. As for those who were left behind in what were called the reserved battalions, they, for the most part, were so left behind and reserved, because no one thought it worth his while to take them, and were of a sort which no time or drilling could ever render serviceable; time indeed, being with many of them the last thing wanted, as the very objection to be urged was, that they were already past the age of service. The last and most important, certainly the most extensive head of force, was that which comprised the great body of inhabitants to whom arms had been given or promised, the general collection of the volunteer corps. In speaking of these bodies, it was as well perhaps to attempt, though the attempt was sure to be fruitless, to obviate the misrepresentation, which, he was aware, was lying in wait to seize upon every word he should utter, (which "hush'd in grim repose expects his evening prey,") by observing, that what he had to condemn in these institutions was not the individuals but the system: That in speaking of a body of 400,000 men, he certainly did not mean to say that they were all useless, or worthless, or of a character he knew not what, that was to make them run away at the sight of an enemy. He certainly should not be inclined to say this of any 400,000 men, taken at random from among the inhabitants of this country, and must necessarily be less inclined to say so, of a body which, from the manner of its being combined, must contain a greater proportion of the zeal, spirit, youth, courage, and patriotism of the

country, than any other of equal numbers taken without rule or selection. To impute therefore to any one a purpose of censuring the volunteers individually, was too childish to be deserving of notice. As little could he intend to say, that the body of volunteers, as at present constituted, were of no use. Four hundred thousand men, with arms in their hands, and consisting for the most part of persons within certain ages, could not be so combined, as not to be capable of being useful. All that he meant to say was, that these corps must be for ever unsuited to the sort of service on which it was intended to employ them; and that the methods pursued with them were calculated to render them as little useful as it was possible for such an assemblage of men to be. The idea was, as had been long foreseen, and long deprecated, to combine these into companies, regiments, and brigades, and to endeavour to make regular soldiers of them. He was of opinion that you never could make regular soldiers of them; and that the attempt to do so was founded in every respect upon false views, both of the nature of those corps and of the military service in general. He grounded this opinion upon circumstances, certainly having nothing injurious in them to the characters of persons acting in volunteer corps. It was no reproach to any one, that he was of an age, or size, or state of health, that did not admit of his performing the duties of a soldier; that he was the father of a family, and could not be spared from the care and superintendance of those who looked to him at every moment as their protector and

guide; that he was engaged in a business which he could not leave without ruin, and without ruin to those whom it was his duty to support. There was no reproach in all this, but there was a great deal in it, which must prevent corps, consisting for the most part of men so circumstanced, from either performing for any length of time the duties of soldiers employed on service, or from acquiring the expertness and habits by which those duties must be performed. These were truths which would not, probably, be much disputed. All the world would agree, that to talk of giving to citizens and householders ('to resiant inhabitants paying scot or lot'), to men engaged in professions and callings, who were compelled to live on one spot, were tied down by the care of families, who rejected military controul, were serving without pay, were officered in a great measure by persons of their own description if not of their own choosing — that to talk of giving to such men the character and qualities of regular soldiers, was the greatest of all absurdities. Yet this, which every one would agree in, which no one would be hardy enough to deny, was the utmost that had ever been said, in disparagement, as it was called, of the volunteers. All the rest was a mere military question, by which the volunteers were not at all affected. Once admit that collections of men, such as he had just described, were not capable of being formed into regular regiments, that is to say, regiments possessing the properties which were looked for in troops of the line, and it then became a question, to be decided on general

military principles, and in which the volunteers were no longer concerned, how far corps of a certain acknowledged inferiority ought to be employed in certain services, or to be placed in certain situations.

And here a great mistake seemed to prevail of supposing, that whatever possessed in itself a certain degree of force or strength, must by its addition to any thing of the same description produce a degree of force, more than would be found in either of the parts separately: that strength added to strength, would always produce strength. This was evidently not so. If the addition supposed was not judiciously made, weakness, instead of strength, might be the consequence. No one could doubt that a regiment of four or five hundred men, volunteers or others, must possess some power of annoying an enemy. But was it sure that your line would be strengthened, and your general power of annoying and defeating the enemy be increased by such addition? He would take an example from a profession with which the House and he were, in general, probably less acquainted than they were even with military affairs, but which might happen to be more familiar to them in this particular view. What was the reason that in naval actions, frigates, and even fifty-gun ships, were not suffered to make part of the line? Was it, that fifty-gun ships or even frigates, were of no force? That their balls did not hit hard? That some of their guns were not even heavier than a part of those which formed the battery of a ship of the line? By no means. It was, he must conclude, because a line of battle at sea

was a species of machine, so constructed, as to require a certain proportionate strength in all its parts, the failure of any one of which would draw after it the failure of all the rest. The same was the case with an army. *There* also was a line, and which, as might be collected from the very expression of 'regiments of the line,' could be formed only of troops trained to a certain degree of discipline and regularity. To form it otherwise, to put into the line corps which, from want of experience or instruction, might not maintain the part of the action allotted to them, would not only be to endanger the whole by that particular failure, but might in a thousand other ways, embarrass the operations of an army, and defeat the plans of a commander. Manœuvres must be calculated upon supposed qualifications in the troops and officers, who are to execute them. What must be the situation of a general, if, when directing the execution of any pressing service — a hill, suppose, to be occupied, a post to be maintained, a wood to be defended, a redoubt to be stormed — in a crisis which left no leisure for deliberation or inquiry, he must be comparing the characters of the different corps under his command, and be exposed, at last, to the uncertainties of troops, whose composition was unknown, whose conduct in a day of action was to be tried for the first time, and who, in the mode of service now proposed for them, might involve, in their defeat or miscarriage, the discomfiture of the whole army. These were not objections to volunteers in general: so far from it, that he, on the contrary, had always contended for them, to a

far greater extent, though on a far less expensive footing than that on which they were now established. His objections went only to volunteers, moulded into the forms, and destined for the sort of service which government had now assigned them. It was government which had given them this most false direction; which by dressing them in red coats had betrayed, at once, the character in which they meant to consider them, and the use they meant to put them to, — a use for which they could never be made fit. This was the point on which he wished to insist. Other objections to the present system he should not now dwell upon; nor consider what might be the future danger arising to the state from bodies of armed men, subject to no regular authority, governed by committees and sub-committees, and having more the character of debating societies than of schools of military discipline. He was considering them merely as part of the defence of the country against a foreign enemy, and in this view he must recall to the attention of the House — first, the immense reduction to be made in our force, when, out of *five* or *six* hundred thousand, *four* were understood not to be soldiers, but only armed inhabitants; and next, when these armed inhabitants were prepared and fashioned in a manner so little judicious, as in the plan now pursued. When to this was added, that by the exemptions given, contrary to the intentions of ministry, and by the mere effect of haste and oversight, numbers had latterly flocked into these corps, as a refuge from other service, and that so large a portion of the active population of the country

was thereby locked up, and withdrawn from the service either of the army of reserve or militia (the regular recruiting was out of the question); he would leave to the House to judge what credit was to be given to the Honourable Gentlemen on this head of the account. The whole return, the whole force produced by the Honourable Gentlemen, after three millions expended, and with the command of an unlimited credit, was first, 400,000 volunteers, such as he had described, and whose formation operated, as he had described, in respect to the other services; secondly, a militia, excellent in its kind, but incomplete, and rendered more difficult to be completed by the effect of the measure above referred to; thirdly, twenty, or six and twenty thousand army of reserve; fourthly and lastly, an addition (as he should have said), of 5000, or (as he now understood from the Honourable Gentlemen) of 7000 men to the regular army! This was all that the Honourable Gentlemen had produced at the end of nine months, and as the fruit of all their labour and travail. This was all that the nation had got, in return for its large contributions, its ready sacrifices, its heavy expence, both of patience and money. Five (or seven) thousand men to there gular army, five or seven pints of reasonably good soup, was the whole that these state-cooks had been able to produce after all their simmerings and boilings, all the hams and chickens, and pounds of beef, which they had melted down, and the bills which they had run up in consequence, at the different shops.

Thus far he had gone in considering what a great philosopher of old would have called the *living* instruments of our defence. The *inanimate* instruments must not be overlooked, though he should say but little to all the objects which that class would comprize, such as works, fortresses, preparations by sea and land, every thing in short that wisdom and foresight could provide or could arrange, towards making the approach of an enemy difficult, or giving force and efficacy to the action of those who were preparing to resist him. In all this he feared a dreadful deficiency. Much as might be wanting in living means, the want of judgment and ability in the application of those means, the want of a presiding mind either to create resources, or to turn to account those already existing, was, he feared, not less conspicuous. He would not attempt to enter into a criticism either upon the general distribution of the forces, which so far as it was built upon a system of concentration, or of collecting the force into great masses, for the protection of vital parts, he certainly approved, nor would he offer any opinion as to the considerable works going on at Chelmsford and Chatham, having, in fact, no opinion to offer. He would touch upon one point only of that sort, and that, not so much with a view of stating what he thought ought to be done, as of remarking on what *was* done, and upon the dreadful weakness and inconclusiveness of many of those reasonings, which governed the conduct of the country, in points where its very existence was at stake. From the northernmost point on the coast of Suffolk, where

the protection might be supposed to cease from the shipping at Yarmouth, to a part of the coast of Essex, where a naval defence of another kind might be supposed to begin (and where he hoped it had at length begun, though, very late in the year, it certainly had not made its appearance); there was a line of coast accessible in most weathers, and certainly very commodious for the landing of an enemy in such vessels as those in which they were expected to come. Upon this line he should unquestionably think it highly advantageous if a defence were provided, formed by the construction of what were known to our officers under the name of Martello Towers, a species of edifice so called from a memorable instance of one at Martello, in Corsica; where, by a tower of this sort, garrisoned by some ten or a dozen men, and mounted with about two guns, a ship of the line of ours, and a frigate, were, during the last war, completely foiled and driven off, though they were able to approach within a quarter of a mile of the object, and though the Captain, a most approved officer, would not withdraw from the contest while there was a hope of success left, nor till he had lost an immense number of his men, and had had his ship twice set on fire. No one would pretend to say, that towers of this sort would not produce a great effect upon an enemy, whoever he might be, that came within the reach of their guns. That they would stop the disembarkation of infantry, he was not prepared to say. On the contrary, he was of opinion that they would not. Great as the loss might be, the enemy, if determined, would still accomplish

his object. But would the same be the case with artillery and horses? And would not the slaughter be immense, and the delay most important, were it possible that under such a fire a disembarkation of that sort could after all take place? The objection, therefore, to such defences must resolve itself into the consideration of expence, or into that of the force which it would lock up, and the means which would be furnished to the enemy, should the fortresses in question finally fall into his hands. As to the latter objection, he had already stated, what the contents of such towers were, and what the loss would be to those from whom they should be taken, viz. a dozen men at the utmost, and a couple of guns. The value to the enemy would be none; for the guns would never be transportable; and certainly not the towers; and neither would be of any use to him in the places where they were. But their uselessness to the enemy it was unnecessary to prove, as it was hardly possible that they should fall into his hands. It was of the nature of these little fortresses (quite the reverse of what was the case with redoubts), that they were equally impregnable to cannon and to musquetry, and could not be taken but by such means as the enemy would neither have time nor inclination to employ. The whole question, therefore, was a question of expence: and what would that expence be, incurred once for all, compared with the maintenance of such a living force, (supposing even that we had the force, and could spare it for that purpose,) as would give to any tract of coast the same security which would be derived from the defence in

question? Considering the simplicity of the construction of these towers, the little interior fitting they would require, the rude materials of which they might be composed, (the stones made use of for paving London, might serve for the most expensive part,) the facility with which materials would be conveyed for buildings necessarily situated on the edge of the coast, and in its most accessible parts, it is difficult to conceive, that 1000l. a piece must not be an ample allowance. And thus for a sum of 30,000l. and with a force of 300 men, thirty miles of coast, in parts the most vulnerable, would be put in a state of security far greater at least than any which they could enjoy without the aid of such precautionary measures. But let the House consider what happened without this. To supply the place of these despised towers, the coast was lined with sea-fencibles, armed with pikes, a weapon which had been said, if he recollected right, in some of the circular official papers, to be capable of great effect in the hands of a Briton, fighting for every thing that was dear to him. He wished the House to reflect, what would be the situation of these pike-men, at Aldborough for instance, one of the places where there was a corps of that sort, and which was situated on the part of the coast to which he had been alluding. Here was a straight shore with deep water, and a beach, on which in moderate weather vessels might run with confidence, without even shortening sail: and in these circumstances it was supposed, that when vessels should thus arrive, containing each a hundred soldiers, and carrying a four-and-twenty pounder on its bow, men

were to stand on the shore with their pikes, and push them off! Was this the idea of a bold Briton? or was it the idea of master Fribble? "Begone, fellow." You might as well suppose, that the enemy was to be kept off by bodkins or knitting-needles!

It was certainly not by a force of this sort, that the coast could be defended. The great argument, indeed, was, that it could not be defended at all, and that therefore no defence should be attempted. And here he wished to recall the attention of the House to that loose, vague, inconsiderate style of reasoning, to which he had before alluded, and to which, it was melancholy to think, the very life and being of the state was sometimes entrusted. When a proposal was made, for securing a part of the coast by works, as happened in the case of an honourable friend behind him (Colonel Craufurd), the answer universally made was, that you could not fortify *every* part of the coast; and thence it was meant to be inferred, that it was useless to fortify *any*. But what was the sort of reasoning that could lead to this as a conclusion? In many cases, he was ready to allow, that an argument to that effect would be just. If the question was of shutting mice out of a pantry, the conclusion would be correct, that to stop up one hole was useless, while any other was suffered to remain open. The strength of a chain, according to an old observation, was the strength of the weakest link. To fortify those above it, was useless: to add to the strength of those below it, might be injurious, as well as useless; because, without adding to the general strength, you might add some-

thing to the weight. But were any one to apply that same reasoning to a chain in a figurative sense, to a chain of posts, nothing could be more false and inconclusive. It is not here as in the other case, that the force applied acted through every part. The force acted only on the part to which it was applied, and if that part happened to be the strongest, would be resisted with the power of the strongest. It was true, that if the enemy knew your weak point, and could be sure of carrying his attack there, all that he was arguing against, must be admitted. But would any one maintain, that such was the fact? Was this, what they heard on other occasions? When the danger of invasion was in discussion, how were those laughed to scorn, who seemed to reason upon the idea, that the enemy, once embarked, could say either where he should, or where he should not, touch the land? How much of our confidence was founded, and justly founded, on the uncertainty which belongs to all the enemy's operations, and in the impossibility of his fixing with certainty the point in which his descent must be made? Yet here the tables were suddenly turned; and to attempt to secure any part of the coast, while another was left unguarded, was treated as trifling and childish; because the enemy would be sure to chuse what was weakest, and must be able to guide his armament with perfect precision to the part, whatever it was, that he should chuse. He urged this topic, with a view to expose the sort of reasoning, which was admitted often into concerns of the greatest importance, and might prevail possibly at the present mo-

ment in question more critical and more certain, than that which he had brought forward respecting the coast of Suffolk.

There was, in fact, no security any where with persons so wholly unsuited to the arduous crisis in which they had to act, as the Honourable Gentlemen. In every part of their system little considerations were mixing themselves with great, so as to spoil the effect of the whole, and prevent its working truly in any of its operations. This was eminently the case in the pecuniary part, where a wild profusion was so combined with a mean parsimony, that it was like the conduct of a man, who in giving a great entertainment with all the dainties of the season, peas at a guinea a quart, should suffer the whole to be spoilt at last by a want of bread or salt. With this must be coupled, as it possibly arose out of it, an extraordinary passion for machinery, into which the Honourable Gentlemen had been led, partly, as it appeared, by the hope of working cheaper, and partly by that common error, of supposing that a great machine must be calculated to produce a great effect. Their machines were much like that which Hogarth represents, where the wedge, the lever, the axis *in peritrochio*, all the mechanical powers, were introduced for the purpose of drawing a cork, an operation which a waiter or butler would perform more effectually, as well as more expeditiously, by a little instrument from his pocket called a cork-screw. It was of the nature of all machinery, that in proportion as the parts were complicated, the movement was likely to be slow; not to mention that if any

part should happen to be misplaced, or wanting, or ill-adjusted, the whole must be at a stand. This was very much the case with some of the machines of the Honourable Gentlemen. In order to keep their expences out of sight, and to throw as much as possible upon individuals without the intervention of Parliament, they had set up their grand system of lord lieutenants, deputy lieutenants, lieutenants of division, inspectors of divisions, superintendants of parishes, &c. &c. persons very proper to be appointed, and to be held in readiness, but very improper for much of the work on which they were employed, namely, that of getting the country into a state of military defence. Of all the instruments to work with for such a purpose, the worst, surely, that could be devised, was that of a deputy lieutenant's meeting. Every one had heard frequently, and almost proverbially, of the slow progress of official business. But at what rate must that business proceed, which had for its office a county? Which, instead of clerks with salaries, amenable to superiors, and compellable to a certain attendance, was transacted by country-gentlemen, subject to no authority, who were bound by no especial duty, who might attend as much or as little as they liked, and who might feel proudly that they conferred a favour every time that they attended at all? Offices too, in which Government business was transacted, were open commonly every day, and for many hours each day. But what must be the condition of that office, whose days of attendance were one in a week, and whose office hours were about three in each of those days? To

office was likewise a *corresponding* office: but what must be the activity of that correspondence, where between the letter and its answer the least interval known was a week? He took no notice here of the manner in which at such meetings business must necessarily be conducted, where few possibly had given much attention to the object in question, where no one had any right to prescribe to the rest, where many would come more to talk of their own private business, or to meet those they were in quest of, than to promote the business under discussion, where most were impatient to be gone, where all had voices, and, what was possibly not the least evil, where every one had a right to declare that voice at as great length as he thought proper.

He could not better illustrate the effects of the system which had thrown business into this course, than by stating what had happened upon the subject of signals. It might have been thought, that the arranging a system of signals, as it must have been among the earliest and most pressing objects of attention, that which, in some sort, was to give effect to every thing else, was the one also which would have been most easily accomplished, and most speedily carried into execution. The mode that had been adopted, was, too, of the most simple kind. A line of stations was to be established along the coast, placed under the direction of persons appointed by the Admiralty, and qualified to collect and to convey, by means of the Admiralty signals, such more detailed intelligence as was necessary for officers appearing off the coast, or

commanding at the naval stations; while from this, as from a circumference, other lines were drawn inland, for the mere purpose of giving alarm, or for communicating a few of the more simple results of what had been observed upon the coast. Any one would suppose that this was a work, which would not take long in completing; considering that it was of that sort, which might be going on in all places at once, so that the time for the whole would be no more than that of the latest of the parts; and that in three weeks or a month from the first alarm, that is, from the 8th of March, however much our means of resistance might have been wanting, we should at least not have been liable to see the enemy amongst us without notice of his approach. And so it would have been with any set of persons, who would have done things in a plain way: who would have been content "to draw a cork with a cork-screw." But not so the savers of money, and the lovers of machinery. By seeking to divide the expence of these signals with the counties, and throwing the business, in consequence, into the train which he had described, the result was (the House would hear it with astonishment) that in some of the maritime counties, immediately exposed to the enemy, and where the attack was most expected, the system of signals, even in those parts of it which were most essential, and on which the whole depended, was not compleated to that very hour. It would naturally be enquired, how this could happen; and the explanation might be given, by stating only what had taken place in the county to which he belonged. When

the deputy-lieutenants signified to the lieutenant of division, that stations must be prepared for the reception of the naval officers: the lieutenant of division did not care to stir in the business, till he knew whether the sums which he should advance, would be repaid to him by the deputy-lieutenants. The deputy-lieutenants, on the other hand, were a little shy of engaging for this money, till they should know, whether they could make it good from the county: and, on the part of the county, it was quickly replied, that the lieutenants would look in vain for repayment there: for that the sums in question were no article for a county rate, and in no county rate should they be admitted. Here the matter hung for some time, and here it might have hung still longer, if the deputy-lieutenants, weary of this slow return of correspondence, and impatient of further delay in a matter so important and urgent, had not resolved to take the risk upon themselves, and to direct the completion of the work, trusting that Government would see them finally repaid. This, Government had engaged to do; and the county of Norfolk might by that time, perhaps, be in possession of its signals. But by whose fault had it happened, that it was not in possession of them sooner? It must fairly be said, not by the fault of any one. The striking feature of the case was, that with so great a delay, and such a succession of persons, no one could be found to whom the delay was imputable. The lieutenant of division could not be blamed, for not being willing to advance his money, till he knew by whom he was to be repaid. The deputy-lieutenants might

well have been justified, had they persisted in refusing to the last, to take upon themselves an expence which they had no means of recovering from the county. The county was well warranted in insisting that this charge was one, which was incurred for the general safety, and which ought to be defrayed by a general tax. The Admiralty were not to blame for delaying to send officers, and commence the expences of their establishment, till they should know that houses were ready to receive them. — But this successive justification of all the parties concerned in the measure, was the most complete condemnation of the system to which it belonged. What must that system of proceeding be, in which, when every party under it had done his duty, nine months could elapse, before the maritime counties were furnished with their establishment of signals?

With this example he might safely close his account of the conduct of the Honourable Gentlemen as persons fit to direct the energies, and call out the resources of the country, at a crisis like the present. The instance itself, as a circumstance in the situation of the country, was now of no great importance; as it might be hoped, that by this time, or at least in about a month more, the evil was, or would be, at an end, and the maritime counties be prepared with their signals. But it was not so with the state of the army, and of the military force of the country. Here was not only a great misconduct, but a great national evil and danger, present and future. The Honourable Gentlemen had not only not provided an army, but had brought

things to a state, in which, without some great change, it was impossible that an army should be provided. The army of reserve, the only channel of recruiting not yet dry, would soon, possibly, be dry likewise. It had yielded 7000 men: it was doubtful how many more it had to yield. Whatever it gave to the army, was so much in diminution of its own numbers. How much might continue to ooze in from it, in its decreased and decreasing state, was very uncertain; not to mention the dreadful expence and ruinous example of those successive enrolments — this double bounty. At all events the supply, in this way, had necessarily a termination. It was an artificial, not a natural cascade. As a supply, it must at last run out. When recruits should have entered from this army, equal to the original numbers, the measure was at an end. The army of reserve, therefore, could not be looked upon as a permanent mode of recruiting and reinforcing the army; and, in the meanwhile, by this and their other measures, ministers had laid the foundation of such difficulties, as would render it nearly impossible that any such mode should be devised in future. The probability was, that after yielding to the army a few more thousands, so much would just remain of the army of reserve, as would be sufficient to preserve the example of this anomalous force, and to make recruiting impossible by contributing, with the militia, to continue the high rate of bounties.

In aid of all these mischiefs came the effect of the volunteer system, which, as the Honourable Gentlemen had managed it, whether by design or by mistake,

locked up 400,000 men of the active population of the country. What a blow was here! He was tempted to call out to the Honourable Gentlemen, as the Roman Emperor did to his General, *Redde mihi, Vare, legiones.* Seventy thousand men and more, withdrawn from the supply of the army of reserve, by the militia; and 400,000 men withdrawn from both militia and army of reserve by the volunteers; and the army of reserve, the only source for recruiting the army; with what sort of men, and at what rate of recruiting, was the army likely to be supplied?

All this as a future consideration, the Honourable Gentlemen thought nothing of. They had got, or thought they had got (they had in fact got no such thing), what was sufficient for present defence; and, beyond that, they never thought of looking. Defence was their utmost horizon. All beyond was clouds and darkness. But to those, who did not wish to bound their views merely by that consideration, who thought that if the country *was* to exist after the present dangers, it was of some consequence to consider what that existence was to be: to such persons it would be a matter of anxiety to know, how the country was to proceed without the use of a disposeable force, and if such a force should appear necessary or desirable, it what manner it was to be obtained.

His ideas upon this subject had long since been declared, and he had not been able, by any subsequent reflection or enquiry, to get beyond the notions which he had at first formed. His opinion had been, and was, that, as a first step, there should be an universal

abolition of the system of substitution. That all commutation for personal service (as commutation there must be) should be made by fixed fine, so as to render government the only recruiter in the market, without competition from militia, army of reserve, or any other service. That to meet, and co-operate with the effects of the advantage thus given, service, in the army, should be changed from life to term of years; drafting should be formally abolished; means possibly devised to render service in the West Indies less frequently necessary, and some other subordinate regulations adopted, calculated to give to the profession of a soldier advantages and attractions, additional to those, not inconsiderable ones, which it already had. With these things done, he was of opinion, that the condition of the country was not so changed, either as to the wealth or inclinations of the lower orders of its inhabitants, as to make it impossible, that, upon a greatly increased population, the army should be recruited as in former times. He was by no means sure, that if these methods had been adopted at the time when they were first suggested (and still more if they had been adopted at a period somewhat earlier), the army would not have been recruited, and the general defence of the country increased, even at this moment, far beyond what it had been by the boasted measure of the army of reserve. That it would be so in the end, there could not be the smallest doubt. In a comparison of these measures, the same distinction must be observed, as gentlemen, accustomed to planting, knew how to make between a sown and a planted

tree: though the latter would have the advantage at the beginning, and it might be, for some few years, it was known which would outstrip the other at the long run.

But should the danger at any moment be such, as not to wait the gradual progress of recruiting, however successful; or should the general success of recruiting, even in the new circumstances proposed, be less than he was willing to imagine, it would be then open to have recourse to compulsory measures; but measures so chosen (that is to say, of which the abolition of substitution should make part), as to become a powerful *stimulus* to recruiting, instead of presenting any impediment to it. He was as little a friend to compulsory measures, where they could be avoided, as any other gentleman: but he would not court popularity, nor discredit his own judgment, by decrying them as unconstitutional. He had shewn, on a former occasion, together with several of his Honourable Friends, that so far from objecting factiously to any measure of government, or lying in wait to raise a cry against the Honourable Gentlemen, he was more ready than they had seemed to be, to brave that cry, in support of any measure of the sort alluded to, which the circumstances of the times might render necessary. — These were his ideas of the measures to be adopted, for creating that first and most indispensable requisite in the present state of the world, as well for the sake of immediate safety, as with a view to the future condition of the empire, — a regular and disposeable military force. Instead of this, the Honourable Gentlemen

seemed by their measures to be looking to any other force, rather than that of a regular army, the augmentation to which was as yet, by their own account, only 7000 men; while by their general conduct they had brought the country to a state, in which, at the end of nine months, a line of cruizers, or (according to the expression of an old poet, whom he did not dare to quote in the original) "a single plank," was all that protected the country, he would not say, from the "grave," but from evils and dangers, of a magnitude not to be described.

Mr. Windham was replied to by Mr. Yorke (Secretary of State for the Home Department). Mr. Pitt recommended a further application of 500,000l. to the Volunteer Service, in order to render it more efficient, by increasing the number of drills, and attaching a regular field-officer and adjutant to each battalion. Mr. T. Grenville and Mr. Fox concurred with Mr. Windham, and were answered by Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Addington (Chancellor of the Exchequer); after which the several resolutions on the estimates were put, and carried without a division.

DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY.

December 12, 1803.

THE Report on the Army Estimates occasioned a debate, in which the measures of the administration were opposed by Colonel Craufurd, and defended by Mr. Secretary Yorke. On the question being put on the last resolution on the Army Estimates relative to the Volunteers, Mr. Pitt repeated his desire that further aid should be granted to the Volunteer Service. The Chancellor of the Exchequer concurred in the principle of Mr. Pitt's suggestions, but doubted their practicability.

MR. WINDHAM said, he did not mean to trouble the House at any length, after what he had said on a former occasion; but, as many topics were then omitted, and some important suggestions had since been made, he thought it not unnecessary to say a few words. — His Right Honourable Friend under the gallery (Mr. Pitt) had explained and enforced, with his usual ability, the measures which he had wished to see adopted for the improvement of the volunteer system; observing, with too much truth, that his ideas in that respect were diametrically opposite to those of Mr. Windham. He lamented the fact, and and not the less sincerely, because it would happen in consequence, that *his* ideas must be diametrically opposite to those of his Right Honourable Friend. It

was always painful to him to differ from his Right Honourable Friend, with whom he so generally agreed: and independent of that feeling, there was commonly the further cause of regret, that his opinion, so opposed, had less chance of being received. It was not on that account, however, less necessary, that he should state the grounds, on which his opinion was formed.

His objections certainly did not arise from any general feeling adverse to voluntary service. On the contrary, he had always strongly declared himself in favour of voluntary service, as opposed to that which was compulsory: but voluntary service did not necessarily mean service of volunteer corps, such as they were now constituted. Here and there, perhaps, the cases might concur. One of the corps which he should have looked to, though resembling in some degree those to which he was objecting, was the corps of which his Right Honourable Friend was at the head: and which had contributed probably not a little, to lead him to the ideas which he now entertained respecting volunteer corps in general. This was a corps, formed in peculiar circumstances, and with peculiar advantages, both in respect of its leader, and of the men of whom it was composed. His Right Honourable friend was not to conclude that what could be done by himself, circumstanced too as he was, could be done by every other commander, and with respect to any ordinary corps. His Right Honourable Friend had at once his own personal powers, his general authority in the state, and the authority of his high

provincial office *, now directly applied to its ancient and appropriate functions. He had a people to deal with rendered tractable by a more immediate exposure to the danger, and animated with the idea of something of a peculiar character, and peculiar duties. It was the experience of what might be done in these particular circumstances, which had led his Honourable Friend into ideas erroneous, as he conceived, of this service in general.

For his part, he must confess, that the notions which he entertained, as well as the conclusions which he was led to draw, were altogether different. He must object to the volunteer system; first, as being very ill-adapted to the principal and more immediate purpose, for which it was granted; 2dly, as increasing most materially the difficulties of recruiting the army; 3dly, as being liable to have a most injurious influence on the character and conduct of the army; 4thly, as infringing the just claims, and violating the reasonable feelings, of military men, by confounding those distinctions which they had hitherto enjoyed exclusively, and effecting thereby a general depreciation of military titles and honours; 5thly, as confounding the ranks and gradations of civil life, while it disturbed and deranged the ordinary functions of society; and lastly, as liable to become a source of great future political danger, such as might be apprehended always, from bodies of armed men subject to no military controul,

* Note. — Warden of the Cinque Ports.

and whose constitution, as in the present instance, was, in innumerable points, precisely that, which would be most likely to give birth to such danger, and to render it formidable, were it to take place.

A proof of this latter assertion he would give to the House (since he perceived in some parts expressions of incredulity), by producing the constitution of one of the principal corps in this city, which had been recently furnished to him, and which he had in his pocket. It would appear by this, that the corps was governed, not by officers approved and appointed by His Majesty, but by committees and sub-committees, so constructed, as that it must happen continually that questions the most important to the proceedings and well-being of the corps, might be decided by a *quorum*, in which there should be *six* privates to *one* officer. Any thing more completely democratical, or better supplied with all the apparatus usually provided for such purposes, could not have been furnished by any of the dealers in constitutions to be found in the Corresponding Society. It was impossible, therefore, to look at these institutions, however full of zeal and loyalty at present, and to reflect on what they might become hereafter, without a considerable degree of jealousy and uneasiness. One effect of their power was already apparent in the complete conquest which they had obtained over His Majesty's ministers. It was plain, that the Honourable Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) did not dare to stir a step respecting them, without first asking their leave. It was whimsical to see the embarrassment in which he

was placed, between his fear of rejecting a proposition coming from the Right Honourable Gentleman behind him (Mr. Pitt), and the great dread of offending the volunteers. Both were objects of terror, and the combination of the two fears seemed likely to produce in the Right Honourable Gentleman, as was usual in such cases, a kind of diagonal course, that would satisfy neither one side nor the other. This was a most unpromising and disgraceful situation for a government to be seen in. A military measure, before it was adopted, might, with great propriety, be referred to those, who were likely to have a good judgment in military affairs; but the question referred would be, "what is good upon the whole for the interests of the state or of the army?" not, as in the present case, "what do the soldiers or officers like?" Such, however, was the ascendancy which the volunteer body already had over the government! He wished they might be able to prevail as easily over the legions of Buonaparté. If they would, he should be inclined, for one, to overlook all other dangers that might be apprehended from them. He would shut his eyes to consequences, and 'jump the life to come,' if he could be satisfied that the system, as at present established, was calculated to answer its grand purpose, that of the defence of the country against a foreign enemy.—It seemed to be admitted, that it was not so at present: though it was hoped it might become so under the alterations proposed by his Right Honourable Friend. He was fain to confess, that he despaired of the efficacy of these alterations. It was not that he did not see

the advantage of having an intelligent regular officer attached to a volunteer corps; or the improvement which the corps would receive by the effect of greater training. But how were these advantages to be obtained? And to what extent could they, after all, be carried? Among the difficulties of obtaining part of these advantages, viz. the assistance of the regular officers, must be stated, not only the consent of the corps, which did not appear, by what had been said that night, to be quite a thing of course, but the consent of the officers; and when to ensure this latter, it was proposed that rank should attach to these appointments, a most material objection arose on account of the effect which such a system would be likely to have on the character and discipline of the army. A more mischievous thing could not well be conceived, than to let loose, among the army, a wild spirit of speculation, similar to that which was so fatally opened at the beginning of the late war by the measure of raising men for rank, and to put half the officers of the army upon seeking advancement in their profession, not by foreign service, not by professional skill, not by a strict discharge of their regimental duties, nor by the approbation and good will of their commanders, but by interest and recommendation among colonels, (or committees,) of volunteer corps. The evils of such a state of things would reach to a greater extent, and operate in more directions, than might at first be supposed. It would unsettle the minds of officers; it would disturb the discipline of regiments; it would weaken the useful dependence of officers

upon their superiors; it would injure the military character; it would relax the zeal and spirit of the army by opening a new channel to advancement independent of service or military merit; it would produce discouragement and discontent, by new examples of men, who had succeeded in reaching the honours, by deserting the duties, of their profession.

If this was the view of the measure, in respect to the army, it would not be very promising, on the other hand, with respect to the volunteer corps, for whom, certainly, it would not procure that class of officers, (it was to be hoped so at least,) who would be likely to render them the greatest service. But when the best was done in procuring aid of this sort, what, after all, could be the effects which it could produce upon corps constituted as those in question must necessarily be. To give opportunity for the exertions of these officers, an augmentation was to be made in the number of days of training: but, besides the insufficiency of the time proposed, great as it might be, to give to men the expertness, and much more, the general habits and character of soldiers, was it considered how far the assembling men in this way would be practicable; and what the inconvenience would be, could it be effected?

Here came in the great and insurmountable difficulty in the attempting to give to volunteer corps the form and character of regular troops. — Without embodying there could be neither discipline nor training: and how was it to be supposed, that men engaged in the common avocations of life, and who never meant

to enter into service as a means of livelihood, could continue long embodied? Every attempt of this sort was an attempt against the nature of things. *Ex quovis ligno, &c.* or, to take the English version, 'you could not make a silk purse out of a sow's ear,' you could not make that hard, cutting instrument called an army, out of a mass of inhabitants, residents, householders, men with families, men with property, men engaged in trades and callings, though for purposes of local defence, and with a view to special services, they might be willing to enrol themselves into volunteer corps. He had wished, therefore, that the attempt should never originally have been made; and upon the same principle was equally averse from all expedients and contrivances, for the purpose of assisting it; being persuaded, that it never could succeed.

Had the volunteers been willing, or, more properly, had they been advised or permitted, to assume the character of an armed peasantry, and to have trained themselves accordingly, they would not only have been far more useful, but would have been free from the inconveniences now chargeable upon these corps in the form in which they at present subsisted.

One of these he had already described to be, the factious tendency which they might discover hereafter, and the general dangers to be apprehended from bodies of armed men, subject to no military controul. — But an evil more immediate, and more certain, though somewhat more confined, was to be apprehended from their effects upon the army. These were of several sorts. The first and most obvious was the reduction made

in those numbers, from which the militia and army of reserve were to be supplied; the latter body being the only fund from which they could now look to recruit the army. Four hundred thousand men, who, if it was hoped to make soldiers of them, must be considered as men capable of military service, could not all be persons, whom no temptation could induce to enter into the army, or who, if drawn for the militia or army of reserve, would all decline to serve in person. Such a portion, therefore, of the active population of the country could not be withdrawn and set apart, and other services not be the worse for it. The inconvenience would certainly be augmented, by measures such as those recommended by his Right Honourable Friend, and in general by whatever tended to give to the volunteer corps more of the shape and air of regular troops. Volunteer captains or colonels might not care much at present about restraining their men from entering into other services, nor feel very confident, probably, as to the powers they possessed for that purpose. But in proportion as the corps improved in appearance and regularity, these powers, if they existed, would be ascertained and exerted; or, if taken away, would be followed by the same complaints, which had been heard from militia-colonels, namely, that they would not submit to become recruiters for the army.

Such could hardly fail to be the effect of the volunteer system in respect to the *recruiting* the army. But were there no effects which might be apprehended with respect to its discipline and character? The vo-

lunteers were, to be sure, and necessarily must be, so inferior to the regular army, that little possibly might be apprehended from their example. Men were not apt to take examples from those whom they did not look up to. But it must be remembered, that what was wanting in authority, might be made up in numbers. Between volunteers and militia, the notion of a regular army had nearly dropped from their minds. — They hardly enquired what it was or where it was to be found. It seemed to be the least part of the national defence: *Pars minima est ipsa puella sui.* It was so enveloped and hid in the force of various kinds that surrounded it, that it might be all withdrawn, and for a long while its removal not be perceived. But was there no danger, that in this state, forgotten by others, it might at last forget itself, and feel by degrees the contagion of that mass under which it was thus concealed and buried? A long communication with troops, who, with appearances the same, were, in habits, notions, constitution, and practices, so widely at variance with all that was military, might in time produce an effect even on the regular army. — He would not dilate upon this danger; but advert to an effect, which, though of a less alarming, perhaps less important nature, was not undeserving of consideration, viz. the immense depreciation which these institutions must produce in the value of military titles and honours; honours which were, heretofore, confined to military men, but were now lavished among persons, having no pretensions to that character. It would hardly be said, that this could be of no consequence,

for that after all, every man knew his own value, and that the difference between regular and irregular service would still be the same, however external distinctions might be confounded. He should be glad to try this with respect to other honours. He should be glad to know from his Right Honourable Friend, or from the Honourable Gentlemen opposite to him, whether the candidates for peerages, and baronetcies, for red and blue ribands, would be satisfied on being told, that these distinctions could be no object to them, as they would neither make them richer nor wiser, nor more powerful, nor confer or declare any quality that was not equally possessed and equally known, at the moment of their application? Whether the present holders of these honours would be perfectly well pleased, or *were* perfectly well pleased, at seeing them become as cheap and common as most of them, it must be confessed, had of late years been made? Yet the complaint in this case would be far less reasonable than in the other. It was much more easy to conceive, why an officer, with only his pay to live on, with no place perhaps in society but what his commission gave, and with nothing to announce his commission but the ribband in his hat, or the title by which he was addressed, should be tenacious of these distinctions, earned through many a hard day's service; than why men, possessed apparently of all that fortune could give, should be pining after honours, which to the eyes of ordinary observers could add so little either to their happiness or consequence. A great peer, it might be thought, could better dispense with a riband, or a

great commoner with a peerage, so far as distinction was concerned, than a soldier of fortune with those tokens and titles, which were to distinguish him in the eyes of strangers, and which, being withdrawn or confounded, left him without distinction of any kind. But these things were not only relatively great, great to the officer, who had probably nothing else either to supply their place or to console him for the want of them; they were in themselves distinctions, which all mankind would agree to value, and of which it would be much easier to explain the value, than of many of those which were more eagerly pursued. Formerly, he who bore the title of captain or colonel, could be no other than a man belonging to an honourable profession, who, if not in the prime of life, must probably have been an actor in scenes, which every one would be glad to have shared in; and have displayed qualities, which those who most felt to possess them, would still be happy to have evinced by trial. His title afforded presumption of a character, which the common feelings of mankind would never suffer to be regarded but with respect. Could the same be said of every other honour? Of which, nevertheless, the extension and depreciation would justly be considered as a ground of complaint. No one certainly could look down upon an honour, which implied that the person attaining it had been accepted on the part of his Sovereign. But, since in this, as in other instances, the Sovereign would not act but by advice, nothing was really proved in these cases but the protection and favour of the minister; which might evince the political power of the

party, but neither was, nor pretended to be, an evidence of any thing else. Let it not be said, therefore, that those who reduced the value of military distinctions, took from officers, and from the army, nothing but what they ought to part with, with indifference. If this were so, every title, order, medal, decoration of whatever sort, was a mere toy and plaything, which none but trifling minds could value, and which might be dispensed from thenceforth to whoever would take it, without the least regret on the part of those, by whom, till then, it had been enjoyed — Whether the loss of this distinction had excited any regret on the part of the army, was more than he could pretend to say. Very possibly it had not; though the effects in time would not be the less felt. But that the distinction was in fact lost, could be no longer matter of dispute. A witty lady of the last age, the mother of a venerable marquis, still more distinguished than her for his numerous and happy sallies, was reported to have said, upon some great creation of peers, that she was afraid to spit out of her window, lest what fell at the moment should happen to light upon a peer. A similar apprehension might be felt in the present circumstances with respect to persons bearing His Majesty's commission. — There could not be a company assembled of half a dozen, in which, the chance was not, that one of the number was an officer. He himself was a captain; it was probable, that before long he should be a colonel. What might be his impressions in these circumstances, when placed before persons having real pretensions to these titles, it was of

little consequence to inquire: they would be those probably of a Knight's Lady, who should hear herself addressed as 'your Ladyship,' in the presence of a Countess: But it might be material to consider, what would be the feelings of those (if they happened to have are care upon the subject), who having embraced the army as a profession, and served in every quarter of the world, should find themselves suddenly lost in a crowd of officers, who had never seen, or were likely to see a day's service, and who, like himself, had nothing military but the name.

These were some of the objections to the volunteer system, as it respected the army. But its effects on the community at large were far from inconsiderable. It was attended with great expence: it created much individual embarrassment: it mixed, in a manner by no means desirable, the several ranks and orders of society: it disturbed, to a degree highly incommodious, many of the functions of common life; and would do so yet further, if the plan was pursued of giving to these corps a still more regular consistency.

He would not pursue these topics severally and in detail: but to one he could not but advert, as it was connected more immediately with the suggestions which had been made that night. It was a great mistake to suppose that in withdrawing men from their avocations and employments, it was easier and better to take the labour of many partially, than of a few altogether. The contrary was in general the fact. Men, removed altogether, were replaced by others, who filled up the void which they had left; and society

after a while went on as usual. A man who enlisted, was like a man dead. It was rare that his place remained long unoccupied; that the opening made was not soon closed. But not so with the man, whose employment was only suspended, who was to be called away for awhile, as in the plan proposed, and then to go back to his occupation, with all the inconvenience of having left it, and all the difficulty possibly of resuming it at his return. If he was an artisan or small tradesman, his neighbour had run away with his business: if he was a journeyman or farmer's servant, his master had provided himself with a new man: his employers and customers in the meanwhile had been wanting his labour; there would be a period, during which, they could neither have had *him* to work or to deal with; nor have been able to supply his place by another. He would himself at the end of this have his livelihood to seek; for he would not, like the soldier, have found a provision in his new profession.

Nothing would, therefore, be found for the most part to answer less in practice, than this notion of taking part of the labour and leaving the remainder, of employing the man during part of his time in learning the business of a soldier, and leaving him at the end to return to his ordinary occupations. It was as impossible to take half the man, as to kill half a sheep. When it came to the question of an embodied force, or any thing beyond armed peasantry, it seemed infinitely better, both for the individual and for the public, that the man should be either entirely a soldier

or not at all; and that he should not be left in that mixed intermediate state in which he would be fit for neither capacity, would be just enough of a soldier to be spoiled for a peasant or artisan, and too much of a peasant or artisan (or whatever else he happened to be), to admit of his becoming a valuable or well-trained soldier. As to the expence of a force thus composed, it could not be better illustrated than by what had been said by an Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Rose) of the provision to be made for the families of these men during their time of exercise. His idea that in virtue of this training, they would, if employed as light infantry, be as well qualified to encounter the enemy as any troops in His Majesty's service, was a little contrary to received opinions, and very contrary to the opinion of his Right Honourable Friend near him (Mr. Pitt), who had described the service of light infantry, and in many respects truly, as that which required more training than any other. If zeal and courage were all in all, as in some parts of his speech the Honourable Gentleman seemed to think, no training at all would be necessary. And this was in some degree his (Mr. Windham's) opinion. He thought that so little, after all, could be done by the sort of training now attempted to be given to the volunteers, and that the evils and inconveniences attending the attempt were so great, that he wished this species of training to be forborne altogether; and that the country should content itself with that, which, while it contained what was by far the most essential, would be attended, comparatively, with no expence, no loss

of time, no interruption to the common business and avocations of life.

Such a course of proceeding was, as he conceived, better both upon the whole, and certainly so, with a view to the crisis of the moment, which could not wait the slow return of any long circuitous method. The illustration used by an Honourable Gentleman the other night (Mr. Fox), was so happy, that it might seem almost to be conclusive. If the question (said he) was of instructing a person thoroughly in the knowledge of any language, you would begin, of course, by the usual methods, and as the first step, ground him well in his *accidence*. But if the call was pressing, and the time limited, and the occasion such as required no profound or critical knowledge, but so much acquaintance only with the current language as might suffice for the purposes of a journey or a short tour, you would be intent upon teaching first the most necessary words and phrases, and proceed to other things as time and opportunity might allow.

In the present instance he was satisfied, that not merely on account of the urgency of the occasion, but from the nature of the subject, another and more simple kind of training, was that which ought to have been adopted. But at all events, and under whatever mode of training, the form and constitution of the corps should have been such, as not to interfere with the supply of other more regular and more important services. If it was too late to provide entirely against the continuance of the evil at that time incurred, care should at least be taken that it was not increased in

future. Whatever was due to the volunteers in point of good faith must be strictly fulfilled. To what extent that went he was not prepared to say. But nothing certainly could require, that exemptions should be extended to those who might enter from that time forwards, and no such exemptions; therefore, ought on any account to be granted.

Mr. Erskine and the Attorney General replied to Mr. Windham's arguments, which were supported by Dr. Laurence; after which the question was put and carried, and all the resolutions of the committee were read and agreed to.

VOLUNTEERS' AMENDMENT BILL.

December 14, 1803.

THE order of the day being read for the third reading of the Volunteers' Amendment Bill (the object of which was to define the exemptions to which members of Volunteer Corps were entitled),

MR. WINDHAM said, he was much grieved, that by not being present in the House the night before, he had lost the opportunity of offering some suggestions, which would, he conceived, if adopted, materially have improved the bill. He did not expect the report would have been brought up before this day, and as it was competent to offer any improvements that occurred, upon the report, he had been less anxious to attend in his place yesterday. It was true, that Reports were, in cases of urgency, immediately received: but this was not a case of urgency; and the present ministers ought to have known more than any other men the propriety of leaving every measure before the House for as long a time as possible. The very bill which they now pressed forward so unnecessarily, arose from that sort of hasty legislation which left in every act doubts and ambiguities requiring further acts to remove them. The Honourable

Gentlemen seemed particularly prone to this. They were fond of driving to an inch, of running every thing to the last moment. The consequence was, as it necessarily must be even with persons more expert, that being obliged to act in a hurry, whatever they did was crude, ill-considered, and full of mistakes. There were two modes, Dr. Johnson had observed, of composition; one, in which the several parts received from the writer, before they passed from his mind, all the perfection which he hoped to give to them; the other, in which they were committed to paper in the first instance to be improved by subsequent correction. The Honourable Gentlemen, by the circumstances in which they placed themselves so constantly, seemed to prefer the latter of these modes. They threw down their first loose thoughts in an act of Parliament; trusting to future consideration and experience to bring them to something of a better shape. An Act of Parliament was their foul copy, in which it did not signify how many faults there were, as the Legislature would be able afterwards to set them right. Their preference to this mode was founded, he supposed, upon the observation of the poet, that poets

> Lost half the praise they should have got,
> Were it but known, what they discreetly blot.

The Honourable Gentlemen did not choose to lose this praise. They chose to compose in public; and to have full credit both for their first conceptions, and for the successive improvements which changed them often to something utterly unlike what they had been originally.

Though by this course of proceeding of the Honourable Gentlemen in the present instance, he had lost the opportunity of suggesting his amendment in a stage when it might have been received, he should nevertheless mention it, with a view to occasions, when the volunteer system might be again under discussion. It was in fact, however, no more than what he had already urged on more occasions than one, viz. the putting a stop to exemptions with respect to those who should enter into volunteer corps in future. To abolish those already subsisting was, he was aware, difficult, and might perhaps be impossible. Certainly it ought not to be attempted, if it could not be put upon a footing to make it consistent with good faith. But the granting such exemptions in future, and continuing by design what had got a place in the system only by chance and against the intention of its authors, was a proceeding for which no rational motive could be assigned, and which he could not hear without great surprise, as well as concern, was to make a part of the present bill.

What he had further to object being of a sort, which could not have been corrected by an amendment or clause, was as proper (or more proper) to be urged on that day as on the day before. It was an objection to the whole system. While the right of exemption produced the effect on one hand of defrauding the army, the army of reserve and the militia, by contracting the population, from which they were severally to be supplied, it oppressed the whole country, on the other, and particularly the

lower orders, to a degree the most grievous, and by means the most intolerable that were ever admitted into the institutions of any civilized community. Where did any one ever hear, except as matter of complaint and reprobation, of a power such as that vested in the leaders of volunteer corps, whether one or many, of deciding arbitrarily and without appeal, who should, or should not, be liable to a ballot, the effects of which would be to the persons on whom it might fall, a fine of 40 or 50 guineas? These were sums which to the bulk of those who might be liable to them, would be nothing less than absolute ruin; at the same time that it might be equally ruin to them to quit their trades and their families, and to engage for a service of five years, as soldiers. Such a power lodged in the hands of a commandant where the constitution of the corps was monarchical, or in a committee or sub-committee, where its form was republican or democratical, would rank hereafter, for oppression and abuse, with any of those most famous in history — with the dispensing power, or with that of granting indulgences. It was not that this power was applied abusively or oppressively, in many or perhaps in any instances, at present; but it could hardly fail to be so in the end, and in the meanwhile must be considered as out of the course of all ordinary proceedings, and one for which it was hardly possible to find a fit depositary. Such a power must, however, exist somewhere, supposing the privilege of exemption to continue; for it was impossible to imagine, that every one could be allowed to enter into a volunteer corps that pleased;

and he or they, who had the power of admission or rejection, must possess the power here spoken of, improper and unsafe as that power might be.

The only remedy was, either to abolish exemptions, or to abolish volunteer corps. It seemed hardly possible to correct the evil by regulation. Nor was it to be conceived, that such evil had now become small, because the greater part of the militia and army of reserve were raised, and ballots of consequence to the same extent were no longer wanted. To the same extent they certainly would not be wanted; but it must be recollected always, that what there were would have to operate upon diminished numbers: so that to supply and maintain the present force, that is to say, to make good what was then wanting, and afterwards to maintain the whole (for which latter purpose too, as was obvious, more would be required the larger was the force already raised), these ballots would perhaps not be much less burthensome than they had been at any preceding period.

So much as to the oppression of this system, armed as it was with a power such as he had described, which the present bill both confirmed and extended, and which it seemed extremely difficult to take away.

Its injurious effect on all the other species of force he must still maintain, notwithstanding the specious statements made on the other side.—First, as to the fact. Whatever the numbers might be, produced by recruiting during the last seven months, as compared with the produce of an equal number of months during an antecedent period, and however small the

proportional diminution which appeared to have taken place in the latter instance, he must still insist upon some strong and hard facts; namely, that in many regiments the return *per* month was not more than two, and sometimes not so much; and that in one of the largest recruiting districts, comprising many extensive and not unfavourable counties, the rate of recruiting *per* month was not more than seven or eight. Now, when this was so, let the gross numbers be what they would, he must contend that recruiting was nearly at a stand, taking the question upon the footing on which it ought to be taken, as a comparison between the supply and the consumption, between what was gained to the army in recruits, and what was lost by desertion, death, invaliding and discharges. But next as to the reasoning. Proportion, which the Honourable Gentlemen dwelt so much upon, that is to say, the proportionate abatement in the numbers at that time recruited, compared with those recruited in equal periods formerly, was not that on which the question properly turned. Proportion, it was true, in abstract quantities had place among the smallest as perfectly as among the greatest. If the Honourable Gentlemen had a mind to be very deeply learned, they might tell us of the proportion of one *nothing* to another *nothing*; a mode of conception very applicable certainly in one view to much of their recruiting. But in common concerns they must apply to proportion, what was said of law, *de minimis non curat lex*. If a regiment, which formerly recruited three a month, now recruited two, you were not obliged to say *gene-*

rally, that recruiting in that regiment had declined one-third, nor on the other hand could you be entitled to say, that it had declined *only* one-third. Such variations would happen by chance, and by a law consequently wholly different from that of proportion. No conclusion, therefore, could be drawn from such instances separately considered: and if a judgment were to be formed, as it ought to be, from the whole state of facts taken together, it would be the very reverse of that meant to be established by the Honourable Gentlemen; who, instead of saying, 'the recruiting during the existence of these causes, (viz. the immense bounties; the great extent of the militia force; the 400,000 men locked up as volunteers, &c. &c.) has been so and so; therefore these causes have not operated to its disadvantage,' ought to say, 'the recruiting being what it is, *notwithstanding* the operation of these causes, which must have acted against it so powerfully, what would it not have been, had these been removed, and other new causes, which must be presumed to have arisen, have been left to produce their natural effect?' This he must contend was the legitimate conclusion. It was not in the nature of things, that causes such as he had enumerated, and were obvious to every one's observation, must not have some effect in checking the progress of recruiting. To take only one, — could any man in his senses suppose, that with fifty guineas offered for service in the army of reserve, men would go on to enter for the line, at a bounty of five or ten, in the same manner as if no such competition existed? If

the recruiting, therefore, kept up to nearly its former amount, as was contended by the Honourable Gentlemen, it was plain, even to demonstration, that there must have been something to counteract the effect of these impediments. And this something it was not difficult to find. It was a state of war; it was the threat of invasion: it was the *stimulus* of the compulsory service: the discharge of numbers of workmen in consequence of temporary checks to trade; the general military spirit, that filled and animated every part of the country. These circumstances were of force sufficient to uphold to a certain degree the recruiting service, even in spite of the causes which tended to depress and to annihilate it. How far might they not have carried it, had there been nothing on the other side to counteract their effects?

The objection, therefore, to the volunteer system, as contributing, with other causes, to destroy the recruiting of the army, continued in full force, even admitting the statements of the Honourable Gentlemen: And he must continue to urge these objections, even though he should be asked, as he was the other night, why he would persist in decrying a system, which, whether right or wrong, was now fixed and incapable of being altered. His answer was, that it was not fixed, but must on the contrary, and infallibly would, and that, at no distant period, come again under revision, and that it was with a view to that period, that these observations were made; that the defects of this system were such as would never suffer it to go on long as it was; and that, if other causes

were wanting, the very failure of its funds must soon bring it again before Parliament. Unless Parliament greased the wheels, the machine must soon stand still. He wished, therefore, that before that time gentlemen would be prepared with their opinions on the several parts of the measure; would consider how far the objections were valid; how far the parts objected to might be corrected or got rid of; and, failing of that, whether the whole system would not require to be new cast, and in a great degree, possibly, to be done away.

A debate ensued, in which the spirit and provisions of the bill were censured by Colonel Craufurd, Sir W. Young and Dr. Laurence, and vindicated by Mr. Hiley Addington and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In reply to some observations made by the latter, Mr. Windham, in explanation, denied that he ever meant to disparage the Volunteers; and said, that his remarks upon the reduction of the army previous to the commencement of the war, referred to the disbanding of the foreign corps in our service, which was a proceeding that he would ever condemn. The bill was read a third time, and passed.

VOLUNTEER CONSOLIDATION BILL.

March 22, 1804.

A BILL had been brought into the House of Commons by Mr. Secretary Yorke, "to explain, amend, and consolidate the "provisions contained in the several acts relating to Yeomanry "and Volunteer Corps throughout the United Kingdom."

The third reading of this Bill having been moved by Mr. Yorke, Colonel Craufurd, in a speech of considerable length, urged various objections against it. After a loud cry of "Question, Question," from the ministerial benches,

MR. WINDHAM rose. He confessed that he felt no surprise at the uneasiness which Ministers betrayed by their cry for the question to get rid of the measure before the House. It had certainly given them much trouble, and was likely to give them and the country much more. They might, however, state, as a justification for the silence which they seemed willing to preserve upon this occasion, that all the arguments used by his Honourable Friend who had just sat down had been advanced before. This might be for the most part true, but he would ask, whether those arguments had ever been answered, and whether they did not remain entirely unrefuted? If so, then, they ought to be repeated, in order, if possible, to persuade the pertinacious adherents of this dangerous system to

yield to their force, and to resort to measures more consonant to wisdom, and better calculated to secure the safety of the country. But, perhaps, Ministers had exhausted their eloquence upon this subject, by the four-and-twenty new clauses which they had introduced, and being tired of amendment and re-amendment, of commitment and recommitment, of propositions and recantations, were anxious to send the measure out of the House, without any more words about it. To their wishes, however, he was not disposed to yield, and as this was perhaps the last opportunity of speaking upon this bill, he would avail himself of it to enter his solemn protest against a measure which he thought, if persisted in, would lead to little short of absolute ruin. This sentence, however harsh, he could not hesitate to pronounce, as the full conviction of his mind.

The House, he observed, had never yet taken a distinct view of the question. One way of shewing what the question was, was to shew what it was not. It was not a question between volunteers and no volunteers; between a system such as was now proposed, and no system at all; between the present bill and a total absence of that force to which the present bill was meant to apply. Any Gentleman might easily satisfy himself upon that point, by only considering whether he should suppose, if the present bill had never been brought in, that all volunteer force would have ceased. The bill, therefore, was not necessary to the *existence* of a volunteer force; its object both was and professed to be, to improve a force of that

description which already subsisted, and which would continue to subsist though no such bill should be brought in: and the objection on the part of himself and others who thought with him on this occasion, was, that the improvement to be obtained was in many of its parts doubtful, that it was not applicable to much of that for which it professed to be intended, and that it was at all events not worth the price that must be paid for it: for that independent of other considerations, though the bill might in the end do something for bettering the volunteers, it would in the meanwhile operate most injuriously on every other species of force, and finally deprive us of that species which was confessedly the most valuable, he meant a regular army. This was the view to be taken of the question, and these the several points of comparison, by the result of which the question must be determined.

To assist the judgment of the House in forming that comparison, it would be right to consider some of the general reasonings on which all the measures adopted for some time past seemed to have been founded. — These would, for the most part, be reducible to the three or four following propositions: 1st, that the prospect of an immediate attack from the enemy, though not absolutely certain, was so nearly so, that persons must act precisely as if its certainty was assured to them. 2dly, that this danger, thus certain and immediate, was of a nature so disproportionate to every other, that nothing could be allowed to come in competition with it, or could be regarded for the time otherwise than as it could be made con-

sistent with that great and over-ruling object. 3dly, that the improvement of the volunteers was, in the actual state of things, the means most effectual that could be taken for guarding against this danger, and, consequently, must be pursued, even supposing (what was not admitted) that it was injurious in many other respects, and was inconsistent with those provisions and establishments which would be most conducive to the safety of the country in future. These propositions, every one of which ought to be true, to support the measures which had been built upon them, were nevertheless, he would venture to say, every one of them false.

To the first, which said that such was the probability of an immediate attack, that our conduct must be the same as if the event were certain, the answer was, that our language and our actions were wholly at variance with each other, and that nothing could be more evident, than, that while we talked this language, we ourselves had no belief in the truth of it; for that, if we had, it was impossible to suppose that we should content ourselves with such precautions merely as those which we were taking. It was in vain, therefore, to attempt to rest any measure upon the ground that we were to consider the present danger, otherwise than as one which, though probable in a high degree, might nevertheless not happen.

The other proposition, that, namely, which related to the *magnitude* of the danger, which would confine the whole of our thoughts and exertions to the business of present defence, and would allow of no competition

between that and any other object, was a question of somewhat greater extent, and required a more particular examination. It was always forgot or dissembled in talking upon this subject, that cases of present danger were to be distinguished into two sorts, viz. those in which the danger being present, was present merely, and, if it should happily be escaped, would be succeeded by a state of ordinary security; and those in which the danger, though present, was only the commencement of a long course of danger, which might last with more or less interruption and remission, and possibly with great occasional increase, for a period, as was well stated in the present instance, of which the youngest of us might not live to see the conclusion. In the latter of these cases, it was idle to say, that we could confine our thoughts merely to the consideration of the danger of the moment. We could not do so, without an abandonment of all the principles of right reason, and of civil prudence, both public and private. It might be admitted, if any one pleased, that the character of the present danger was such as to allow of no comparison with any consideration of a different sort; that no thought of future prosperity or greatness, of riches, of commerce, or any other object of national interest, could be opposed to that first and paramount consideration, the salvation and actual existence of the state. But the comparison which he was contending for, and which the present case required, was not of safety against interests, life against money, &c. &c.,—quantities between which there might be no comparison or proportion, but of safety against safety, danger

against danger, the danger of the present moment against that of the next and every one that was to succeed it. There was the same fallacy in the reasonings which he was adverting to, as occurred often in discussions upon the treaty of Amiens, and other occasions of that sort, where the question used to be described as a question between war and peace. The answer was, that it was not a question between war and peace, but, as we now experienced to our cost, between war and war — war such as it was at that time, and war such as we now find it to be, when we are shut up as prisoners in our own island, and are fighting, not to conquer the enemy, but to preserve ourselves from destruction. We must inevitably, therefore, and whether we would or no, take into our consideration the interests of future moments, as well as of the present, and not be guilty of the folly of trying to save ourselves from the present danger, by means that must ensure our perishing under the self-same danger the moment after. The only possible case in which we could justify the disregard of all precautions for our future safety, would be, the certainty that the present danger must overwhelm us. If he were sure that he must perish to-day, he might safely neglect all provision for to-morrow: but if he were not sure of perishing to-day, and that the danger was of that sort which, even if averted for the moment, would not thereby cease and pass away, he must, upon every principle of reason, in considering the means necessary for his present safety, have a view to the dangers which were immediately to succeed.

Under this conviction, therefore, and upon these principles, the House must come to the consideration of that third proposition which he had adverted to, and on which the present bill was founded; namely, that the improvement of the volunteer system, supposing it to be the best for present defence, was for that reason, and without further inquiry, to be adopted. Two questions were for this purpose equally important. Was the improvement of the volunteer system, the measure most efficacious for present defence? And admitting it even to be so, was it the measure (taking in, agreeably to what he had just been contending for, both present and future dangers,) which would most conduce to our safety upon the whole, and for that reason to be adopted, whatever objections might be urged against it in other respects? To these a third might be added, which he would not stop to argue at length: was it certain, that by the measures now proposed, the force of the volunteers would, in reality, receive any addition? The question must not be wholly passed by, nor dismissed, without a word or two of observation. Though it might be admitted, that greater allowances in money, by enabling the volunteers oftener to assemble, would considerably assist their training; that the aid of officers and non-commissioned officers from the regulars would contribute to the same end; and advantage possibly be derived from the regulations for securing attendance in the first instance, and afterwards for enforcing orderly behaviour among those who should be made to attend, yet it must be remembered, that these benefits

would not be obtained without a certain abatement, and that a part of the provisions in question, while they might improve the discipline, were likely to thin the numbers of the corps. This was a circumstance, which even the approvers of the present system must consider as a drawback: but by those who disapproved of that system, who have always considered it as mistaken and vicious, and as turning the zeal and energy of the country into a wrong channel, a further objection must be found in whatever tended (and was designed) to confirm that system, and to continue the volunteers in a course which they ought never to have taken. Much doubt might, therefore, be felt, whether the volunteer force would, in reality, be increased by the provisions of this bill: in other words, whether what was represented as an improvement, was in truth an improvement or not? But admitting this to be the fact, there still came the two great and leading inquiries; first, how far the improvement of the volunteers was the best course to be pursued, with a view even to present danger; considering, that even for the moment this improvement would not be obtained, but by means prejudicial in other respects? And secondly, how far what might be best for the moment, would be best upon the long-run, and might not more than counterbalance what was gained in present safety, by the injury done to all our means of safety in future?

It was singular enough, that in all this discussion about the improvement of the volunteers, no one should have remarked, that the main clause of the

bill, that which was by far the most efficient and operative, namely, that which gave the exemptions, was one, in which improvement was not at all concerned. A man was not a bit the better volunteer, was not in the smallest degree improved, either in his marching, or in the use of his musquet, in consequence of being exempted from the militia or army of reserve. The whole effect of this clause was not to improve, but to continue the volunteers; and in the question, therefore, of improvement, must be wholly laid out of consideration, though, in other views, it was the most important and powerful clause of all. It was of consequence that the House should keep distinctly in its view, that there were two descriptions of clauses in the bill: those, namely, which were meant for the improvement of the volunteer body, and those which were directed only to preserve and keep it together. The former might be called the *improving*, and the latter the *preservative* clauses. The latter had nothing to do with improvement, and could be considered as no addition to the bill in that respect; but the former had, on the contrary, something to do with the maintenance and preservation of the body, and, in fact, would be found to operate very forcibly against it. The powers given to the commanders of corps, the regulations for enforcing obedience, the additional days of attendance, all these would in themselves, and still more by the sort of confused apprehension which they would excite, operate, probably, in driving considerable numbers from the volunteer service, and in

counteracting the effect intended to be produced by the grant of exemptions. And so far the Honourable Gentleman might say, that he (Mr. W.) must approve of their operation, inasmuch as it would defeat in part the effect of a clause which he was not inclined to approve. But in fact, when the matter came to be considered, it would be found that they would not be attended with even this advantage. Though they might thin the volunteers, they would not reduce the grievance complained of, which was, the injury done by the volunteer system to other services. The objection to the grant of exemptions was, not that it gave men to the volunteers, but that it withdrew them from services which were more important; and this evil would not be diminished, unless, contrary to what was likely to be the fact, the men whom these new regulations might cause to resign, were persons who had no exemptions but those which their volunteer service gave them. The reverse was rather to be expected, viz. that those persons would first give way, who had no need, for protection, of service in the volunteers, but had protections of another sort, either from age or number of children, or from their being already serving by substitute in some other species of force. These persons might go, while the others remained; so that with less numbers in the volunteers, the number withdrawn from other services might continue just the same; and thus, all the evils consequent upon the present bill will be incurred, while the volunteer force, that force to which every thing was sacrificed, would really be less in numbers, and probably weaker alto-

gether, than if none of these mischievous provisions had been introduced.

Here, therefore, if the facts were as he supposed, would be a good answer to one of the questions which he had adverted to, namely, whether even present security was well provided for by the measures now proposed? It was not very intelligible, how an immediate danger was to be provided against by a gradual improvement; how they were to guard against the dangers of the next three weeks, or next three months, by such a change as could be effected in the volunteers by the operation of the bill during that time. But when to this was to be added, the reduction of numbers which the bill might occasion, — a reduction not unlikely to operate faster in diminishing the volunteer force, (meaning here by that expression, not the numbers, but the real effective result of the system), than the improved discipline would in increasing it; and (far more than all this) when they were to take into consideration the effects of this system, not future and distant, but instant and immediate, upon all the other and better species of force; — it did not seem too much to say, that from the present moment, as well as at all future ones, the country would be weaker in its general defence, in consequence of this bill, and of others which had preceded it, than if no such bills had ever been passed.

The greater part of the evils here complained of, which would begin to operate from the present moment, which would continue their operation through all succeeding ones, would be derivable partly from the

condition respecting exemptions, which the present bill confirmed, and partly from what was now professed, and what might at all times have been expected, of the course likely to be pursued by the executive government. It was easy to foresee, and it had in fact been foreseen, that those who wished to make the volunteers permanent, and to give them their present shape and character, would adopt a course of proceeding with them, similar to that which had in part been declared.

The first circumstance that presented itself upon this occasion was, the odd idea of making the volunteer system permanent. It was very near a contradiction in terms. Zeal was, in its nature, a very transitory feeling; and accordingly the Honourable Gentlemen, when they meant to prolong a system derived originally from that source, very prudently had recourse to motives more constant in their operation, and less likely to fail, than a mere effusion of zeal and patriotism excited by an opinion of present danger. The permanence of the system was to be entrusted to the good old steady principles of interest and fear, excited by bounties and advantages on the one hand, and penalties on the other. It was whimsical, indeed, to hear those who had vaunted so loudly the disinterestedness of these corps, who had branded as enemies to the volunteers every one who had hinted even a suspicion that a view to exemptions could have had any influence upon their offers, now stating, that nothing but the hope of exemptions could hold them together, and that they would all fall to pieces the moment this

principle of coherence was withdrawn. Let it be remembered always, that this was the language of their friends. *He* had never said more, than that the prospect of exemptions had been a motive with many; as with many, it certainly had not. He could himself vindicate from any share in that motive, those with whom he had been more immediately connected, as they had been expressly told, that exemptions were what they were by no means to count upon. Testimonies to the same effect had been heard from every part of the House; and the fact was, indeed, notorious, that a great part of the volunteers, probably much the greater, had offered their services, either not thinking about exemptions, or being distinctly told that they were not to have them. It was curious, therefore, to hear it now stated, and by those who made themselves the peculiar guardians of the character of the volunteers, that exemptions, and exemptions only, would induce them to continue their services. He was inclined to doubt this statement, at least to the extent to which it was urged. It could hardly apply to those who had never had exemptions in view, and who, by possessing them hitherto, had enjoyed a *bonus* which they had not originally looked to; and if there were others, who, having been influenced by that motive, which he was far from meaning to blame them for, though it would take from their offer any claim to merit, might be disposed to withdraw, when their purpose in that respect was no longer answered, their number might not be greater than that of persons who would be led to quit the corps from the causes which he had before

adverted to. Whatever the effect might be, it was plain that the purpose of these regulations was to continue the volunteer system at all events; not limiting its continuance by the motives which gave it birth, and which might be supposed commensurate with the causes that made it desirable; nor suffering it, whenever the time should come, to die a natural death, but giving to it a kind of forced existence, by means of motives which must equally operate, whether a force of that description was desirable or not. — This was the purpose; and therefore, in estimating the merits of this measure, they were to consider, not merely what its present effects would be, but what its operation at more distant periods. And in this view they must not overlook one great head of danger, on which he had rarely dwelt, but to which he must not, on that account, be considered as insensible; namely, that which must arise from the existence of great bodies of armed men not subject to military law. Upon this point possibly, though upon this only, his opinions might vary in some small degree, from those of an Honourable Gentleman, (his Honourable Friend as, he, was sure, he would allow him to call him, and as he well might call him on subjects on which they so generally agreed, having commonly found it so difficult to forbear calling him so on subjects on which they completely differed,) who, from the general turn and cast of his mind, might be less alive to eventual dangers of the sort which he was alluding to. He would so far agree with his Honourable Friend, as to admit that there was no danger of that sort at present.

He was as much persuaded as any man, that whatever disaffection there was in the country (and they must never flatter themselves that it would be wholly extinct), was, for the present, confined within very narrow limits, and in a great measure absorbed and lost in the general care of providing against a danger which would make no distinction of friend or foe, but involve all in one common ruin. Of this disaffection, a less portion would necessarily be found among the volunteers, than among any other equal collection of people. Where there was so much zeal and loyalty, and patriotism, there could be little room for feelings of an opposite sort. But they must not suppose that this would be always so; there was in this institution, "nature, that in time would venom breed," though there might be "no teeth for the present." Evidences of this were perhaps already to be discerned. The volunteers, even in their present infant state, just new from the egg, had already shewn their strength, in obtaining a complete mastery over his Majesty's ministers. It was not the infant Hercules that was strangling the full-grown serpent, but the infant serpent that was subduing the full-grown strength of this Herculean ministry. His Majesty's ministers did not venture to stir a step upon this subject, without a previous consent obtained from the volunteers.

He could not but strongly reprobate the outcry which had been raised, and principally by the Gentlemen of the Treasury bench, against all those who had freely delivered their opinions in condemnation of the volunteer system. Such an outcry, he had no hesita-

tion in saying, was disgraceful to any man who contributed to raise it, and would be equally disgraceful to any man who suffered his conduct to be influenced by it; but it was evidently one of the characteristics of the present administration, that they had too much a view to that popular favour, which, unless under certain modifications and restrictions, should not operate upon the proceedings of government. They fancied, perhaps, that if they could succeed in exciting popular clamour against a member, they should restrain him from declaring opinions hostile to their measures; but they were excessively mistaken if they supposed, because that fear had so much effect upon themselves, that therefore it would have an equal effect upon the minds and conduct of others. He was told by a Right Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Hiley Addington) on a former night, that he was detested by the volunteers; he also heard it said, that it was dangerous for certain Gentlemen to walk the streets, for the same reason. This might be intended as a joke rather than a serious warning; but it was a dangerous joke, and did not acquire much facetiousness from the manner of the persons who uttered it.

He would not now dwell upon other instances of misconduct in the volunteers, particularly a memorable one, to which he had formerly adverted, namely, the riot at Chester. However little he might be disposed to call for any thing like vindictive vengeance in that case, or to look upon cases of that sort in general,

> "As if the nations ne'er could thrive,
> "Till every rioter were burnt alive;"

yet he must say, that it was a marked and shocking instance of that sort of subjection in which the government was to the volunteer body, and of subjection manifested in the way least to be endured, viz. by an unequal and partial distribution of criminal justice.

An immense objection, therefore, was on this score to be urged against any measure of which the tendency and object was to perpetuate the volunteer system; not to mention, at present, those other numerous objections which he had often had occasion to advert to; viz. the disturbance given, and the confusion introduced into all the relations and functions of civil life, and the fatal effect of weakening, and absolutely reducing to nothing, those distinctions which had hitherto been appropriate to military men, and which, with the sentiments belonging to such men, they had hitherto been willing to accept in lieu of more solid advantages. — But he would confine himself at present to what related merely to defence: and to say upon this head, that the volunteer system, with the exemptions granted to them, had no effect upon the supply of the other services, was something so extravagant, that he could not understand how it could be seriously asserted. The exemptions, as was evident, operated in no less than four ways. — They, 1st, as was notorious, exhausted, in many instances, the very population of the parish or district from which the supply was to come. They, 2dly, by being conferred principally on the young unmarried men, who were the first to enter into the volunteer corps, threw the ballot in a greater proportion on those who, when drawn, were the least

likely to serve in person, and who, in consequence, in proportion to their numbers, would require a greater number of substitutes. Thirdly, while they thus increased the demand, they, by protecting men from the danger of the ballot, lessened the number of those who might be willing to engage as substitutes; and, lastly, when they did not absolutely produce the effect of preventing men from so engaging, they put them at least in a situation in which they could bargain to much greater advantage, and were not likely to engage but from the temptation of higher terms. In every one of these ways the exemptions had a direct and necessary tendency to increase the rate of bounty, and of consequence to bring it to that state, in which it actually was, and in which recruiting for the army could no longer go on. If an instance were wanting, he might take the army of reserve, which, in spite of all the whipping and spuring which had been applied, had come to what, in the language of sportsmen, was called a dead stand-still, at the distance of 14,000 men from its projected amount. There it was for the present, incapable of moving a step further. And though he would not pretend to say, that by the aid of a little nursing, with the help of a feed of corn, it might not again creep forward, yet he would venture to predict, that it would never reach the place of its destination, would never produce the number for which it was calculated.

Even in this view alone, speaking of the system as a permanent establishment, he could have no difficulty in saying, that the prejudice it would occasion, with

respect merely to defence, was beyond comparison greater, than any advantages to be derived from it in the improved state of discipline and expertness in the volunteer corps. The great question, however, still remained; that which seemed in gentlemen's minds to put a stop to every other, viz. could the volunteer system, false and faulty as it might have been originally, be then abolished? Would not the suppression of exemptions instantly disband the corps? And could the country, in its present circumstances, afford to divest itself at once of such a vast portion of its force? Finally, could the suppression of exemptions be effected consistently with a perfect observance of good faith? He had little difficulty in saying that it could; provided always that no abridgment was made of the exemptions, which were granted for service already performed, or which was in a course of performing: and unquestionably no doubt could arise with respect to all who might enter into volunteer corps from that time forward. It was curious, indeed, to hear those talk with so much solicitude about preserving faith with the volunteers, who were at the moment taking such liberties with that faith, or rather committing so great a breach of it, in the very provisions which they were then proposing; there being nothing so clear, as that upon any principles of strict engagement, they had no right whatever to make those changes in the condition of volunteer service which was then proposed. If, then, good faith did not seem to stand in the way of the suppression of exemptions at a proper time, with respect to those even who were already enrolled;

as unquestionably it did not with respect to those who might enter in future; there were, on the other hand, the strongest reasons for wishing to get rid of exemptions, not merely as injurious to the public interests, but as inconsistent with a principle not less to be regarded than good faith itself; namely, justice. Nothing could be more flagrantly unjust, nor more cruelly oppressive, than the power now possessed by individuals, or by self-created bodies of individuals, of imposing or withholding at their pleasure, a fine, such as that which attached to the ballot of the army of reserve and of the militia. Let any one consider what that fine was, what its amount in itself, and what the effect likely to be produced by it, in nine out of ten of the persons on whom it may fall, and then say, whether this was a power fit to be left to individuals or to committees, acting with respect to those whom they may protect from, or expose to this fine, with little other rule than their own mere discretion and option. The obligation upon the House to guard against the existence of such a power was greatly encreased by considering the classes of persons, upon whom it would be found principally to operate. These were the lower orders of journeymen and labourers, especially those who were married, and who with families so circumstanced as to make the burthen either of serving in person, or of providing a substitute, more grievous and least possible for them to support, had yet not the specified number of children which would entitle them to an exemption. There could not be a class of people having more claim to the consideration

and protection of the House, or whose rights and interests the House should be more jealous of appearing in any respect to abandon. Of all persons, those whose cause ought to be espoused with most zeal and anxiety, were the helpless and friendless; though these were, unhappily, the persons, who in the general confusion of human affairs, and with the general infirmity of human nature, which too often lead men to press upon the weak rather than to resist the strong, were the most likely to be neglected and overlooked. It was not always that in public affairs, the greatest injustice was that which was least easy to be committed, or would excite the loudest complaints. Complaint seemed to be among those effects, in the producing which, bodies are found to operate in proportion to their surfaces; whereas injustice was often greater the more it was confined and condensed, and the more partially it fell; so that it was commonly easier and safer to do a great injustice to a few, than a smaller one to many. The House, therefore, would, he hoped, be particularly anxious not to leave such a power, could it possibly be avoided, as that which enabled persons, not only to withdraw themselves from a burthen which ought to be common to all, but, what was far worse, to throw the burthen from their own shoulders upon those of others, and thus to double and treble and quintuple the load upon those who were least able to support even their own original share. Against any supposed hardship of withdrawing the exemptions from the volunteers, he hoped the House would not fail to set in opposition, the extreme

injustice, towards the classes, which he had mentioned, of continuing them.

Thus far as to the question of good faith, which might be supposed to stand as a plea in bar against any alteration to be made in the volunteer system, as applicable to those who were already engaged in it. Upon the effect which the withdrawing exemptions would have in dissolving the corps, he had already spoken, and would not do more, therefore, than repeat his opinion, that the reduction thus occasioned would very possibly not be greater, and would certainly be far less disadvantageous, than that which would be effected by the joint operation of the liberty of resignation, and the various vexatious regulations now introduced.—But upon the whole of this question of the reduction or disbanding of the Volunteers, he wished to make one observation; namely, that to disband corps of volunteers was a very different operation, and would have a very different effect, from that of disbanding a part of a regular army. An army disbanded, is dispersed in a way not to be re-assembled: but not so a corps of volunteers; which, though nominally dissolved, left all the parts precisely in the same situation in which they were. Not a man would be found removed from the spot on which he had all along been residing; nor would either his powers or his disposition be changed in any degree, at least in any material degree, from what they were when he belonged to the corps. Supposing, therefore, that the whole volunteer system were completely dissolved to-morrow; though a change would be made, no doubt,

yet it would be a change not at all of the sort which many were hastily led to suppose. Though there would be much less correspondence in the Right Honourable Gentleman's office, fewer orders and counter-orders, less annoyance, less disturbance, fewer disputes, less of the present evils, great and small, of the system, and though much would no doubt be lost of the progressive improvement in the common practice and training, yet the men would all remain, there would be the same bodies, the same limbs, and the same hearts, and, upon any alarm, the same disposition to run together again, either as some have supposed of the atoms at the last day into precisely the same shapes, or into new combinations possibly not less advantageous.

The House must not run away, therefore, with a notion, that to dissolve the volunteers, was utterly to deprive the country of all the benefit of that force in the same manner or to the same degree, as would happen in the reduction of any other military body: And this consideration would apply to that other head of inquiry; viz. the prudence or possibility of making any material change, with a danger impending such as that by which we were now threatened. It was said, our system may have been ill-conceived, our means ill-chosen, the posture into which we have thrown ourselves not the best calculated to give us the benefit of our strength: but what can now be done? To attempt to change our course of proceedings now, would be as dangerous as a general's at-

tempting to change his positions at the moment when he was expecting an attack. — This argument he heard, he confessed, with great distrust, because it never failed to be urged from the beginning, and at periods when it was evident now that it was not true. It was the argument which had been in constant use to cover every thing that was wrong, and to make it impossible that an error once begun, should ever be set right. We had been for ever in the state of a horse, who having got into a false gallop, was so pressed on by the injudiciousness of his rider, that he had never time to change and to get right again. We were acting upon the instruction sometimes ludicrously given to a foot messenger, "to make such haste, that if he should tumble down, he must not stay to get up again." But, in opposition to such maxims, he must say, that on this, as on almost every other occasion, there must be a comparison of evils, and that it was not sufficient to say, there will be great mischief or danger in doing this or that, without taking into consideration what would be the evil or danger of not so doing. He would accept the comparison of a general who had got into a bad position, and was threatened with an attack, and admit the danger in such circumstances, of his attempting to make his position better; yet if he knew that he must be attacked in that position, and that, if attacked, he must to a certainty be beat, it might be necessary for him to attempt the change, with whatever danger it might be attended. A ship, in like manner, going before

the wind, might be so pressed by the gale, that to tack would hazard instant destruction; yet if destruction were inevitable by continuing her course, if there were a shore a-head that admitted of no escape, the attempt to tack must be made, whatever consequences might be apprehended. Such he felt to be the situation of this country. To continue the present system, with all the consequences which it was obvious would grow out of it, was little else than ruin. One of the consequences which it was plain was intended, was that of bringing the volunteers to meet the enemy in regular battle. It was a mistake exactly similar to this, which lost the country to William the Conqueror, at the battle of Hastings; a place that ought to be a warning to those who would now put their trust in so fallacious an idea. The case of La Vendée did not apply here. The Vendéans gave up their country to be ravaged, and their villages to be burned; not as part of their system, but because they could not help it; when they had done so, they attempted a course, of which he feared, we could not avail ourselves, in case of any disaster under the present system. He certainly allowed it was the best way to meet the enemy at once, and beat him. But this was like the receipt for running a race, to take the lead and keep it. The Vendéans had never once assembled to fight as a regular army, except on one memorable occasion, when they met to march to Granville, to the number of 40, 50, or as some said, 80 thousand men, for the purpose of receiving the supplies of arms which they

expected us to have brought them. It was on this occasion that the French armies took advantage to to crush them, in such a manner as they never recovered, though they long sustained themselves with a noble energy. It was once considered whether they should again meet their enemies in regular battle; but it was thought by all their generals, that they would have much disadvantage in a regular conflict with troops so far superior to them in arms and discipline. They had again recourse to that warfare in which the enemy could not reach them, in which they were in the situation described by Macbeth,

"As easy may'st thou the intrenchant air
"With thy keen sword impress, as make me bleed."

By that system they still eluded the force of a power which subdued all Europe, and which did not subdue them till it *had* subdued all Europe.

He considered the sort of discipline the volunteers would obtain a disadvantage. It brought to his recollection what Pope said of Curl's circumcision—the ceremony was interrupted, and he was left half circumcised, which, according to the Jewish law, was worse than not being circumcised at all. Whether this was good rabbinical doctrine or not, he did not know; but it was perfectly conformable to the common notions and language of mankind.

"A little learning is a dangerous thing,"

had been observed the other night.—*Aut nunquam tentes aut perfice,*" was a maxim to the same effect.

The system, in his opinion, ought to be entirely changed. The French National guards, so often cited as a justification for regarding the volunteers as regular troops, were employed at times in garrison towns, in escorting convoys, or perhaps murdering prisoners in cold blood; but they were not placed in the front of the battle, nor were ever employed against the enemy at all. These were the troops, however, to which alone, in their mode of formation and training, our volunteers bore any resemblance. Whereas the *Volunteers* of France, whom we, judging by the name, chose to conclude at once to be troops corresponding to ours, were troops raised upon a quite different footing, who were instantly marched away from home the moment they were raised, and were never employed as troops against an enemy till they had been trained for at least eighteen months in every other species of military duty. This was particularly the case at Jemappe, where the battle was fought in November 1792, and the volunteers that fought there were those raised in the beginning of 1790. The bill, in his opinion, might be considered as a new mutiny bill, printed on fine white satin. He ridiculed the measure *in toto*, and described it as having been formed in a smithery near Westminster-Hall, where every one was at work at it, and amongst the rest, the Attorney-General, hammering away and fetching it up with John Doe and Richard Roe assisting him. He was fully satisfied, that out of a barren moor like this, not one good crop could be got, and he was the more convinced of the folly of resorting to it,

when such a rich and abundant field presented itself as the army. The Right Honourable Gentleman concluded with expressing his decided opposition to the whole of the system.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Addington) answered Mr. Windham, and was replied to by Mr. Fox. The question was put on the third reading of the bill, and carried in the affirmative. The bill was afterwards passed.

In May 1804, *Mr. Addington's Administration was dissolved, and another was formed, with Mr. Pitt as Prime Minister. The following is a list of its members:*

Cabinet Ministers.

The Duke of Portland	President of the Council.
Lord Eldon	Lord High Chancellor.
The Earl of Westmoreland	Lord Privy Seal.
Right Hon. W. Pitt	First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer. (Prime Minister.)
Viscount Melville	First Lord of the Admiralty.
Earl of Chatham	Master General of the Ordnance.
Lord Hawkesbury	Secretary of State for the Home Department.
Lord Harrowby	Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Earl Camden	Secretary of State for the Department of War and the Colonies.
Lord Visc. Castlereagh	President of the Board of Controul for the Affairs of India.
Lord Mulgrave	Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Not of the Cabinet.

Right Hon. W. Dundas	Secretary at War.
Right Hon. G. Canning	Treasurer of the Navy.
Right Hon. George Rose, Rt. Hon. Lord C. Somerset	Joint Paymasters of His Majesty's Forces.
The Duke of Montrose, Lord Charles Spencer	Joint Postmasters General.
William Huskisson, Esq., W. Sturges Bourne, Esq.	Secretaries of the Treasury.
Sir William Grant	Master of the Rolls.
Hon. Spencer Perceval	Attorney-General.
Sir T. Manners Sutton	Solicitor-General.

Persons in the Ministry of Ireland.

Earl of Hardwicke	Lord Lieutenant.
Lord Redesdale	Lord High Chancellor.
Sir Evan Nepean	Chief Secretary.
Right Hon. Isaac Corry	Chancellor of the Exchequer.

ADDITIONAL FORCE BILL.

June 5, 1804.

MR. PITT, Chancellor of the Exchequer, laid before the house his plan for maintaining an Additional Force. Under this plan, the Army of Reserve and Militia were to be completed to their establishments; after which the latter force was to be reduced to 40,000 *men, by transfers to the Regular Army; and vacancies thus occasioned were to be supplied by further levies. The men were to be raised by ballot in the first instance, but if the person drawn should decline to serve, he should be allowed to fine, and the ballot should go on; — and if no person should be found willing to serve, then the parish should be bound to provide the quota allotted to it, taking care, however, that no higher bounty should be given than was already fixed by law. This recruiting to take place under the direction of the parish officers. If men could not be found by them, the parish should be fined; the fines carried to the general recruiting account, and the commanding officer of the district be empowered to raise the deficiencies by means of regular recruiting, paying the same bounties to the men thus raised as the parishes would have done. Mr. Pitt having stated the nature of his plan, and moved for leave to bring in a bill accordingly,*

MR. WINDHAM rose, and spoke to the following effect:

I perfectly concur with the ideas of my Right Honourable Friend, so far as they regard the necessity

of increasing our regular army, but I cannot help thinking, that the means which he proposes for that purpose, are very far from being likely to prove effectual. His plan, in this respect, resembles too closely the measures which have been pursued for some time past in this country. In many respects I confess that it differs from, and is much superior to, that hitherto acted upon. It is, notwithstanding, liable to considerable objections.

Upon subjects of this kind nothing is more natural than that there should be differences of opinion. The plan proposed this evening is very different from that which was announced by my Right Honourable Friend some time since. This serves to shew, that even within a short space of time my Right Honourable Friend himself has changed his mind upon the nature of his own project; and unless he can change his mind still further upon this question, I can hardly flatter myself that I shall be able to support him. Indeed, I much fear that our sentiments are fundamentally different, and that I must be one of those who will be compelled to resist the project which he has to offer. What the points are on which I must oppose it, I may more particularly explain upon a future occasion. At present I shall only state, and with as much brevity as I can, the general fundamental principles which urge me to refuse my concurrence to some parts of this proposition. I say some, because there are many parts, which to resist would be to resist myself — would be inconsistent with the sentiments I have repeatedly delivered in this house,

and which I hold at present. I mean that particularly which relates to the reduction of the militia. This is an idea which I threw out long since, and which I must be proud to find seconded by the authority and talents of my Right Honourable Friend. Although it must be recollected, that when first mentioned it was very much censured, yet now it appears to be generally recognised as a wise and eligible expedient. Another point of the plan of which I approve is, the rejection of the principle of substitution. I should have been very glad to have got rid of this principle upon the condition of commuting service for a fixed fine; in which way certainly the evils of exorbitant bounties would have been avoided; but I am much better satisfied to have compulsory service put an end to altogether. Both of these alterations therefore, namely, the reduction in the amount of the militia, and the abolition of compulsory service, I heartily approve of, and either expressly or by implication have long since recommended. I am also happy to understand, from my Right Honourable Friend at the close of his speech, that it is his intention to bring forward a motion for a change in the condition of service in our regular army, by which I conceive him to mean, that men shall be enlisted for a certain term of years in lieu of the present custom. This, I think, and have always thought, a thing so desirable, that it was my determination, if it had not been taken up by any other member, to submit the question to the consideration of this house. I am glad to find that the idea seems to be adopted by an Honourable Gentleman

who is so capable, from his situation and ability, of carrying it into effect.

Having stated those parts of my Right Honourable Friend's intentions of which I approve, I now come to the less pleasant part of my duty, that of stating the points of which I disapprove. In the whole of the proposed proceeding for raising men, there is introduced an injudicious mixture of the voluntary and the compulsory, of which the latter strikes me to be much too strong. This was one motive of my resistance to the army of reserve bill, the principle of which is preserved in the plan under discussion; and I remember, that in the course of the arguments offered in favour of that bill, the principal ground relied upon by its advocates was, that it would go to raise a body within a short time, more effectually than could be done by any other method. This argument, as to expedition, which was founded on the circumstances of the moment, and which was made to overcome every consideration of future advantage, cannot be used with any effect now. We now find ourselves in a state, in which what is called present emergency, can no longer operate to remove from our minds what is due to the consideration of consequences which may take place at subsequent periods. We are not now called upon to consult for the present only. We are at least in circumstances in which we have a little pause and breathing: time to consider what is good for the country permanently, as well as for the present moment. If we were not, the plan proposed by my Right Honourable Friend, must be given up alto-

gether, for with a view to present defence it does not promise to effect any thing. On the other hand, its provisions are, as I before observed, in a very considerable degree compulsory. If the danger to be guarded against were imminent, and that a levy were necessary immediately, unquestionably a compulsory proceeding to obtain that levy might be the most effectual. Measures of that sort are undoubtedly in their own nature the speediest and most certain in their operation. Nothing seems to be so sure and direct in a case where men are wanted, as to pass a law, by which men shall be forcibly taken. But here care is necessary, to consider the nature and constitution of the country in which such powers are to be exercised. What is good for Russia or Prussia may not be good for Great Britain. It is not that the power of enacting such laws is wanting in Great Britain. In every country, free or otherwise, there is a power that is supreme; and that supreme power must, by the very description and name of it, be capable of enacting whatever laws it pleases. Whatever the King does in Prussia, or the Emperor in Russia, or the Grand Turk in Constantinople, or, what is still more, the Emperor of the Gauls in France, that may the King, Lords, and Commons, legally enact in Great Britain. But the question then comes not merely as to the propriety of such enactments, but as to the means of carrying them into execution, and according to those means will be the advantage that is to be expected from the measure. In a free country, therefore, in a country like this, where nothing is to be done but by

regular authority, where every thing must be conducted according to law and even according to usage, where there must be a constant regard, not only to men's rights, but even to their feelings, measures of compulsion will often fail of their effect, and show themselves to be ill-chosen, when the same measures, in countries of a different description, would be confessedly the most advantageous and judicious. Where the constitution of things is such, that the power of the state can go straight to its object; where the sovereign, as in Russia, or as in old times in this country, can call upon his great lords, and they again can call upon their vassals; where, as in Prussia possibly, he can send forth his recruiters, and with little ceremony take whatever men are fitted to his purpose, there compulsory measures, as they are unquestionably the most simple, so they probably are the most certain and efficacious: but the reverse may possibly be the case, where they are to be loaded with all the restrictions, exceptions, provisions, and modifications, which must be charged upon them in this country. In such a complicated system of movements, half the power of the machine is lost in overcoming the friction.

These are the reasons why we must not conclude that a measure which is good in one country, must be equally, or proportionably, so in another. A country and constitution like this, is not good for measures of this description. Our compulsion is not good compulsion. It has not the strength and flavour of that which is the growth of more congenial climes. It

would not follow necessarily, even if it had, that it would be equally beneficial with us as in other places. Inquiry must always be made, agreeably to what is the fact in the present instance, how the compulsory measure is likely to operate on measures of voluntary exertion that are to be going forward at the same time. Inquiry must likewise be made whether the voluntary measures will not render the compulsory unnecessary; for nobody, I suppose, wishes to have recourse to compulsory measures if you can do without them.

In the present instance, it happens both that the compulsory part, as there is all reason to think, is unnecessary, the voluntary being sufficient without it; and that the voluntary will not be able to do its work, if the other is persisted in. All the parishes are to be called upon for a certain number of men, to enforce their production of which (so much is their inclination doubted) a fine is to be levied upon such as fail to furnish their complement within a certain time. It is understood also, that the militia is to be suffered gradually to waste itself to a certain number, and that this difference is to be made good by men raised, in succession, in the way proposed, and who are to be transferred to this new army of reserve; so that for the regular army, which is professed to be the main object in view, the stock which will be left for direct recruiting, will be those who remain after deducting the amount of the present militia.

A hope, however, is entertained (and this is the great strength of the measure) that men when once

detached from their original habits, and engaged in military life, will enlist in great numbers from the force thus to be created. The fallacy of the arguments which make the foundation of this hope is obvious, for it may quite as well happen, that after men have so far caught the military spirit, (or rather so far lost the civil one,) as to resolve to continue soldiers, they should remain in the corps from which they derived this feeling, and continue on the home-service, as that they should enlist into regiments destined to serve abroad. If, however, some men should so enter, as it is to be presumed that many will, there is no reason to expect the number to be greater than will be necessary to compensate those, who having originally been disposed to a military life, and being persons who, if no such limited force had offered, would have engaged for general service, will now be satisfied with the experiment they have made, will have sown their wild oats, and either return to their former employments, or, at least, continue in that species of service in which they find themselves placed. I am not an advocate, therefore, for providing in greater abundance such species of force. I do not want to multiply the opportunities by which men, having a military turn and disposed to betake themselves to a soldier's life, may be drawn into services in which that propensity will be only half-indulged, and in which, in quite as small a proportion, the public service will be promoted. I have the strongest objections to this new-fangled scheme of dividing our public force into two parts — of crippling that part which is disposable,

and increasing that which is not, in the ill-grounded hope of providing, through the latter, an augmentation for the former. This is the modern, indirect, circuitous, and fallacious mode of recruiting the army.

It appears now, that the propriety of abandoning the balloting system is admitted, and, in lieu of a ballot, my Honourable Friend proposes to raise men in another way; he means to commit the recruiting to parish officers. I will not say that this is not an improvement compared to the mode pursued of late, which, besides being so grievously oppressive to individuals, interfered so materially with the supply of the regular army by high bounties, &c.; but yet I would not be understood to believe that the plan before the house, will not operate considerably in the same way. For although the amount of bounty to be paid by the parish officers is limited in form, we can have no security that that bounty will not be generally exceeded. Those officers could have no particular motive for economy, and they must have a strong wish to save their parishes from the proposed fine. This wish will naturally render them anxious to procure men, and ready, if necessary, to give an advanced bounty. From this, all the evils complained of under the army of reserve act respecting high bounties are, in their degrees, likely to recur; for no sum short of the fine will of course be scrupled, so as to avoid the penalty, by raising the complement of men. Some parishes may, from pride, even exceed the fine in the allowance of bounty, rather than not bring forward their quota.

A great deal has been said, now and upon former occasions, about the hopes to be formed from individual exertion; but this appears to me to be altogether imaginary. Nothing can be conceived more helpless than an unfortunate countryman, who, in the midst of his day's work, or at his return home tired in the evening, is told that a ballot has taken place, and that he is one of the unlucky number upon whom the lot has fallen. If he does not happen to be insured, by being a member of an association-club, he is as much struck down by the news, as he would by a stroke of the apoplexy. His first resource is probably to vent his complaints among his neighbours; but finding that this is but of little avail, and being told by some one of a substitute that has been heard of in a parish not far distant, he sets out on his mission, roaming about, like *David Simple*, looking for a true friend. In this way he wanders on, from house to house, and from village to village, spending his money, losing his time, tiring his horse (or his neighbour's horse, as the case may be), filling the alehouses with his complaints, but helping to empty them of their beer, till good fortune or good advice directs him to one of those obnoxious, but, in these cases, necessary personages, called a crimp. There, at least, his labour ends; and, by the help of some forty or fifty guineas, he is enabled to procure a recruit for the service, and an exemption for himself; at least, until the recruit shall happen to run away.

The same thing, with circumstances in a slight degree varying, must happen in the case of the parish

officers. What means upon earth have the parish officers to get men, but those which they ought not to have? This measure, therefore, which among its other professions professes to abolish crimping, will go, if I am not mistaken, to extend and establish that system. I may almost say, it is to be hoped that it will; for if the parish officers do not supply themselves in that way, it is to be feared that they must have recourse to more exceptionable methods. What is the description of persons to whom they will first apply? and what will be the situation of any of those persons, should the application not be successful? A man dependent on the parish, or in a situation of life to be charged with petty offences, will not fare, it is to be apprehended, very well, should the officers and principal proprietors of the parish have deemed him a fit person to serve His Majesty, and he by chance not be disposed to concur in that opinion. Let him take care how he applies, on his own account, or that of any of his family, for parish relief: how he is seen after dusk stepping aside from the foot-path, near any of his worship's plantations. Without saying to what degree these powers will be abused, it is sufficient to know that the bill holds out the strongest temptation to such abuse; nay, that its very hopes of success seem to be founded on that supposition: for if the parish officers are not to avail themselves of the powers which their office gives them, what advantages, I must again ask, have they for recruiting beyond what are possessed by all other men? For what purpose then, it is to be inquired, are these consequences in-

'curred? For increasing the regular army? Not a man in the first instance is obtained for the regular army. All these compulsory means produce nothing but soldiers for home-service. To engage them afterwards for more valuable service, we depend on the operation of bounties. Our forcing pumps will carry the water only to reservoirs of a certain height: from thence it must be removed, to the level at which it is wanted, by machinery of another kind.

The idea comes then to be considered, founded on the supposition that a force of this limited nature is to exist and to be made the instrument of recruiting the regular army, — of attaching particular regiments of one service to particular regiments of the other, so as to give to each regiment of the line a peculiar and appropriate source of recruiting, in the battalion of the army of reserve that is attached to it. From this arrangement great advantages are expected, such as we have heard set forth with all the embellishments of my Honourable Friend's eloquence. It is the great foundation on which our hopes of giving effect to the plan of a stationary force as a means of recruiting the regular army, are made to rest. But of this arrangement it must be observed, that while it affects by its form to be something positive, and to confer powers not before possessed, it is in truth nothing but restriction and prohibition, principles merely negative, and by which, in the first instance, powers must always be taken away instead of being given. When you say that all who shall enlist from the army of reserve shall enter severally into such and such regiments, it

is the same as to say, that they shall enter into no other, — a regulation of which the prohibitory part is far more extensive than the enacting, and which, in the first instance, therefore, is calculated rather to diminish the numbers of those who may enter than to increase them. There is little doubt that such will be its final effect. By establishing that connexion which this plan has in view, such a provincial character may, it is possible, be imprinted upon certain corps, as may create motives for entering into the service which would not otherwise exist, and by which men will be gained who would otherwise remain in the home-battalions, or would not enter the service at all. But against this must be set, the chance that this provincial character will in innumerable instances never be established; and that when it is, it will not by any means produce effects, equal to the disadvantage of the restriction, by which alone it can be brought about. To make a corps provincial, you must secure to it exclusively the recruiting of the corresponding battalion; in other words, you must deny to the men of that battalion, the privilege of chusing the corps into which they would wish to enter. When you have done all this, such may be, from various causes, the necessity of supplying this corps from other quarters, of making good its losses by other means than those of its own recruiting fund, than its provincial character may be wholly lost, or, at least, but very imperfectly traced; and, after all, it is to be considered what this character will do, estimating its effects according to the present state of society, and the motives which

in general influence those who enter the army as soldiers. The bond of local or county connexion is far less strong than it was in this country forty or fifty years ago. A thousand motives will operate with men in the choice of a regiment more powerful than their attachment to the name of their county, or even than their desire of finding in the regiment those provincial properties which it may really possess. A man would be disposed to enter, but that the regiment to which he must now be confined is abroad, and he wants to stay at home; or is at home, and he is desirous of seeing the world or has an ardour for service, and would wish to go abroad. The regiment is in Canada, or Nova Scotia, and he wishes to go to Gibraltar; is in a hot country, and he wishes for a cold one, or *vice versâ*. For county connexion he cares nothing, having left the county when he was a boy; but by entering with the recruiting party now in town, he shall go where he may hope to see again his old sweetheart, Bet such-a-one, or be in a corps with the comrade with whom he worked in London, who is now a serjeant, and may have the means, perchance, of making him a corporal.

Such are the motives that dictate the choice of particular regiments among private soldiers; and, so far as they operate, this regulation will prove injurious. It will prove injurious, too, in the case of another class of men, be they more or less numerous, those whom my Right Honourable Friend has particularly dwelt on, with a view to the discipline which he hopes to establish in these second battalions. If, says he, a

man by idleness or misconduct should incur the displeasure of his officers, he cannot hope to escape them or to secure impunity, by enlisting into the regular army. He will go into a corps where his character will be sure to accompany him, and where he will meet, or be followed by, those very officers to whom his good or ill conduct will be known. It is amazing that my Right Honourable Friend did not see, that this was a reason why he would not go into the corps at all, and not being at liberty to take any other, would remain to the end of his term where he was. In this instance therefore, at least, the regulation in question will not do much: whatever advantages it may have with respect to discipline, it will not advance much the recruiting for the regular army. I see on the whole nothing in this plan, for which so many fair promises have been made, that is likely to have any other effect than to produce a large stationary force to be confined to this country.

With respect to expense, considering that the measure does, in the first instance, fix the rate of bounty higher than has ever yet been known as paid by government, that the parishes will not be restrained within the rate so fixed, and that, whatever is ultimately given by the parishes, more must of necessity be given to men entering for general service, it will be impossible not to see, that in this view also, the measure must produce effects the most injurious, and that it holds a distinguished place in that system, which in less than forty years has raised the price of a recruit in this country from a guinea, to the enormous amount

at which we now see it. Such have been the glorious fruits of a system of balloting followed up by the principle of commuting personal service for service by substitute!

Much has been said by my Right Honourable Friend and others of the influence of a general military spirit in the country, and the propriety of promoting it. Upon this point I must say, that my opinion has always been, however paradoxical it may appear, that to put a nation in a state in which every man was a soldier, was not the way to make a military nation, or to carry the military strength of a country to its greatest height. A country in which every man is a soldier, is a country in which no man is a soldier. A system, such as is now proposed, would rather serve to damp and deaden than to encourage and animate the military spirit. It is a great mistake to suppose, that the military spirit of a country is cherished and kept alive by those only who appear in the military character themselves. The *un*-military part of the community contribute quite as much to this, and in a manner hardly less direct. They are the spectators or audience, without whom the piece would no more be performed than it would without the actors. We need go no further for a proof of this, than to inquire what the influence is, in promoting the military spirit, of that half of the community, which certainly takes no part in the service, namely, the women. In France formerly, a man would hardly have been spoken to, in the female world, who, not being engaged by some other profession, had passed his youth

without service in the army. What more was necessary? A country in that state is a military country, let its military establishments be what they may: And the fact, in this instance, perfectly corresponds with the theory; for if we look round the world, it will be found that the military countries are not those in which, by the constitution, every man is enrolled as a soldier; but the contrary. France, the most military country, has nothing but its army. Prussia, Russia, Austria, in like manner. Even Switzerland, if it may be considered as military, was not so in virtue of its militia, but in consequence of the number of its inhabitants who had served in foreign armies. On the other hand, in America, and in the little state of Geneva, if that may be reckoned, though neither certainly were considered as military states, every man was in some way or other a soldier. The reason of this is not difficult to be traced, and may be considered as two-fold: first, states not much engaged in wars, and with whom, therefore, on this very account, the military spirit is not likely to run high, will resort to the system of militia, town guards, provincial enrolments, and other establishments of that sort, in which numbers are to make up for quality; and secondly, the very existence of such establishments, instead of exalting, will tend to abate whatever military feeling there might otherwise be. It can never be of advantage to that feeling to familiarize men to the contemplation of soldiers separated from those conditions which make the character respectable. An army merely defensive, and that can from the nature of it

but rarely see danger, is deprived at the outset of that which forms the real and vital principle of those sentiments which the military character is calculated to inspire. It will, moreover, rarely be found to be a good army. Yet, upon these all the military distinctions, insignia, and decorations, are lavished in as great profusion, as upon troops in which the military character is complete. We may see how the fact is in that respect at the present moment in our own country, but we do not seem to be at all sensible of what are likely to be the effects. The volunteers have cloaths as fine, feathers as high, music of as martial a character, decorations of all sorts as captivating and imposing as those of the regular troops. If we continue to pursue this course, diffusing this lustre of military distinctions on that which is not military, and obscuring and eclipsing the regular army, there is danger, that the real military character may not only be enfeebled but destroyed. If you will resort to a contrary course, the true military spirit may again revive, and operating generally and powerfully, like the air we breathe, resume before long its proper influence, and produce its natural effects.

If, in thus objecting to the plans submitted by my Right Honourable Friend and others, I should be asked, whether I had any plan of my own to propose, I should answer, none; nor do I think any necessary. The only change I desire at present, is, to abolish the plans lately adopted, and, in the system of the army, to enlist men for a certain term of years, instead of the practice which now prevails of enlisting men

for life. Let things, in other respects, go on as formerly, and there will not, I apprehend, be any reason to complain. I cannot see why all the machinery of law should be set to work upon our established military system. My only wish is to have it released from that machinery — to have all the obstructions in its way removed.

A great medical writer, of the last century, has laid down a maxim for the conduct of the understanding in matters of science, which may be applied with little variation to the regulation of men's conduct in civil and practical life. *Vera cernit qui aliena rejicit.* Truth will appear as soon as you get rid of error. Affairs will often proceed perfectly well, if you will only remove the impediments and obstructions that are turning them from their proper course. Something analogous to this idea is what I should recommend upon the subject before the house. With good management, I am quite sure that men enough could be found in this country for the ample recruiting of our regular army. There is no scarcity of population. On the contrary, it is far more considerable than at any former period; and there can be no doubt that with the aid of proper encouragement and countenance, by the grant of certain privileges and immunities to those who had served in the army, such as are granted with sufficient liberality to all who have served in the militia, (viz. the right of setting up trades in corporate towns, &c.) and in general by securing to the army its proper proportion of the benefits attached to other modes of life, a supply would be

found of men willing to become soldiers, as ample and as well proportioned to the demand, as of men ready to engage in any other trade or calling. I cannot believe it possible that there should not, when I reflect that the poors' rates of this country amount annually, according to the account on the table, to 5,000,000l. and when I recollect the extraordinary measure lately taken in Scotland, the policy of which by the bye I very much doubt, of granting such a large sum of money for the construction of a canal, in order to give employment to the poor of that district, and to prevent their emigration to a foreign country. This idea of laying a tax for the purpose of providing employment for a particular class of persons, I cannot but consider as a real poor rate. It is accordingly liable to all the objections chargeable upon measures of that description. I mention it here for the purpose of showing, that the prospect for recruiting our army is by no means discouraging, either on the score of our population, or (unhappily) of the state in which a great part of that population is placed. But I am then told of our trade, and the numbers employed in various branches. I have, however, no hesitation in saying, that trade is favourable to recruiting, and not less so perhaps in its flourishing and growing than in its declining state. It is rarely that trade can advance rapidly without great fluctuations, the trade receding in one channel as it flows into another; and thus numbers are successively left out of employment, and glad to betake themselves for subsistence to the provision which the army offers.

From these considerations I can see no foundation for the endeavours so often made to ascribe to scarcity of population the difficulty which recruiting for the regular army has met with for some time back. Let us try to strip that recruiting of the impediments which have hitherto surrounded it; and there is no reason whatever why we should despair of seeing it go on well. At all events let the experiment be fairly tried. No one surely would wish to have recourse to measures of compulsion in the first instance. When measures of another sort have been tried and have failed; when we have employed, without effect, the plain, obvious, and ordinary methods, then will be time enough to resort to the harshness of compulsory measures, and such strange, wild, and new-fangled projects as that which is now proposed.

Upon the whole I cannot persuade myself to assent to a proposition that has no immediate object but to form a stationary and half military force; and no tendency to increase our regular army but through the medium of a process from which I have no hopes—by a kind of double distillation, of which no one has hitherto shown either the use or the necessity. A notion seems to prevail, that a soldier is a thing that cannot be produced by one continued act;—that there must be a second operation. We create this army of men for limited service, as a kind of false stomach in which the aliment is to be lodged for a time, till it can be removed to its proper receptacle, and there finally elaborated for the use and sustenance of the state. Of the whole of this plan the house has heard enough

before. Experiments have been already made upon many parts of it, and certainly not with such success as to encourage a perseverance in the system. But nothing will deter us. There is a perfect passion for legislating upon this subject, and for effecting every thing by the most complicated and circuitous means. My Honourable Friend seems to be actuated by the same sort of feeling as that of the lover in the Apprentice, who, when he is to escape with his mistress, will not suffer her to go out by the street-door, though he is told it is open, but insists upon her descending from the window, by the means of his ladder of ropes. It is in vain that the maid protests that the door is open, and her mistress has nothing to do but to walk down the great stairs. Oh no! says he, but what then becomes of my rope-ladder? Such is in truth the language of the present moment. In all this multiplication of plans I repeat, that very little is to be found congenial with the true military system of the country. Every thing that has yet been brought forward on the subject has proved to be extravagant, and calculated to produce the opposite of good towards the substantial defence of the country; and of the same nature I am persuaded will the plan be which the house has just heard. I am ready to say that no man is more competent to devise a plan requiring great combination of parts, than my Honourable Friend; but my persuasion on this subject is, that no such plan is necessary; on the contrary, that it must be injurious, particularly when founded on the principles of

the system for some time back acted upon; and therefore I feel it my duty to express my disapprobation of the project he has submitted to the house.

After some further objections had been urged against the proposed measure by Mr. Addington, Mr. Fox, and other members, who were replied to by Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Pitt, the bill was brought in, and read a first time.

ADDITIONAL FORCE BILL.

June 19, 1804.

THE second reading of the Additional Force Bill having been carried on the preceding day, by a majority of 265 *against* 223, *the third reading was on this day moved by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, when*

MR. WINDHAM said, that though he agreed that the matter was probably decided, though after the frequent discussions and long sittings he could not suppose that the house was disposed to hear much more upon the subject, he could not forbear offering some further observations, merely to disburthen his mind, and to mark to the last his feelings against a measure so pregnant, as he conceived, with mischief.

The points to which he should advert, were such as had either been overlooked, or at least, not sufficiently pointed out. And the first remark to be made was on the manner in which this measure had been brought forward. When a new military system was about to be established, the natural course of proceeding was to take a comprehensive view of the whole of our military force at that time subsisting. Of this force it was not natural that a part should be omitted, so

considerable in itself, and certainly so considerable in our estimation, as that of the volunteers. When these had been duly considered, some information might perhaps have been expected as to the numbers and situation of our regular army; a species of force which, however overlooked in all our late military arrangements, had in other times been thought to be of some account. In fact, both these and every other part of our force required to be distinctly in our view, before we could possibly say either what was necessary or what was practicable; how far the measures proposed were consistent with those already adopted; or what alterations were requisite in order to prevent the several parts of the system from interfering with, and defeating each other. With respect to the volunteers, those, it was true, who thought of that force as he might be suspected of doing, might not regret the effect which the present measure must infallibly have upon them, and which could be nothing less than to withdraw one of the main principles by which they had hitherto been held together. Though many of the volunteers had engaged upon other motives, it could not be questioned that numbers had entered with a view to the exemption. Upon all these the effect of the present measure would be that of a sentence of dissolution. It would operate like the sun upon the wings of Icarus. The wax would be melted, and down the corps must fall. In saying this, it must not be supposed that he was so confounding things, as to conceive, that by rendering exemption useless only by rendering it unnecessary,

the present measure had done an *injury* to the volunteers. Unquestionably their condition was not made worse, merely because that of others was rendered better. He spoke only of its practical effects. At the same time he must say, that there was something a little ludicrous, as well as not quite decorous with respect to the house, in suffering the volunteers to strut away with a full persuasion, that they were enjoying a most valuable privilege, while those who were in the secret, not being indeed the members of this house, knew that a measure was in agitation which would render the whole of this supposed privilege a mere delusion, or, what was vulgarly called, *a bite*.

So much for the connexion of the present measure with the volunteers. With respect to the regular army, the connexion was, if possible, still closer. So close was it indeed, that it was impossible satisfactorily to give an opinion on the present measure without knowing previously what was done and proposed to be done with respect to the army. If any one was asked, whether it was right to have an intermediate force, such as was now proposed, he must say, tell me first, what you mean to do with your army, and on what footing service *there* is to be put: according to the regulations there introduced, will be the necessity of having a force of this description at all, or of modelling it in such and such a manner. All these previous inquiries, however, the Honourable Author of the present plan seemed to think not only useless but injurious. He studiously and industriously

avoided them. So earnest was he to separate from this question any mention of the volunteers, that all which related to that system was forcibly and violently thrust out of the house, pushed off the stage by head and shoulders, in order that it might be clearly removed before the present measure made it appearance. In like manner, till this measure was done with, nothing was to be said about the plans that were in agitation for the army. The Honourable Gentleman seemed to be afraid of distracting the attention of the house, by bringing before them too many objects at once. It was not a question of the rule laid down for the old comedy; *ne quarta loqui persona laboret.* He was so apprehensive of crouding his scene, so fearful lest his characters should have any thing to say to one another, that he would never suffer more than one to be upon the stage at a time: his whole piece was a continued soliloquy.

If such was the manner in which this measure was brought forward, with a view to the means afforded for estimating its merits, an equal objection might be made on the score of time, and of the little notice which the house had had of the sort of measure which it was meant to submit to them. Till within a few days (almost within a few hours) of the motion being made, not an idea was entertained that the plan about to be proposed, was any other than that which had been opened by the Honourable Gentleman some months before. It was not till the moment of performance, and when the curtain was actually drawn up, that the manager stept forward (without an apo-

logy) and signified that the whole was changed, and that instead of the piece which had been announced, we were to have, not, as an Honourable and Learned Friend of his had said the other night, the good old play of the Recruiting Officer, but a strange fantastical piece, produced for the occasion, and got up in a hurry, called *The Regimental Vestry*, or, *The Recruiting Church-Wardens*. It was difficult to conceive what the progress of the counsels could have been that gave rise to so happy an idea. It could never have been formed at once, or in any ordinary circumstances, but must have been the result of a consultation, such as that described in Foote's farce of the Minor. 'A great day coming on; the greatest day this season. All the world to be there;—old opposition, new opposition, a vast attendance from the country. Nothing in the meanwhile settled. Ballot found to be impossible, and no expedient thought of by which its place could be supplied.' In this situation somebody seems to have conceived the idea of a sort of proceeding which should be neither compulsory nor not compulsory; should not be a *quota*, yet should be connected with districts and parishes; should be a system of recruiting, yet be carried on by persons not named by government, though possessing a certain degree of authority, and known in the country. 'I'll be hanged,' says some one, 'if you don't mean recruiting by parish-officers.' The Honourable Gentleman seems to have jumped at the hint, and parish-officers it has been.

The point important to be considered was what were likely to be the effects of the measure thus happily hit off.* The Honourable Gentlemen here vapoured a great deal, and asked triumphantly, what *they* had to offer by whom the present measure was objected to? To this it might be sufficient to answer, that they who objected to a measure were not therefore bound to be provided with a better in its room. It was enough if they could reasonably presume that a better might be provided. But he was willing to go further, and having frequently stated what his own ideas were, to compare those ideas with what was now adopted. Your ideas, said the Honourable Gentlemen, are merely negative: they are nothing at all. They would do well to ask, before they pressed that topick, if their own plan were stripped of its negative merits, how much of it would remain? The negative merits of the plan, the house would recollect, were all that the Honourable Gentlemen insisted upon. The plan was good, because it abolished the ballot, because it reduced the militia, because it removed competition, because it limited the bounties. So it certainly was: and so equally, and on the very same accounts, was the plan opposed to it.

All the ideas aboveenumerated, the Honourable Gentlemen would recollect, were ours as well as theirs; and, what was not less to the purpose, were ours long before they were theirs, and when in truth they were made a matter of reproach to those who held them. There was nothing on these points, therefore, in which one plan differed from the other. The

great advantage which we had was, that with us all was negative, and that in addition to the rest that we got rid of, we got rid of the Honourable Gentlemen's scheme of fining parishes, and recruiting by parish-officers. It was curious, therefore, to hear the Right Honourable Gentlemen calling upon us to know what were our ideas, and what we had to propose in the room of what we objected to. We were in the situation of a man who, having been stripped of all he had, is asked by the robber where his money was. Where is my money? he would say: why, in your pocket. Where were our ideas? why in the Honourable Gentleman's bill. He must not be understood to mean, however, that in claiming these ideas for himself and his Honourable Friends, he would be willing to take them such as they had now become in the hands of those who had lately had possession of them. The Honourable Gentleman had made them his own by the manner in which he had treated them. He must say with the Roman epigrammatist,

> Quam recitas meus est, ô Fidentine, libellus:
> Sed malè cum recitas incipit esse tuus.

The opinion seemed to be, that nothing could be good, that was not attended with considerable inconvenience. It was like the fancy of some sportsmen, that a gun could not carry its shot well, if it did not kick a little,—did not make itself felt upon the shoulder. The Honourable Gentlemen could not persuade themselves, that means might be at once both easy and efficacious. Their notions were those of the

countryman, who came to London to have his tooth drawn: when the operation had been performed with great ease and address, and he was called upon to pay half-a-guinea, — half-a-guinea, says he! why, in our town, for a quarter of the money I have been pulled round the room.

He wished the Honourable Gentlemen did not despise so much plans which might otherwise be good, merely because they did not happen to be of great show and bulk, did not form a *justum volumen*. It was as possible for a measure of little display and parade to be worth something, as it was for one of a contrary description to be good for nothing. Of the latter position the present bill would probably furnish an example. Nothing was ever worse calculated to answer its purpose, in whatever view it was considered. As operating upon the military spirit of the country, its effect would be that of wet sand upon a fire Nothing could be devised more injurious to the real military feeling of a country than a great home army. To separate military distinction from danger, was the very receipt which any one would recommend who wished to enfeeble and relax the respect felt for the profession and character of a soldier.

But setting aside these more general considerations, and viewing the measure merely with reference to its more direct objects, and as a means of obtaining men, it was in his opinion hardly less objectionable. The part of the population of the country who could be induced at all to engage in military life, might be distinguished into three classes, viz. those who would

enter into a militia or home-army, if such existed, but would in no case be prevailed upon to engage for general service; those who would engage for general service, were the opportunity afforded them, but would otherwise not enter at all; a class less numerous probably than the former, but by no means so little as was commonly supposed; and thirdly, those who being bent at all events upon a military life, would enter as soldiers in one way or another, into the regular army, if there were no other species of force, or among the troops for home service, if there were no such thing as a regular army. It was not meant to be contended, that by having a force of both descriptions, more men would not be gained than if the choice were limited to either service separately. This must of necessity be so, if men were found under each of the classes above-enumerated. But the question was, in which way would more men be gained to the regular army? And here it was evident, that in the first instance the comparison was wholly against us. Those who would engage for regular service, and in no other, we should have on either supposition. Those whom nothing could induce to engage in regular service, we must with respect to the regular service be deprived of on either supposition. But of those who being determined to become soldiers, would at all events engage in one service, whatever that might be, were the other not offered to their choice, all who would now engage in home service, of whom the number could not be considered as small, would

be so much clear loss. While we gained in number of men, we should lose in number of real soldiers.

This was strictly the result of the comparison of the two cases, namely, that of our having a regular army only, or a regular army combined with such a one as was now proposed, — with respect to all those who should enter at any one time. All the men who should so enter must be found in one or other of the classes above-enumerated. But he would not dissemble, meaning to argue the question perfectly fairly, that a further advantage was proposed by this plan, namely, that of changing one of these classes gradually into another, and of converting those who originally would have consented only to serve at home into persons who would engage for general service. By tempting them into the army at first upon easier terms, it was thought that habit would do the rest, and that they would be led finally to engage their services to the full extent required. This, undoubtedly, in many instances would happen, though less generally probably than seemed to be supposed; because it must not be inferred, that those who might be induced to extend their term would necessarily be inclined to change their service. But against this number, whatever it might be, must be set off, in whole or in part, those, who being originally decided against general service might, by degrees, have been led to engage in it, if a service of another kind had not interposed to intercept their inclinations, and finally to fix their choice for home-service only. At all events, he must enter his protest against the conclusion, that all who

entered into the army from the army of reserve, were persons whom the army of reserve had been the means of procuring. No inference could be so completely false. If the bounties had been arranged, as every one must have expected that they would, namely, so that the bounty for the army of reserve, joined to that for removing from thence into the regular army, should have been equal, or somewhat inferior to that which was given for entering into the line at once, there might have been some ground, though far from a conclusive one, for that argument. But in the present case, where more was to be got by entering the army through the medium of the army of reserve than by enlisting as a soldier at once, nothing but complete ignorance or thoughtlessness could prevent men from taking that course. Who would not be willing to make that little circuit for the sake of that additional advantage? Men for ever went out of their way for the sake of a turnpike where they were to pay; but here, with the addition of a safer and easier road, was a turnpike at which they were to be paid! It would be odd, indeed, if this was not the route most frequented. Were it not so, the only possible reason which would be assigned, was one which would sound odd in the mouths of those, who supported this bill, namely, that so strong was the preference for the regular army, that even superior profits could not induce men, though only for a short time, to enter into any other species of service. How this came to be so settled, it was hardly possible to conceive. It would really seem, as if it were done

with a view to blinding the public as to the effect of the measure. All that came from the army of reserve, it was meant to state, he supposed, in evidence of the benefit of this system: and as it was plain that nothing could go out of the army of reserve that had not been previously in it, the more was drawn into that repository, the greater might seem the advantages that had been derived from it. They bribed men into the army of reserve, in order that more might be seen to come out of it. They offered a premium to those who should take this circuitous course, and thereby defraud, in the very first instance, the very service that was proposed to be the great object of the measure.

He was glad to make these observations beforehand, that they might not be thought hereafter to be contrived for the occasion, when they should be told triumphantly of the great number of men that had entered from the army of reserve. These were among the reasons, why he thought the measure not likely to be very effectual for its purpose. But a learned gentleman (the Attorney-General) had discovered, that if the measure was likely to be inefficient, it could not consistently be accused, at the same time, of being vexatious. For his part, nothing seemed more intelligible, than that these two properties should go together. This house was certainly of that opinion, when, according to a well-known *formula*, its committees were directed to find whether the petition referred to them had not been *frivolous and vexatious*. Here the conditions were not only compatible, but the one was commonly a consequence of

the other. There was often no better way to show a cause to be vexatious, than to show that it was frivolous. In the present instance, the inference held both ways. Not only might the present measure justly be described as having both the one and the other of the properties in question, but they were dependent mutually on each other; the measure was vexatious because it was frivolous, and frivolous because it was vexatious. The former position was easily intelligible; and the latter would be so upon a little reflexion, when it was considered how much of the effect of any law depended upon the reception which it met with in the public feeling. Of this a striking proof was to be found in the army of reserve bill. That measure was actually brought to a stand by the growing repugnance of this country to submit to its further progress. It was not that the country was absolutely exhausted: that men were literally no longer to be had. If that had been the case, what would become of our present hopes? It was that the sense of the country rose so strongly against the vexation and inconvenience of the measure, that the execution of it could no longer go on. The same fate might well be apprehended for the present bill. The feeling of its vexatiousness, and the conviction of its inefficiency, would soon arm the public mind against it. Among its numerous evils, one was the encouragement it would give to the system of crimping. To call for recruiting from church-wardens and overseers, was to lay down the rule that the business must be done by deputy; and who would the deputies of the church-wardens and overseers be

but crimps? This was a further proof of the effect of the bill, not only in producing evils, but evils the very same with those which it affected to cure, — consequences the very opposite of those which it professed to have in view. It was to get men for the regular army: it began, at least, by drawing men away from the regular army. It was to abolish crimping: the effect could hardly fail to be a great increase of the practice of crimping. It was to lower bounties: it might not, to be sure, carry the bounties quite to the exorbitant amount to which they had risen under the quota and army of reserve bills, but it established bounties higher than had ever before been given by government, and which would, moreover, be increased in practice beyond the sums at which they were established. This was probably the only fruit that we should derive from the measure. The parishes would get no men; but they would completely establish a rate of bounty which we should enjoy for ever after. It was the *somnium latronis*, the thief's dream: we thought to have men, and we should find nothing but expense: we caught at a purse, and we grasped a halter.

Other evils there were of a subordinate kind, and some of them of such a nature, that the sense of the evil was lost, in a great measure, in the ridicule. The whole functions of life were so confounded and blended in this curious system, that while half of our lawyers were becoming soldiers, all our soldiers must become lawyers. One of our principal generals had been for some time past the attorney-general. Instead

of sending our young men to join their regiments immediately upon their removal from the college at Wycombe, we should give them the run of a few months at one of the inns of court; that they might take in their law, and be instructed in their profession under the various heads of service, of quarter sessions, meetings of deputy lieutenants, and correspondence with parish-officers. Burn's Justice and the Churchwarden's *Vade-mecum* would be as necessary to young officers as the Field Engineer, or Adjutant's Assistant, or any of the elementary treatises, to which their studies had hitherto been confined.

Great pains had been taken to compare this measure with the army of reserve, sometimes for the purpose of assuming the merits of that measure, at other times for the sake of an advantageous contrast. But no comparison could be made between them. They stood on entirely distinct grounds. No greater distinction need be sought, than that the one was temporary, the other permanent. If such was the distinction between this and the army of reserve, a difference not less marked, would be found between the measure in its present shape and that in which it appeared, when it was first announced, and when the ballot was included in it. It seemed as if being a military measure, gentlemen thought it fair to employ it for the purpose of a stratagem of war. They had therefore used it as a masked battery, and held forth the idea of the ballot, which they afterwards withdrew, to bring forward the real attack of fines and penalties.

The Right Honourable Gentleman concluded, with expressing a hope, that a measure so destructive and ruinous would be reconsidered.

The bill, without a division, was read a third time, and passed.

STAMP DUTIES.

July 17, 1804.

ON the order of the day for the third reading of a bill for increasing the Stamp Duties,

MR. WINDHAM said there were two parts of the bill to which he meant particularly to object: that which levied a tax directly upon one class of people, the attornies; and that which went generally to tax law proceedings. To tax a particular class of people, except upon the idea that the tax was not to rest with them, but through them to pass to the community at large, was so repugnant to every principle of justice or policy, that it was unnecessary to argue against it. It was a mere robbery, and could proceed upon no principle but that of *there* is the money, and *there* we will go to get it. The only pretext for the tax could be, that it would be levied upon the clients; and that as all men were liable to become clients, it was, in fact, a general tax. In this view it came under the other general head of a tax on law-proceedings; where certainly the character of it was not much

mended; for any thing more unjust or impolitic, more contrary to all principle, than a tax upon law proceedings, could not be conceived.

The only possible case in which such taxes could be justified, was that in which they were matters of regulation. This might sometimes be necessary, though it was always to a degree objectionable. It was never good, as he had had occasion to remark lately on a different subject (the bill for the disfranchisement of the borough of Aylesbury), to mix in legislation objects of a separate and independent character, so as to leave the motives of the legislature doubtful. It was desirable to have it known, how much was done for tax, and how much for regulation; that what might be called the public motive, might stand clear of that which might be called the interested one. But in this instance, there was not a pretence for talking of regulation. By whom had the happy discovery been made, that law proceedings were too cheap? He could understand the possibility of such a case; or rather that if the case existed, the inconvenience of it would be great. No greater evil could be conceived, than a state of things in which every man might institute suits against his neighbour at no expence or hazard. No man's property would be at rest for a moment. Twenty Westminster Halls, sitting every day, and all day long, would not suffice for the litigation of London alone. But surely this was a state of things of which we were in no great danger. What had been done by the legislature already, what was sure to be done at

all times by others without that assistance, might exempt us from the apprehension of being ruined by the cheapness of law. We might safely trust ourselves, in that respect, to the learned profession itself, which would take ample care that men should not go to law for nothing. It was perfectly idle to say, therefore, that any interference of the legislature was necessary in that view. But if a tax upon law was not necessary to guard against the danger of law becoming too cheap, was there not a fear that such an addition to the expences already attending these proceedings, might render them too dear? It was notorious that it must be so. The evil existed to a degree already which required no new circumstance to inflame it. The expences of law were already a denial of justice in many instances to the poor, and sometimes, it was to be feared, a means of oppression in the hands of the rich. This, to a certain degree, was unavoidable. It was inherent in the nature of things, and could be no subject, therefore, of rational complaint: but it might be a subject of complaint, if we wantonly and unnecessarily should think fit to aggravate the evil.

It was quite ridiculous, if, while we were boasting that in this country the courts of law were open to every one, we should be fortifying the reply that had been made to that observation, "aye, so is the London Tavern, to those who are not afraid of the bill." This was conclusive as to the propriety of such a tax, even supposing it to be in other respects right. But the whole principle of it was wrong, independent of

the degree, and of the effects which it might incidentally produce. To tax law was, as had been well observed, to tax necessaries. It was to tax, not the property, but the means by which the property was to be acquired. This in a degree, and indirectly must, to be sure, often be done. A tax upon one thing might be said to affect indirectly the price of every other. But in general, the object of taxation was to levy a contribution on the property when possessed, and not to bear upon the means of acquiring it. You did not directly tax the smith's hammer, or the carpenter's saw, though a tax upon iron, or upon shipping, might indirectly, and in some degree, affect the price of those articles. This was an argument which he had used many years ago upon the shop-tax, and which, he must still think, was well-founded. A man's shop was the implement of his trade. Though law was not, strictly speaking, the implement of trade to any but lawyers, it was to many the means or implement of acquiring that which ought, above all things, to be considered, namely, the property to which they already possessed the right.

It was no answer to this to say, that the tax fell only on those who had not the right, namely, on the party who lost his suit;—that the expences of the other were paid out of the costs: besides that the costs granted never covered the whole expence, who could mean to assert, that the merits of a cause, and its success, were to be considered as one and the same? Our law supposed no such thing. We had the insti-

tution, as all other countries had, of tribunals of appeal, being tribunals founded on the supposition, that former decisions, however cautiously and conscientiously made, might be wrong. This might happen even where the questions, submitted successively to the two tribunals, as in the case of appeal, were precisely the same: but how often must the fact be, that from accident or mismanagement, from the defect of evidence, from the absence of witnesses, from the loss of papers, from want of timely information or of judicious advice, the case submitted to the tribunal in the first instance was not the true one, and could not decide, therefore, on the real merits of the cause. After all, was no cause fit to be tried, that was not found ultimately to have the merits on its side? Were the parties to be bound under a penalty rightly to decide on their imperfect and partial information, and with their defective judgments, that question on which men the most enlightened, after a hearing of both sides, were found often to differ in their opinions? Every man, it was true, came into a court of justice under that risk; but was it fit, that that risk should be unnecessarily aggravated? It was the case of the old tribunal at Lyons, mentioned by a classical author, where the penalties were such, as to make the situation of a suitor there a proverbial instance of fear.

——————————Sic
Palluit, ut nudis pressis qui calcibus anguem,
Aut Lugdunensem rhetor dicturus ad aram,

How many must be deterred from entering into a court of justice under such risks, even with all the merits of the case on their side; and, what was not less to the purpose, how many even of professional men (attornies he meant), who would now sometimes undertake a cause, which they thought well of, at their own risk, would be deterred from the undertaking, when the loss on failure must be so very heavy.

But of all the extraordinary justifications or apologies for this measure that were ever thought of, was that of a learned gentleman the other night *, who bid us recal to our recollection, that the tax in question did not extend to that part of our law which was vested in the hands of justices of the peace and other magistrates! We were to be reconciled to the obstruction of justice in civil suits, by the facility of its execution in the case of penal statutes! A man was to console himself for the loss of his estate, by the reflection that another might, with great facility be committed to prison! Nay, the merit of the idea did not stop even there, for as the person himself might be the object of the law in both its operations, the real state of the case was, that a man should be consoled for the loss of his property, by reflecting that he himself might with great ease be committed to prison. The case was not unlikely to happen; for the very want of that property, which these increased

* Mr. Dickinson, Jun.

expences made it impossible for the owner to recover, might be precisely the means of plunging him into distress, and thereby procuring him the benefit of that free operation of the law in other respects, which the Honourable Gentleman held out. "Don't be cast down," he would say; "you have lost the hope of trying your cause, and with it that of recovering the little property which you think you have a claim to; but should you, in consequence, and from the distress in which you are now left, be led into any offence against the revenue or game laws, or be guilty of any other irregularity, you will find that, however difficult or expensive the law may be in enabling you to obtain your own, it will furnish the means of sending you to prison in the easiest and cheapest manner possible."

There really seemed, therefore, to be no one ground which this measure had to stand upon. It was a mere determination to get so much money; for which nothing could be pleaded, but that the money was wanted. The reality of this plea he could easily understand, and readily feel for. He could conceive what was the situation of the Right Honourable Gentleman, tormented, perhaps, with the cravings of an empty exchequer; and could sympathise with him accordingly: but so he could with a man who, in compliance with the cravings of an empty stomach, should rob a butcher's shop; yet without being able to pass over the offence, or to say that people's property could be left open to such depredations. In

the present instance, there was far less excuse. Though the pressure might be nearly as urgent, there was not the same impossibility, as might exist sometimes in the other case, of procuring relief by better and honester means.

The bill was read a third time, and passed.

DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY.

February 21, 1805.

MR. WINDHAM, in rising to submit to the house the motion of which he had given notice on the first day of the session, could not forbear calling the attention of gentlemen to the numerous postponements that had taken place with respect to it, none of which, excepting the last, had originated with himself. The only delay that was chargeable to him was rendered desirable and necessary by many considerations.

The motion he was about to offer was almost precisely the same as that offered by his Honourable Friend on the bench above (Mr. Fox,) on the 23d of June last. The terms of it were, that it should be referred to a committee, to review the several acts passed in the two last sessions for the defence of the country, and to consider of such further measures as might be necessary to make that defence more complete. He saw many gentlemen on the other side of the house who had thought it most necessary to review the system of defence in the last session. He would ask those gentlemen, how they could think such a review necessary then, and not think it full as necessary now? He desired them to take the account

as it stood then, and to consider in what respect the balance had been changed. It was necessary, to alter the state of the case, that some change should have taken place, either that the enemy's means of annoying us should have decreased, or that our relative strength should have increased more than theirs. It was necessary also, that this diminution of our danger should not be a temporary cessation, but that the cause of apprehension should have entirely passed away. In his opinion, no material change had taken place. It was true some addition had been made to our force, but if even a greater addition had been made, that would not be sufficient. The general state of our military establishment was what it would be necessary to inquire into, and what had been done under the late defence act, to give us those improvements which were so generally allowed to be wanting before. Those who had voted for a Committee of Inquiry on this subject before, and one in particular who had gone further than all the rest (the present Chancellor of the Exchequer,) were, he thought, particularly called upon to support his motion. He should feel extreme surprise if they should resist it, and was at a loss to think what reason they could possibly offer for such a resistance, except, indeed, they were prepared to confess they were wrong in their opinions at that time; that the measures they arraigned at that time had merits which they did not then see; and that the measures they recommended had deficiencies of which they were not aware. Was the Right Honourable the Chancellor of the Exchequer prepared to say, that

the whole of the additions made to our military establishment were made by his present colleagues, whom he then opposed; was he prepared to say, that the measures he then declared bad, were now good, and that the men he then censured as incapable, were now most capable? Was he prepared to say to those men, "your measures have been such, that if I had then the opinion of them which I have now, I would not have voted for the inquiry?" Was he prepared to allow that every thing which had been done, and which was now available, was done by them? He was, indeed, himself prepared to allow, that the Noble Lord and his associates had done much more than had been done since; but, as his opinion was not changed as to the positive defects of what they had done, he still continued of opinion that the inquiry was necessary; and he thought those who voted for it on the former occasion, could not do otherwise than support his motion now.

If it was meant to be argued, that men were procured by the measures ultimately adopted by the late administration, and then in progress, he had never denied that the system of raising men for rank would procure men. He was ready to allow the force of family influence in Ireland and Scotland, but he contended that the principle of a system of recruiting by influence was injurious. It was not to be denied that the presumptive heir to an estate might raise money on an annuity, but such would be ruinous to him. The measure of recruiting for rank was one which he always objected to; not that he denied its power of

raising men, but that he thought it a most pernicious mode of obtaining them. Thus the ballot obtained men of necessity, and a considerable force, almost all that had been obtained to meet the extraordinary exigency, had been supplied by it, under the direction of the late ministers; so that whatever obligations the Right Honourable Gentleman opposite owed to it, he was indebted for to them; yet, whatever it had produced, could not reconcile him to the principle, any more than if the parish bill itself had produced men. He therefore saw nothing to diminish the necessity of inquiry. All the former objections to the state of our military establishment were still in full force; and he knew not how, after the failure of the measure proposed as a remedy, any member who voted for inquiry then, could avoid voting for it now. This, however, was a mere *argumentum ad homines;* for though a large part of the house, notwithstanding it was a minority then, had supported that proposition, he should not think it necessary, on that ground alone, that they should support him. Men should be determined always by the evidence before them; many of the measures thus instituted had by this time been brought to trial; some might have justified themselves by their success; others had been decidedly condemned by their failure. The very circumstance of a Spanish war changed the situation of the country. But that was not all. It might have been said by the late ministers and their adherents, that the regiments raising in England and Scotland promised to be successful; that some of their other measures also had procured men, and that

the army of reserve, though suspended, had been amply successful, and might again be revived; and that a further trial of all their measures would prove the efficacy of them. To those who voted for inquiry against those ministers, he would submit a broad question as to the necessity of inquiring now. Whether the present state of this country, (not meaning by the present state the bare condition of the moment, but as far as the view could reach,) was not a consideration of more vital importance than had ever been before known? Whether an army was not necessary, not merely to enable this country to rank among the nations, not only to preserve her power, her distant colonies, and the other sources of her consideration, but even to preserve herself from year to year? Whether our situation was not like that of the feudal times, when a man was obliged to sleep with his sword under his pillow, and when he was under the necessity of keeping his armour by him even while at the plough? All that we saw around us abroad, all the domestic occurrences that had taken place here, all the military discussions that had taken place in that house, the result of which had been the turning out of the last ministers and the coming in of the present, which had turned our chancellors of the exchequer, and our attornies and solicitors general into colonels and generals, and which had rendered all the men in the country military, all this proved the extraordinary and imperious necessity for a great and permanent military force. The next question was, Whether we had, or were soon likely to have, such an army, as

was necessary for an immediate exigency? The third question would be, whether our military system was commodious and well constructed, so as to answer the public exigencies in the best manner; so as to yield the best possible force, or a force in some measure adequate to the expence and exertions of the country? Fourthly, supposing it answered all these requisites, had it that facility of recruiting so as that it could exist long and support itself without any new or extraordinary aid? Could these questions be answered, unless the state of the country was different from that which he described it; unless we could soon have an establishment adequate to the exigency; unless the description of the force was good, and in proportion to the expence we had been at, and the exertions we had made; unless it could be recruited and kept up so as to secure it from decay? Unless perfect and complete satisfaction could be given on all these points, there was a positive and undiminished necessity for the inquiry.

We were told of the force of the volunteers, the militia, the army of reserve, and the regulars. One great objection to such a military establishment was its variety. It was not that there were light troops and heavy troops, troops of the line, and troops on horseback, infantry on foot, or volunteers in carts; they might all have their particular services. What he objected to was their being on different establishments. Variety in nature might be very pleasing, but he did not think that was altogether the case in military establishments. If the volunteer system was good, why

had we not all volunteers? If the army of reserve was good, why not make our whole force an army of reserve? But, perhaps, it might be said, they were for home service, and that it was necessary to have one sort of troops for one service, and one sort for another, like the man who had a great hole for his great cat, and a little hole for his little cat. He thought it better, before he proceeded, to examine the constitution of those four different armies; how far they were consistent with economy; how far they gave the greatest and best force; how far they interfered with each other; how far they counteracted the general means of recruiting; and how far they were the basis of a permanent force.

First, as to the volunteers: this was a head of defence which had already undergone so much discussion, that he wished he could pass over it without saying any thing now. But he could not help saying, that all his former opinions were confirmed by the additional experience he had had since he expressed them. They were further confirmed by the testimonies of the best authorities; and here he hoped it would be hardly necessary for him to say, that he meant not the slightest reflection on those who composed the volunteer corps, who were ready to do any thing that was pointed out to them; who had taken great trouble to do what they were directed to do, under this system; and if they had not done what was best, it was not their faults.

The volunteer system had many defects in every view, political, civil, and military. If the volunteers

were designed to answer a sudden emergency, it was a misfortune that they were not left to accomplish their natural purpose in their natural state. He could not help thinking that some things had already taken place, which might be considered as indices of what would probably take place in consequence of the prolonged existence of the volunteer system. The country had not yet seen the volunteers, either under the circumstances of a general election, or a general scarcity.

With respect to the second point, that was by far of more consequence. He considered the volunteer system as altering the civil character of the people of the country. As to the civil character, he apprehended a general effect on the manners and habits of men, such as would be much to be lamented. It tended to disturb the general relations of civil life, to fill those who belonged to it with vain and extravagant pretensions, to bring down the high and to exalt the low. Though he was far from wishing for a revival of those aristocratic notions which induced men of high rank to look down on others with disdain, yet he was a friend to that respect which belonged to persons in the several ranks and gradations of life. History had a story of a Prince who had a man to go before him, to remind him that he was a man, lest he should forget he was one; and many political writers thought it a great advantage in our constitution, that our popular elections brought the great occasionally to sue to the humble. But extreme distinctions were not the vice of the present time. The

vice was, if any thing, the other way. The toe of the peasant came too near the heel of the courtier. When committees of volunteers had the power of giving votes of praise and censure to those of the highest ranks, he thought a door was opened for much injury to society in a quarter where it was least apprehended. There was not a people in the world disposed to shew more respect to the superior classes than the people of England; he meant a dignified respect, having nothing slavish in it, a homage to imputed virtues. If these virtues were not equal to the credit given them, the fault was in those who were supposed to possess them, and the respect that was shewn on the belief of their existence, was not less honourable to those who paid it.

Then, as to the effect of the volunteer force on the army; he did not think it could be the object of any considerable degree of confidence. If some battalions were equal to regular soldiers, and others were not so, it would be impossible to know when they were to be depended upon and when they were not. It was like those books of travels in which truth and falsehood were so mixed, it was impossible to distinguish what was true. To those who argued that the volunteers were better materials of defence, disciplined as they were, he answered so was a pistol a more effectual weapon than a bludgeon, but if the lock was out of order and the powder bad, the bludgeon was unquestionably better. It was absurd to suppose, that putting men in red coats and grenadiers' caps, was sufficient to make an army. We were told

every day of the volunteers being so well trained, of their dressing, marching, exercising, manœuvring, and looking in every respect like regular soldiers; but that was not enough to make them regular soldiers. Nothing was more like a man than a picture; yet it was not a man. He had heard of a celebrated painter who painted grapes so well, that the birds came and pecked them, but they found they were not grapes. It was not the right way to judge of things by appearances. So to judge was to view with the eye of a child, that mistook painted devils for real ones. It was impossible to make an army out of a painted army, or what merely looked like an army. It was not men that made an army, but discipline. Discipline was the very life and soul of an army. You might as well suppose, that flour and eggs and butter and plums, would make a plum-pudding, as that men alone would make an army. The action of the fire and water was necessary to make the excellent production to which he had alluded; just so the action of discipline and subordination was necessary to the constitution of an army.

He had read in a well-known weekly publication (Political Register, Vol. 7. p. 193.) a letter which the writer had done him the honour to address to him from Edinburgh abounding in true philosophy and plain sense, professing to be a summary of those opinions which himself and others, his friends, entertained on the subject of our national defence; but the letter stated these matters in a style superior to what he could aspire at compassing. He thought it worthy

the perusal of every gentleman who heard him. If the volunteer force had, in the first instance, been only intended as a manifestation of the public feeling, that service had already been performed. A system built on zeal alone, was not built for perpetuity. It was like a fine threatrical position, which could not be preserved beyond a certain moment, and if the curtain did not drop, the arms must fall. The men would fall back into their natural station. By bounties and threats an effort may be made to draw them forth into battalions. The government may shake their parchments at them to drive them back again into these battalions, as it had done at first to drive them forward. A bill may be passed to render the volunteers more voluntary, and to make them permanent they may be constituted into a little militia. It was said, in accounting for the thinness of the musters, that those who absented themselves from drill had learned all that was necessary. Those who were most diligent, being of course soonest perfected, if they absented themselves as soon as complete, those who remained in their absence must be a mere aukward squad; and when all were completed, there would be none in attendance. There were certainly some things, such as swimming, which if once learned were never forgot; military discipline was not of that number, it required continued exercise to preserve it. From these considerations, he could not agree that the volunteer system had done any great good; or that it was calculated to do any; but least of all, that it was to be looked up to as a part of our military establishment.

Next as to the Militia, which he would describe in two words, by allowing that it was as good a force as it could possibly be, and that it went far beyond the designs and expectations that were formed of it at its institution. It had attained the highest perfection it could possibly reach; but the vicious principle of the ballot on which it was founded, had the most pernicious effects on the means of supplying our general military system. There were but two ways of supplying an army, by voluntary services and by compulsion. The armies of most other countries, he believed, in some measure, of all, were now supplied by compulsion. France recruited her armies by conscription, he believed, not to the exclusion of volunteers; Old France, he believed, recruited entirely by volunteer service; Russia recruited by compulsion; so did Sweden; Denmark in a great degree; Prussia altogether; and Austria chiefly by means not very remote from these; Britain raised its forces by volunteers alone, with the exception of the train bands. The consideration of a bounty of one guinea, or a guinea and a half, could not have presented any inducement. The inducement was the state and condition of a soldier, and the bounty served only to wet the bargain.

Here the Right Honourable Gentleman traced the history of the militia, from its institution in 1756, from the impulse of shame, at having Hessians and Hanoverians brought into the country to defend it. This was considered as a cheap force which would lie by in time of peace, and go to grass till it was wanted.

Thus, being a force of a mixed description, it lost the advantages of both those between which it was intended as a mean. Our foreign and our home defence were intimately connected. The loss of its greatness would be to this country equivalent to the loss of its existence; for when it ceased to be great, it would cease to be at all. There could be therefore no question of the legitimacy of the right of calling for and enforcing personal service, if there was a necessity of calling for it. It was not necessary, however, to have recourse to compulsion, and it was not legitimate, as we could do without it. There were other measures more constitutional and more consistent with our former practice, which there was still room to hope might be successful. Such was the system that had existed before the ballot had been introduced, a poison that had of late spread so widely, and been so destructive. This poison had long lain dormant. There was a spirit in the lower orders of the people, which would not for a time suffer the ballot to be enforced. From 1756 to 1774, the beginning of the American war, the ballot had never once been enforced, but in this period there was certainly included nine years of peace, from 1763 to 1774. At that time, there was no system of substitution, no bounties growing out of it. From that time the increase of bounties commenced. The Government was before the only bidder in the recruiting market, and the recruit took the condition of a soldier, with a guinea to make it a wet bargain. Then came the limit of time and of space in the obligation to find a substitute in one's

own district, when the price was increased to government all over the country, in so much that ten guineas were given in the American war. Then a remedy was adopted similar to that which our farriers applied to horses' legs, till the Veterinary College taught us better, giving temporary relief, but causing the complaint to relapse with increased force. Thus our state farriers, when the amount of the militia rendered the regular recruiting so dear, expected to relieve us by giving us more militia. In 1772 officers were threatened to be dismissed the service if they gave so much as two guineas bounty. In 1782, after its vast rise in the American war, it was again reduced to 3½, and the whole of that was not given in money. In the following war, when the militia was formed as it were into a regular army, and few served who were not substitutes, the bounties became enormously high. Then came the pernicious system of raising men for rank, by which men who were only cornets, and even men who had never been in the army, were made colonels. In raising men the bounties had been brought to such an excess that it was necessary to threaten with dismissal those who gave more than 15 guineas. Then the Scotch and Irish militia were instituted, and the latter was carried to the amount of 28,000. Next came the supplementary militia, and afterwards the provisional cavalry. This last was a thing of so short a duration, that it had slipped his memory at first, but it had left effects not to be forgotten. It passed over the country like a blight. It was like a hustle at a fair, which one got through in a

moment, and did not think of it afterwards, till he found he had lost his watch. It was a pleasant conceit, to make every man ride another man's horse, till at length, when the men and horses were all brought together, no man knew how to mount, and so they all separated. From the effects of all these proceedings, the bounty was raised to 60 or 70, or even 80 guineas, and there was no reliance for an adequate and permanent supply after all. Then the establishment of the militia and army of reserve to the amount of 140,000 men, entirely choked the regular and ordinary sources. It was an Honourable Colonel who was now absent (Colonel Craufurd), and other gentlemen at that side of the house, who had given its beneficial qualities to this Army of Reserve Act, so that whatever effect it had came from that side of the house, and he and his friends might say, like critic Dennis, "that is my thunder."

Thus he had traced the mischief down from the American war. The ballot was a principle which must of necessity exhaust itself, and it must have been exhausted where a measure which was calculated to produce 50,000 men, could by no possibility be made to produce more than 37,000. Applying it further was like giving physic to a man whose stomach would not hold it, and who immediately vomited it off. The ministers who had acted upon it till it stopped, were not, however to be blamed. They had only tried a known and established principle as far as it could go. Having made the Peace of Amiens, having suffered Bonaparte to overrun the Continent,

and having made war when this country could be nothing but a besieged island, that minister had recourse to this measure as the bow of Ulysses, which he made such use of, that Adam Bell, and the other celebrated archers of old, were nothing to him. At length the force was so spent, that nothing more could be done, and as soon as this great archer fired the arrow, it fell at his feet. The friends of the noble Lord (Sidmouth), however, cried *victoria*. They did not consider it, in the language of the turf, as a race won by a neck, though it seemed it was neck or nothing with him. The rider was thrown, and the horse came in. The noble lord called upon the clerk of the course to give judgment for him; but the person who held the stakes was called upon to give them into his hands; and having in the mean time been given into other hands, with a view to a different system, the noble lord now demanded them back, and was not satisfied to have them by halves.

Here the Right Honourable Gentleman gave many forcible illustrations of the absurdity of recruiting the army by the circuitous means of the army of reserve. The army of reserve supplied many recruits, because it absorbed all the men of the country, and the additional bounties induced men to go the circuitous route into the army. To praise it on this account was just the same as if, because all the members of the house came into it through the lobby, it should be said, what a wonderful place this lobby is, which supplies the house with all its members. It was a kind of turnpike where soldiers did not pay, but were paid for passing

through it. A man would be thought rather foolish not to go into the lobby first, by which he was able to get a double bounty before he became a regular soldier. He hoped to hear no more of the good effects of this lobby. The whole system was encumbered and weighed down with a complication of machinery. The existing bill was a sort of great digester, supplied with almost innumerable small capillary tubes, one running to every parish in the kingdom. Why not have a large straight pipe, making a direct communication at once, and free from the confusion of useless intricacies? But then he should be told, oh, there is no invention, no contrivance in all that! It was much easier, in those gentlemen's eyes, to take a circuitous mode of filling the great machine, than to throw all the materials into it at once, in a straight forward way.

Gentlemen had talked about the bill not being oppressive; the oppression was not upon the recruit, but it was pretty heavy upon the parish. The parish was to do the work, after the old saying: "fire burn stick, stick beat dog," and so on. The parish officers, over whom the parish had no controul, were to raise the men or levy the money from the parish; but that could no more have the effect of finding the men, than one could make the horse drink though he should take him to the water. It was, however, now given up. It was like a man of whom nobody spoke well, and of whom therefore it was unnecessary to speak ill. It was like harlequin's horse, which had but one fault, and that was, that it was dead. It was, per-

haps, unnecessary to follow it further, unless, indeed, the humane society may not have yet done with it, and the Right Honourable Gentleman opposite may hope to revive it by some process. If, however, the Right Honourable Gentleman would content himself with saying merely that it deserved to be revived, he would be satisfied.

It was said the present measure (the Additional Force Act) had not been successful, because the parish officers did not understand it so as to proceed to enforce it immediately. If it lay six weeks in their hands before they could understand it, much could not be expected from their sense of their duty under it. The bill passed on the 23d of June, and nothing was heard of it till the 13th of August, and then, when it was supposed to be ready to go off like a spinning jenny, like the machinery of a thousand looms, not a sound was heard; it was *altum silentium.* Instead of all this, you went about as quietly as ever, and people in their disappointment were every where enquiring, "where's the new parish bill?" Wonderful, indeed, were the effects of this parish bill, that was to work with such unprecedented local efficacy, and which had produced, allowing for casualties and desertions, the astonishing number of 665 men! Yet this was the system which was immediately to produce all we wanted, and to afford a continued and full supply to 60 battalions. In what situation was the country, when the ballot failed altogether, and when no hope could be entertained of the measures brought forward to replace it? It was not only a present supply that we wanted, but

the means of constantly keeping up that supply; 5000 men was the whole number obtained by the staff recruiting. The rest was obtained from sources reprobated, not as unproductive, but as unfit to have recourse to, as exhausting the permanent hope, like the savage who cut down the tree to get at the fruit. To pursue this system further, was to act like a man living on credit, and going on smoothly for a while, but who was obliged to shut his door as soon as the bills came in for payment. When were we to go back to the ballot? The gentleman who had tried it last had stuck to it while it could produce any thing; and now it was like a fallen minister, in company with whom nobody wished to be seen. The present measure had gone far beyond the ballot, except that the parish officers were not compelled to act, as it was not determined how we should proceed. They could not get the men, and ministers were afraid to take the money. It may perhaps be resolved to take it from two or three parishes, to quicken the others, by whipping them, just as the captain of a ship compelled the dropsical man to mount the mast, saying his complaint was but arising from indolence, till the fall of the poor man into the sea convinced him of the truth of his sickness by the loss of his life.

Another complaint against this mode of recruiting was, that while it professed to keep the bounty below 20l. the crimps who were generally employed, had the 14l. allowed by government, in addition to the 20l., making altogether 34l. for every man. Thus ingenuity came at length in aid of the parish officers,

and obtained some men at an increased bounty. He therefore considered the experiment as having completely failed; and here he might say, what he was sure the house would be glad to hear, that his task was nearly at an end. He had shewn, that as a means of improving our military system, this measure was abortive. In nine months an increase of 11,000 had been made. In the same period the losses at home and abroad amounted to 16,000. Both these making 27,000 ought, and must have been supplied by other means, if these had not been resorted to. And if, on the whole, the increase had been equal to both these 15 or 16,000, it would have been for the consumption alone, all the rest would be derived from foreign sources. Thus it appeared, that only 5000 men had been gained for the general service in the first instance, and the remainder of the increase by measures which the Honourable Gentleman had reprobated, so that only one-third of the increase had been supplied by the means that had been employed. Some small addition had been made to the cavalry, but when it was considered how favourite a service that was, the supply was by no means such as it ought to be under proper encouragement. Except the troops employed on colonial service, which were all set fast to answer the local demands, and could not be detached, unless, perhaps, on small expeditions, for no man could suppose that the troops in garrison at Gibraltar, &c. would be safely employed in that way, all the regular infantry we had to dispose of, amounted only to 53,000 men; and, indeed, if we took off the amount of

foreigners, we should find it to be only 47,000 British infantry. This was all we had for any important and unexpected demand whatever, whether it were at home, or for any effort in any great continental operation that might be undertaken. As for the foreign troops, it was, doubtless, very proper to have them in our pay; but one could not help being struck a little with the character of these foreign troops. Soldiers of this description were generally supposed to be for general and unlimited service, ready to go any where. But a greater part of them were Canadian Fencibles, and New Brunswick Fencibles. The house would, however, think it odd that in these foreign corps were included 4 or 5,000 native troops of Ceylon, armed, he supposed, with bows and arrows.

From what he had stated, it would be evident, that something more than the present measures was necessary to fill the vast vacancy in the army, and after having shewn what were our military prospects, he was satisfied that every body would agree in the necessity of resorting to the wisdom of parliament, for that something that was necessary to be done. In saying that it would be right to resort to the wisdom of parliament, no man, of course, could be supposed to mean his own wisdom; but the more he felt himself incapable, and the more he looked to others, as more competent to point out the measures that ought to be adopted, the more necessary it was to resort to the wisdom of parliament, and of the nation. As, however, in the event of his motion being agreed to, he should feel it his duty to submit his sentiments on the

subject in the committee which it was his intention to propose, he thought it would not be altogether out of place to state summarily the particular objects to which his observations would apply. And here he begged to disclaim all systems, his object being only to remove the obstructions which at present interfered with the regular supply of the army, and to restore our military establishment to the old way of recruiting it. He had already shewn from experience the ruinous effects of the system of ballot, that had first created, and afterwards continued, the difficulties in keeping up the numbers of the army; and he was confident that the fault was with the government. Wherever difficulties and impediments were felt in any branch of the public service, it was *a priori* to be inferred, that the fault lay with the government. He was aware, however, that no minister could, as had been boasted by Pompey the Great, raise an army by stamping his foot on the floor. The creation of an army would be a work of time. He was not, however, one of those who were apt to run into the opinion, that every thing that was wrong must result from the fault of government. The question might be divided into two parts, with respect to an army within our power to have, and out of our power to have. For any purpose that we wanted, he was happy to think, that an army was completely in our own power. An army might undoubtedly be carried too far, as well as neglected too much, and not carried far enough; but what was there to hinder us, with our population, from making a proper army? What was to prevent us from turn-

ing a certain proportion of our population towards the military profession, as well as towards any other of the professions, or any particular trade? Why could not the army be made to feel that it was equally worth their while to go to that profession, as to go to trade? Make it an object with men to enter into the profession, and enough will be induced to join it. Suppose any new manufacture of great importance, some great cotton manufacture for instance, suddenly sprung up and flourished; some other trades and manufactures were probably at first hurt by its prosperity; but these things found their own level. There was a new means of subsistence discovered. Mr. Malthus had not, indeed, discovered any new principle, for the principle was obvious before; but he had pursued it with great perspicuity and truth. The demand will have its relation to the supply. For instance, if shoes took twice their quantity of materials, if men had four legs instead of two, or even supposing they had as many legs as a caterpillar, shoes must still be worn. What was there then in the trade of a soldier so exceedingly forbidding and revolting to the people of this country? A soldier was not quite sure of a very long life, but his occupation was more healthy than most others. People were found every day to go down into damp, unhealthy mines in Cornwall and Derbyshire; we had painters, and other tradesmen following unhealthy pursuits; nothing was wanting but to put the soldiers's trade upon a proper level. The army had great attractions to the young and ardent and high-spirited. Notwithstanding all seeming dis-

advantages, there was an invincible attachment to a military life to be found, by no means uncommon. But when he spoke of the trade, he might also speak of the trader. The military life was the trade; the trader was the government. Could not this great trader do as much as other traders do, to put this particular trade on as high a ground at least as any other of the profitable pursuits of mankind? Could government fear any competition on such a subject? They could grant privileges, they could bestow immunities, they could confer distinctions. We know very well that in some other countries the force of certain religious opinions have been such as would either entirely prevent or else impair the formation of an army. Thus, in some parts of Asia there were people that could not be brought to military pursuits. So the numerous body of Quakers could not be persuaded to throw off their religious opinions on this point. We find no such prejudices operating generally among us; but would any body say, that we were become so unmartial and so effeminate as to be past the age of military glory, in the history of this country? Why were our ships manned without fear of storms, or wrecks, or enemies? If we had not an army it was entirely our own fault. Ministers had sometimes laid the fault of bad systems upon the heads of their predecessors; but what excuse of this kind could be made where a minister had been his own predecessor?

Now, the first thing he should propose, would unquestionably be to clear away all the obstructions that

stood in the way of getting an army. To the system of ballot he certainly objected, though he would not at once do it totally away in the case of the militia. He had been misrepresented as the enemy of the militia, which he had never been. He did not like to see it extended too far beyond the original object, and clogging the regular army. He considered the manner in which the militia was broken in upon some years back, as the most injurious mode of meddling with that establishment, and as one which could only be justified by an immediate emergency. Some gentlemen who held commissions in the militia, fancied they had the militia under the protection of the Chancellor of the Exchequer; but he would tell them, that they had put their lamb under the butcher's protection; and, if they pleased, he would tell the militia colonels how long it would be safe. It would be safe just as long as they themselves had power and numbers enough in parliament to protect it.

The Right Honourable Gentleman then dwelt at considerable length on the improper profusion of military honours. Military distinctions, he said, were scattered about over the land with a profuse and indiscriminating liberality. He here again referred to the letter from Edinburgh, addressed to him, and published, which contained some excellent observations on this head, written too, in a part of the island, where he had good reason to believe the volunteers were the most perfect. It was odd, that while all other characteristic honours are sparingly diffused and charily kept, and while they sustained their impor-

tance by their rarity, they should be so profuse and unbounded in their relations to a profession which is most particular about its honour and its glory, and which seeks 'the bubble reputation, e'en in the cannon's mouth.' Why should there be this strange, and seemingly unaccountable difference? Did gentlemen imagine that the estimation of any other honour would long hold its place if treated with any thing like such indifference? Independently of the impolicy of thus making common the military rank, he would put it to the feelings of gentlemen, whether it was treating military men with any degree of fairness, to lessen the value of that which formed the most grateful reward of a soldier's ambition, and enabled him to support the greatest variety of fatigue and danger? From the very nature of man, such a conduct must have an ill effect. By taking away the importance of the military distinction, all the association of glorious and animating ideas connected with it were likely to be lost, and the public as well as the individual deference attached to it must soon disappear. Many other distinctions might be mere nullities. A man might be advanced to the peerage without any claim to merit. Certainly the possession of a title of that nature did not imply any; but the military distinction was of intrinsic value, particularly because it implied intrinsic merit. If, said the Right Honourable Gentleman, you destroy the peculiarity of the symbol, you take away the fairest portion of its value. If you, by your indiscriminate use of a distinction, take from the soldier the fruit of what he has earned by a life of

military activity and the arduous exertions of a long and well-fought field, you must, beyond calculation, destroy the spirit of an army, and that high-minded ardour of military life, which has so justly been called the "cheap defence of nations." Now, Sir, in this, as in other matters, I say, go back to simplicity in your theory and practice. Get rid of the incumbrances and obstructions of your system. Clear away all the brush-wood, and brambles, and moss, and ivy, and let the tree have the full benefit of the air and the light of heaven. — That was what it wanted to invigorate its growth, and without that it could not prosper. We required an army for our defence, not a thing decked out in gaudy trappings that was merely an army to look at. To acquire such an army, nobody could say that much was not to be done, and nobody would say that much ought not to be done.

In order to attain these objects, and to procure men, he would propose, as the most essential improvement, an alteration in the time of service. That improvement adopted, there were various other regulations which he would take occasion to submit, and particularly one with respect to the condition of the inferior officers of the army, whose pay was at present extremely inadequate. This was a point that, in a country like ours, where money was in a great degree the criterion of consequence, was highly deserving the attention of the house. It was notoriously impossible for military officers of inferior rank to subsist upon their present allowance. How, then, could the mili-

tary character sustain itself and be held in proper estimation, if military men were driven, as too many of them unfortunately were, to all the shifts consequent upon poverty; if they were, as was frequently the case, driven from the army altogether, to perish in a jail? That such consequences must have a most injurious effect upon the army, he thought could not be doubted for a moment; and the causes of the evil must be removed, before an efficient army could be had. If it was desired to raise and maintain an army, it was peculiarly necessary to raise the pay of the inferior officers, so as to enable them to maintain themselves like gentlemen. How galling must it be to them, to see themselves surrounded with holiday soldiers, who could afford all the enjoyments of life, and who outshine them in military splendor.

The next improvement he would recommend would be a formal, solid, and absolute renunciation of the practice of drafting. This practice he had ever deemed improper and mischievous, and a great aggravation of the other evils which existed in the military system. By abolishing the draft, and changing the term of service, he sincerely believed that two of the most serious objections which the people felt against enlisting into the regular army would be done away. If this mode of recruiting was adopted, he thought the country would never want real soldiers, and therefore would not be reduced to the necessity of placing much dependance on any other.

He would also suggest some regulations relative to our force in the West India Islands. The horror felt

respecting that service would be set aside in part by the abolition of the draft, and of course one of the great obstructions to recruiting would be removed. It was well known that, among the common people and the soldiery, nothing excited more dread than the idea of a draft to the West Indies; for it was not the men going to share danger with their officers, but going without their officers, and the mischief was to that place which they deemed "the bourne from whence no traveller returns."—Into a detail of the regulations which he thought necessary with respect to our West India service he did not feel it proper to enter. He should merely say, that such European troops as it might be expedient to send to those colonies, he would not send without a gradual preparation for the climate. This preparation to take place by transferring the men in a sort of succession from one spot more congenial to the constitutions of Europeans to one less so. For instance, he would first send them to the Island of Bermudas, or the Bahamas, and having remained there some time, they might be safely conveyed in rotation to those islands where the climate was warmer. The advantage of this arrangement, as the house must conceive, would be to fit the men to endure that climate, which had been heretofore so great a drain on our population. This drain he always understood to be aggravated by the practices to which the drafts generally resorted on their arrival in the islands. If they did not suffer from the common effects of the climate, they either fell victims to despair, or got into habits of intoxica-

tion which speedily produced their death. This furnished another reason for the abolition of drafting, and the adoption of the plan of preparation he had sketched to the house.

Another head of reform which the Right Honourable Gentleman strongly felt it his duty to bring forward, would be the abolition of corporal punishment, unless for acknowledged and specified crimes. Such punishments, he agreed with the correspondent he before alluded to, were by much too frequent and too severe in the army. There were many means of correcting a soldier without resorting to them. Any offence that shame, fine, or imprisonment was adequate to punish, ought not to be the subject of corporal punishment. So much severity as was known to prevail was the more to be deplored, because it was not necessary to the preservation of discipline. Discipline, if it be properly managed, will, like a machine well contrived and set together, move on with the less force. It is generally owing to some great fault in the original structure, or some great mismanagement and unsteadiness in those to whom the machine of discipline is committed, that these excessive severities are at all had recourse to. The reform which was so desirable on this point could not, he was aware, be effected, without a material change in the construction and conduct of courts martial. They must be more solemn in their proceedings, more deliberate in their investigations, something must be contrived to intervene in all cases between passion and its effects; some check on summary punishment must be provided; it

must be settled that no corporal punishment shall take place, no sentence of that nature shall be executed, without previously submitting the proceedings of the court martial to the review of the commander in chief. This last provision would, he was persuaded, have prodigious effect, particularly if combined with a specific description of the crimes for which a soldier should be subject to corporal punishment. To such a description he could not conceive that any objection could be made. Certainly on the score of justice and humanity, it was much fairer that such a description should be promulgated, for the government of both officer and soldier, than that the latter should be left entirely to the mercy of whatever conception of crime the former might happen to entertain. He cared not how voluminous this description of crimes might be, all he wanted was, that the soldier might know what was really to be deemed criminal. The penal code of this country, although death was almost in every line, did not terrify the great mass of the people, because it referred to such crimes as no proper man would commit; nor would a precise description of the crimes to which corporal punishment should attach in the army, have the effect of preventing men from entering into or remaining in it; but quite the contrary.—The soldier will not be afraid of that which no good soldier will deserve: but it would certainly be a considerable alleviation to a soldier's mind to be always able to say, "If I go to parade with a button off my coat, or happen to be a minute or two too late, I shall not be in danger of being tried by a

court martial, or of suffering any immediate punishment that is degrading to the feelings and spirit of a soldier." It was in these small intermediate points of duty, that were of but little consequence in themselves comparatively speaking, that he thought punishments might be modified and alleviated, with the greatest and happiest effect.

He then adverted to certain incentives, which he thought might be applied with considerable propriety and effect, in stimulating soldiers to a keener and more active sense of their duty. The profession of a soldier was such as exposed him to the most imminent danger, and he who had any apprehension of that, was not fit for the profession, nor should ever think of entering into it. He allowed, that, circumstanced as this country now is, it is impossible to increase the pay of the army; in that respect, we had unfortunately arrived at the *ne plus ultra*. But was there nothing else, he asked, could be found worthy to be substituted as an equivalent to an additional 5d. or 6d. a day? was there no such thing as contriving to put by part of the bounty, to be paid on the expiration of the service, instead of the beginning, as a stimulus to the valuable and true soldier, and to operate as a reward to his family, in case any accident should happen to him. The bounty, he said, generally acted both ways, and he feared there was not perhaps above one man in seven or eight, that really deserved it. But there were other things, which operated as incentives, as powerfully, or perhaps more so, than money. Suppose we should give him a right to vote

in particular cases, or even suppose we should go still further, and allow him to kill game, for instance, as a stimulus to be a true soldier, and thereby deserve preferment; suppose a serjeant should be allowed to kill game? This would be no unprecedented method of holding forth inducements independent of pay. In France the soldier was always, during the ancient government, entitled to a particular row in the theatre. Was it not to be supposed, he asked, that such grants or remunerations as those he had mentioned, would operate in this country as they had done in others, and not only be a means of drawing men into the army, but of making them good and attentive to their duty, while they were in it? For his own part, he could not entertain the most distant doubt of it.

It now remained only for him to touch as briefly as possible on the several objections which might, perhaps, be made to these different alterations and points of reform, which he had taken the liberty to suggest to the house, as applicable to the present state of the forces, and the peculiar circumstances of the country at the present moment. One of those was, that this change will require time, and that at present we have none to spare. This was an old argument, he said, but it weighed very little with him. In order to act as we ought to do, we must boldly look our situation in the face. If bad measures were allowed to go on because the time was too pressing to consider of their removal, the time would at length become pressing, because the measures were bad. We should be found, according to this argument, to be in the same situation

with the hare that is hard pressed by the greyhound; she must go on because she has not time to turn, and yet in turning lies her only safety; for if she persists in going forward, she is sure to fall a sacrifice. Such, said the Right Honourable Gentleman, will precisely be the situation of this country, if we blindly and obstinately persist in pursuing the same measures as have led us into our present unfortunate circumstances. Can any one, he asked, pretend to flatter himself that the danger we had to dread is over, and has passed away? He cautioned the house to beware how they suffered themselves to be deluded by such an idea. If, therefore, that should be allowed, and it should be granted that it was still hanging over us, then he contended, there was no time like the present; we had not a moment to lose, and, our greatest safety lay in looking the danger boldly in the face, and endeavouring to avert it by an immediate adoption of measures different to those which had been proved to be so imbecile in themselves, and so totally contrary to the ends and purposes for which they had originally been intended.

The Right Honourable Gentleman again repeated his opinion, that without changing the term of military service, the army would never become so efficient as was to be wished. It was the general sentiment, the growing feeling of the country, that to enlist for a term of years would be far preferable to the present unlimited period of enlistment. Against adopting this plan, indeed, he had never heard any rational objection. He had heard something of authority, but

nothing at all of argument. No argument could, he contended, be drawn against this project from the limited experiment which was alledged to have been made. In order to ascertain the efficacy of this plan, it must at once be rendered general. There were some things which ought to be proceeded in progressively; one iron might be hot while the other was cold; but the plan he now proposed was not of that description; it must not be executed slowly or partially, it must be promptly and universally set in motion, or it was one of those things in which the fire would go out, and the iron grow cold. If in addition to this change, that of abolishing the draft were acceded to, he should entertain the best prospect of the speedy advancement of the army. On the abolition of the draft, he would advise the grafting of another regulation, namely, that men who, after serving the first term, suppose seven years, would agree to enlist again, should have some marked additional privilege. To those who observed that the limitation of time he mentioned would have an injurious effect on discipline, he should only think it necessary to say, that as a soldier was liable to punishment if he committed a fault only the moment before his time of service expired, he could not conceive that such an effect was possible. If, however, such an effect were likely to arise, how happened it to our Army of Reserve and our Militia? It was to be observed, too, that very good discipline prevailed in the armies of Austria and Prussia, among whom enlistment for a term of years was universal. By what contrivance

then could men be seduced? By what artifice could they be duped to attend to the notion that this term of enlistment would induce desertion? A contrary consequence was, in his judgment, to be looked for; but if a man should desert, let him be obliged to serve for two of the ordinary terms, or during his life. From some officers who had travelled in Germany, he understood that it was extremely difficult to persuade the soldiery to desert, because, as they said, the term of their enlistment was soon to expire. Why should not a similar reflection produce a similar unwillingness to desert among the soldiers of this country, if the same plan of enlistment were adopted? The parish bill, he was persuaded, would have gone on better, if this term of enlistment had been promulgated, because the influence of the gentry would have been more cheerfully employed to induce men to enlist, if they had been aware that the men were only to serve for a limited time.

"What reasons could be urged against the propriety of considering of some means to augment our regular army, which was the object of his motion, he was at a loss to imagine. It was confessed, that all the ordinary means of recruiting were at a stop, and that the parish bill had failed. With this confession before the house, how could resistance to the motion he had to submit be justified? He recommended the adoption of a few plain principles, which must tend to increase the consequence and comforts, and of course the numbers of the army. Several expedients had been tried, and all, including the parish bill, had

notoriously failed. He trusted that all gentlemen who had these failures in their recollection, would join with him in endeavouring to devise the means of rescuing the army from that ill-judged and mischievous system in which it was involved by those who had had the management of it for the last 30 years. Now that necessity so imperiously called for the revision of this system, he hoped that it would not be objected to.

With respect to the foreign corps in our service, in the present state of the country he approved of the existence of that body, and if we could combine with it a strong disposable force of our own troops, he thought we should not be obliged long to withdraw ourselves from the continent, nor to shut ourselves up like a tortoise in its shell. This shutting ourselves up so long, he considered one of our greatest misfortunes. He hoped he should hear no more of the fantastical doctrine that "we were a people too honest for continental connections." We had appeared to withdraw ourselves so much from even the feelings of the continent, that Europe might fairly say, that while we were engaged in our commercial pursuits, and in collecting wealth, we were offering them money to fight for us. As he considered the state of our army to be that which had placed us in this situation, and that the increase and improvement of that army could alone bring us out of it, and that no time was to be lost in struggling to effect our release, he felt it his duty to move, "That it be referred to a committee to revise the several acts passed during the two last sessions of parliament, for the Defence of

the Country, and to consider of such other measures as may be necessary to make that defence more complete and permanent."

Mr. Canning having replied to Mr. Windham's arguments at considerable length, and Sir William Young having made some observations in answer to Mr. Canning, the house divided, when there appeared

For Mr. Windham's motion - - -	96
Against it - - - - - - - - -	242
Majority against the motion -	146

MILITIA ENLISTING BILL.

March 26, 1805.

ON the order of the day for the second reading of a Bill which had been brought in by Mr. Pitt, "for allowing a certain proportion of the Militia of Great Britain voluntarily to enlist into His Majesty's Regular Forces," the measure was opposed by Mr. Hughes, Lord Temple, Mr. Bastard, Lord Stanley and the Marquis of Douglas, and supported by Mr. Yorke, Lord Euston and Mr. Pitt. In reply to the latter,

MR. WINDHAM said, it was not to be supposed he had any objection to the increase of the troops of the line. That was an object so much in conformity with all the sentiments he had maintained, and so directly in opposition to all those that had been supported by the Right Honourable Gentleman who moved this measure, that it was not likely he should oppose him in it. The Right Honourable Gentleman was now employed in taking down a part of the building which he had been so long employed in erecting. He applauded the workman and he applauded the work. It was a satisfaction to find that the Right Honourable Gentleman was so good-naturedly disposed to correct every thing erroneous he might have formerly established. Considering the length of time the Right

Honourable Gentleman had formerly been in power, considering he was now in power again, and that many wished him to remain in power, it would be to be lamented indeed if he adhered to every error he had fallen into. The Right Honourable Gentleman had completely relieved the house from that apprehension; for a more formal, distinct, and pointed recantation of his former principles and practice could not possibly be exhibited. Still it was a departure from his former system only in part, for with a happy variety, it contained in it what, in the sporting language was called "a hedge," the effect of which was, that there was a chance the Right Honourable Gentleman would at all events win.

Here the Honourable Gentleman adverted to the extent to which the militia system had been from time to time carried. The English militia was increased by the addition of the supplementary; then the Scotch militia was added, and afterwards the Irish. The building was elevated by heaping Pelion upon Ossa, story on story, till it was impossible to go further. The Right Honourable Gentleman was at that time in the militia line, he afterwards opened shop for the abolition of the ballot. He had, however, stuck to the old trade till it failed; he kept close to the ballot till its death, and he cried out its last speech in the introduction of his parish bill—this parish beauty, "in coarse russet clad," of whom he was so violently enamoured. The ballot had not been given up till late. It had been given up, however; it was found that it increased the bounty, and that, by its means, men

were not to be had for general service. Then the Right Honourable Gentleman set out with a general declamation against the ballot, which he at length found out was very injurious to the service. The abolition of the ballot was one step towards that negative system, which he and his Honourable Friends had recommended, when being asked for their plan, they said it consisted merely in getting rid of all the impediments that checked the simple recruiting. To remove an evil was certainly the first step towards effecting good; but the Right Honourable Gentleman's change had not this effect. Two negatives, it was said, made an affirmative; but the Right Honourable Gentleman's second proceeding was but a further departure from his former principles and practice. His parish bill went to abolish the ballot, or at least to remove it to a considerable distance. But if that took it away, this measure gave it back. Because the parish bill removed it to too great a distance, this brought it near, so as to enable him more easily to come at it. These observations, he confessed, went more to the author of the measure, than to the measure itself; but though measures were to be judged of in themselves, yet a part of their credit was connected with the personal character of those from whom they proceeded, and therefore what he had said on this head was not improper nor irrelevant.

The Right Honourable Gentleman had argued, that he and those who were of opinion with him that the regular force was too small, and the militia too large, ought to support this measure. Certainly, it

would not be inconsistent in them to support it, but they were not therefore necessarily to do so. Though they argued that the militia should be reduced, and the regular army augmented, they were not therefore bound to approve all means whatsoever proposed for carrying those objects into effect. His objection to this measure was, that it did not produce advantage to the regulars in proportion as it did injury to the militia. The only difference was, that the number of men transferred would be applied to a more advantageous service. He allowed the service was more advantageous; but it was not trained men that the army wanted, and he put it to the regular officers, whether they would not prefer unexercised men to those disciplined militia, who would never make good troops. He did not say that the militia were not in every respect equal to the regulars in training, in many instances they were accustomed to equally severe discipline, but from the nature of the service there was always something hanging about a militia-man which rendered him more untractable than was consistent with the well-being of the regular service. He did not mean in this to argue that no aid should ever be taken from the militia to the line, but never without great emergency.

Another objection was much more extensive, and was founded on a remark which he had formerly made, that measures ought to be adopted wholly and not partially, as in the present instance, because the success often depended on the union of the several parts. In the plan which he had formerly proposed, the Right Honourable Gentleman seemed to have

forgot that he had included service for a limited term of years, and the improvement of the condition of the soldiers. If this were adopted, people would flock to the army like bees, as long as you had a hive to receive them. He allowed that, if necessity required, he himself would be ready to take stronger steps with respect to the militia than the present, and he considered the mitigations allowed by the Right Honourable Gentleman as the most convincing proofs that the necessity of the measure was not felt.—He regarded these expedients so frequently varied, as the ruinous resources of a spendthrift prodigal, who, to supply the want of the moment, cuts down the young timber of his estate, which in a little time would be double its present value. Those ministers who had reproached their predecessors with inefficiency, had found that they could not get through their own measures for six months. The shifts resorted to from day to day, by them, was an argument for the committee he had had the honour on a late occasion to propose. He did not believe this measure was in contemplation when the parish bill was introduced, which was a proof, that the system of ministers was temporary and unstable. Thus the parish bill, which was to produce 27,000 men, of which 9000 were to be allowed to go into the regulars every year, and to be supplied again from the country, had produced about 2000, which was nearly the same proportion a tailor bore to a man. Thus, instead of the full grown man that had been promised, the country must now content itself with this miserable tailor's apprentice. The house was in

fact reduced to subsist upon its votes, as a noble lord had very properly expressed it on a former occasion. The house had voted the measure of last session, in the hope that it would produce recruits for the army to a great amount. The hope had failed. Now this measure was called for with similar promises, and it was unknown what other equally infallible expedient was in reserve, if the promised hope should not be fulfilled. The measure now proposed would be attended with great inconvenience, and the officers of the militia were averse to it.

He took occasion to revert to the irritation with which his hints at the propriety of reducing the militia had been formerly received. He then admonished the friends of that system, that they had less to apprehend from those who openly attacked them, than from those who afforded them a treacherous defence, (see page 283). There was a Spanish proverb, which said, "protect me from my friends, and I will guard myself against my enemies." This applied well to the militia in the present instance. The Right Honourable Gentleman opposite (Mr. Yorke) had argued forcibly in support of his own sentiment on this occasion, but he allowed he had but few of his brother officers of militia with him. The question was not which opinion was right, but which opinion prevailed; not what they ought to feel, but what they do feel. When the Right Honourable Gentleman said, that 18 out of 32 militia colonels, who signed the resolutions against this measure, were actuated by party principles of opposition to ministers, he surely did not see

the effect of this position: for if so large a portion of the aristocracy of the country, the rank, the landed property, and influence, were to be seized upon a distinct question of this kind, to convey their decided disapprobation of the ministers of the time, it was a pretty clear proof of the sense the best part of the country entertained of these ministers. The generality of the feeling, however, let what may be the cause of it, afforded no argument for the success of the measure. The country, notwithstanding the extraordinary success of all the measures recommended from the other side, was still extremely at a loss for a disposable force; this, with the expectation of possible circumstances in Europe to afford room for employing this force, were the reasons for resorting to that which the government was pledged not to recur to, except in cases of extreme necessity. The repetition of this measure went totally to change the militia from its original constitution, to destroy the principle of connection, and thus to do a vast injury to the home service, without having any thing like a permanent good effect on the army. This measure could not be made a part of a general system for recruiting the army. It was a measure of such a nature, that we could not long go on in it, but should soon come to a total stop. Our military system should be so constructed that its parts would correspond with and assist each other. The consequence of doing this thing in this case was, that one part of the existing system acted in one direction and another in the opposite. Then there was a sort of compromise, and such a com-

promise was most ruinous to any thing like a general system. For all these reasons, and for many others, which he could adduce, he thought himself perfectly consistent in opposing this bill. — The question being called for, the house divided —

For the second reading - - -	148
Against - - - - - - - -	59
Majority - - -	89

The bill was then read a second time, and afterwards passed both houses.

IRISH CATHOLIC PETITION.

May 14, 1805.

MR. FOX had, on the preceding evening, moved that a Petition which he had presented from the Roman Catholics of Ireland should be referred to the consideration of a committee of the whole house. Dr. Duigenan, the Attorney General, and Mr. Alexander, opposed the motion, which was supported by Mr. Grattan. The debate was adjourned to the 14*th, when the motion was supported by Mr. William Smith, Mr. Lee, Dr. Laurence, and Mr. Ponsonby, and opposed by Sir William Scott and Mr. Foster. Mr. Pitt also resisted the motion, on the ground of its inexpediency, though he acknowledged that he should have been friendly to the claims of the Catholics, had they been brought forward under other circumstances.*

In reply to Mr. Pitt, Mr. WINDHAM rose and spoke in substance as follows:

SIR,

I consider the question now before the house, as one naturally and immediately the consequence of the legislative union established between Great Britain and Ireland, and one to which the catholics of Ireland were certainly taught to look forward in the course of all the arguments urged in favour of that measure, both in and out of parliament. I think, and have

long thought, it is that measure by which alone the great union of protestant and catholic can be brought about. When the proposition for the union was first brought forward, I had strong objections to the measure; and I was only reconciled to it upon the idea, that all disabilities attaching on the catholics were to be removed, and that the whole population would be united in interests and affections. Believing this to be the case, Sir, and finding that impediments were started to this measure, much stronger than I was prepared to apprehend, I relinquished the administration, because I thought the measure indispensable to the safety of this empire; and I have seen nothing since to change my opinion on that point. The Right Honourable Gentleman has avowed that his opinion was then the same; and surely if it was expedient in 1801; if the circumstances of the country then imperiously called for its adoption; surely it is still more loudly called for by the circumstances of the present moment; and I know of no alteration that has taken place in the situation of the empire that can be truly said to render it less expedient now.

The Right Honourable Gentleman, in every thing which he has offered as argument against the question itself, has referred to times past; but how those arguments can apply to the present day he has not stated. The Right Honourable Gentleman has said that many persons are averse to the measure, that the clergy and the nobility are opposed to it, and that the public mind is not unanimous in its favour. Why,

Sir, if the catholics are to be told they must wait until all the objections which passion, or prejudice, or ignorance, or caprice may suggest, are perfectly silent; and that no man is to be found in or out of parliament opposed to their wishes, I am afraid their hopes of success must be postponed to a very distant day indeed: but, Sir, I am not aware of this very general sentiment of the leading clergy, the nobility, or the public at large, against this measure; unless we take the speeches uttered in this or another house of parliament, opposed by other speeches, at least equally strong and independent, for that general sentiment; or unless we consider the declarations of a few individuals, in different quarters of the kingdom, or a few newspaper publications from prejudiced authors, as expressive of that general sentiment. But if arguments drawn from such sources are insisted on; if no measure is ever to pass in parliament which has not the unanimous sense of the country in its favour, prejudice and passion may for ever triumph over reason and sound policy.

But, Sir, as long as a catholic remains in these countries, such objections will exist. They are founded upon the very essence of opinions, which you can never remove from those minds, on the very first principles of which they are rooted. And so long as they exist, there never will be wanting an outcry against the claims of the catholics. I should be glad to know what public question that ever came forward in this house has had in its favour such unanimity,

that there could be no objection to it? While we have to encounter prejudice, and oppose confederacy, how is it possible that truth and reason can be victorious with unanimity? But to say that this house is to be deterred by popular clamour or prejudiced objections from exercising its fair judgment, is tantamount to a declaration that no disorders can be removed, no abuses corrected, no tyranny subdued. I therefore must resist and deprecate such arguments coming from the Right Honourable Gentleman against this motion, as unparliamentary, unconstitutional, and dangerous. But, Sir, I know of no reason why that measure which His Majesty's minister is of opinion was expedient, and ought to have been done four years ago, and may be done hereafter, ought not to be done now: and as to any danger that can arise from bringing forward the question now, as is alledged, without the chance of success, the only mischief I can apprehend is from the refusal, which must recoil upon ministers themselves, as the cause of it.

The whole of the Right Honourable member's speech upon this subject is indefinite, full of mystery, and, to me at least, not clearly intelligible. The Right Honourable Gentleman has talked of expediency as distinct from right. But the claim of the catholics is not set up upon what is termed a fantastical claim of right, but a plain and common right to an equal share and participation in the benefits of the constitution under which they live. I am myself disposed to rest the principal part of the claim upon expediency, with-

out excluding right. But the Right Honourable Gentleman will hear only of expediency. But this sort of attack upon principles of right cannot be maintained. Rights, in the strictest sense of the word, as employed by the Right Honourable Gentleman, no where exist: but even on the ground of right as a claim of nature, the catholic petition, I say, is founded in justice. They state that what they ask is founded on political expediency; and the policy and expediency of acceding to their petition, is only rebutted by alleging, that to grant their claims would be attended with the greatest danger to our protestant establishments in church and state. What this danger is, from the best consideration I have been able to give to the subject, I am utterly at a loss to discover; the *onus* of proof lies upon those who plead that danger. But, looking to all the dangers; as well these which those who oppose this motion plead, as those which there may be any reasonable ground to apprehend, I think that to grant now the claims of the catholics is by much the less dangerous policy to pursue.

For the present, however, I shall not trespass on the attention of the house by arguing the question further; I shall content myself with entering my solemn protest against the species of argument urged by His Majesty's ministers against this petition, and declaring my firm resolution to persevere in this object, which I consider as best calculated for the safety of that very protestant establishment to which it is said to be inimical: and I have the strongest hope, anxiety, and

confidence, that the period is not far remote when this house will see the justice and sound policy of conceding this salutary, wise, and beneficent measure.

Sir John Newport, Mr. Maurice Fitzgerald, Mr. Dillon, Mr. John Latouche, Sir John Hippesley, Colonel Hutchinson, and Mr. Hawthorn supported the motion. Mr. Archdall, Mr. Shaw, Mr. Hiley Addington, Sir George Hill, and Sir William Dolben opposed it. After Mr. Fox had replied, the house divided, when there appeared,

For Mr. Fox's motion - - - -	124
Against it - - - - - - - -	336
Majority against the petition -	212

CAPT. WRIGHT'S IMPRISONMENT.

July 9, 1805.

MR. WINDHAM felt it to be his duty, previously to the separation of the house for the session, to recall to their recollection a subject of much interest, which he had twice before had occasion to mention, once at the close of the last session and again at the commencement of the present. This was the case of Captain Wright, an officer who had been captured with his ship, when serving on the high seas in the regular course of his profession, and with His Majesty's commission in his pocket. This was material to shew that his case was not distinguished by any circumstances from that of the other prisoners of war; but the French Emperor, it appeared, thought he had been employed on other services, as in landing men upon the coast of France, which placed him on a different footing from prisoners of war. When questioned on this head, Captain Wright, very properly, and as might have been expected from men even far less determined than he, refused to give an answer though menaced, not obscurely, with proceedings that went

to affect his life. Nothing so atrocious, however, had been perpetrated, but he had been committed a close prisoner to the Temple, denied pen, ink, and paper, and excluded from all communication with persons without. The severity of the confinement there could be explained from experience by a gallant officer then in his eye (Sir Sydney Smith), who had, after escaping confinement there, nobly revenged himself upon his oppressors by his illustrious exploits in the defence of Acre; exploits, he would venture to say, not to be exceeded by any thing which could be found in the naval or military annals of any country.

As to the truth of the charge against Captain Wright, he thought it unnecessary to inquire into it; it being a matter of perfect indifference for the present purpose whether it was true or not. Nobody, he supposed, would contend, that to put on shore upon an enemy's coast persons meaning to excite commotion or insurrection, was contrary to the laws of war. If it was, what would become of all which the French had done during the course of the last war, in landing Tandy and others on the coast of Ireland? If men so landed were not of the nation on whose coast they landed, and yet did not avow themselves as enemies, they were liable to be treated as spies. If they were subjects of that nation, they might be treated as rebels or traitors: but neither in one case or the other, was there any ground for charging with a breach of the laws of war those by whom they were landed. The fact was, that the hostility of the French Emperor to

Captain Wright arose from his having been the close friend and intimate associate of the gallant officer to whom he had before alluded.

How Captain Wright was to be relieved now, he could not say; and though that officer had every claim on the country, his relief was not the principal consideration, but the prevention of similar acts of violence in future. Retaliation in the first instance was the only means of preventing such violence. The omission of that retaliation was as much as to tell Bonaparté he might do what he pleased, and we should not retaliate for fear of what he should afterwards do. If we were once to admit this, it would amount to a confession of inferiority, which must have the most fatal effect upon the country and upon every man employed in its service. What officer would enter a service when exposed to such violence? — But what people would not flock to it, if assured that any unwarrantable violence offered them would be repelled with the whole weight of the nation? — This principle, he was sorry to say, had suffered considerable relaxation in its application towards the enemy with whom we have had to do in the last and present war. The admission of inferiority that would follow from our being afraid to retaliate would be the most grievous degradation. It had been said, that Bonaparte had a hold upon us through the persons that had been detained at the commencement of the war at Verdun. These were no doubt so many hostages, but not distinguishable from those who became hostages by being

made prisoners of war in the service of their country. If they were to be distinguished, as many of them undoubtedly might, it was in a way not to entitle them to any preference. If they had not less, they had not greater claims upon the feelings of the country, especially such as had gone to France for amusement without business or necessity. So far, he stated, if it should be supposed that retaliation would be productive of the intended apprehended consequences. But what ground was there to suppose that it would be productive of such consequences? The French Emperor, great as he was, was not released from the obligations of public faith, nor without the reach of the public opinion of his subjects, on whom the effects of the retaliation would fall. He saw that the attempt would be made with infinitely less advantage late than at first. Without pretending to answer for it now, or at any time, he was strongly of opinion that it would have been effectual in the first instance. It must be grievously affecting to the country to know, that a meritorious officer had been suffered to languish under severity which he had drawn upon himself by his zealous exertions in its service.

He had mentioned this subject last session, and had been given to understand that some steps would be taken. If he were to proceed with the business now, he should conclude what he had to say with a motion for an account of what steps had been taken. He should omit that, however, as long as he had any ground to hope that further measures would be taken

during the recess; and he should confine himself now to a notice, that if no such steps should be taken, he would bring the matter before parliament early next session.

No reply was made to Mr. Windham. The unfortunate object of his compassion soon afterwards suffered death in the Temple at Paris; — it is not precisely known by what means; but he had previously assured his friends that no pressure of calamity should ever drive him to commit suicide, whatever might be reported of him to that effect.

ADDRESS ON THE KING'S SPEECH.

January 21, 1806.

THE speech of the Lords Commissioners having been read, an address was moved by Lord Francis Spencer, and seconded by Mr. Ainslie. Lord Henry Petty read an Amendment which he had prepared, disapproving of the part which the ministers had taken in promoting the recent unsuccessful confederacy of our allies against France. This amendment, however, he forbore to move, on account of Mr. Pitt's alarming illness, but proposed to bring the subject forward for discussion at an early day. Mr. Fox, approving of the sentiments expressed in the amendment, concurred in the propriety of a short delay. Lord Castlereagh expressed his confidence that His Majesty's ministers would be able to justify most completely their conduct and measures; after which,

MR. WINDHAM said, he did not mean to enter into the consideration of topics, which had been for the same cause avoided on both sides of the house. In the few words he had to say, he meant to confine himself solely to stating his entire concurrence with the sentiments expressed by his Honourable Friend who had spoken last but one, and by his Noble Friend who had preceded. He agreed, that to enter into the discussion at present, would not be possible, conformably to the feelings which must prevail uni-

versally both in the House and in the country. It was impossible even for those, who had never known what it was to live in any habits of friendly or social intercourse with the Right Honourable Gentleman alluded to, not to feel that it would be one of the most painful tasks that could be imposed upon them, to enter into an adverse discussion on the merits of measures in which he was so deeply concerned, at a moment when he was lying on a bed of sickness, not without good grounds, he trusted, for hoping his recovery, but with the danger necessarily incident to such a situation. It was not however what must be the feelings of any one on such an occasion, that was to be considered: men must perpetually be compelled to do, at the call of duty, what was in the highest degree unpleasant and painful to them. But it happened here, that what made the task painful, did, in the same degree, disqualify them for the performance of it. Even this consideration however could not long delay the discussion in question. The moment must be at hand, should the Right Honourable Gentleman's illness be prolonged, when the public interests could no longer wait, and when this task must be performed, with whatever pain or at whatever disadvantage. But the pressure of public affairs, great as it was, would still, it was hoped, allow of a short respite, such as was now proposed; and if so, every one must wish, that such respite should be given. Let us hope, in the mean while, that some favourable change may take place, which, if it cannot remove that part of our embarrassments which arise from the

absence of the Right Honourable Gentleman, may free us at least from that gloom and depression which the apprehended extinction of great and transcendent talent and high qualifications, in the midst of the most splendid fortune, cannot fail to produce even in the minds of those who may have been most opposed to the political system of which they made part.

The motion for the address was carried without a division.

MR. PITT'S FUNERAL.

January 27, 1806.

MR. H. Lascelles moved an address to His Majesty that he would be pleased to give directions that the remains of the Right Honourable William Pitt be interred at the public charge, and a monument be erected to his memory in Westminster Abbey. This motion having been seconded by the Marquis of Titchfield, supported by Mr. J. H. Browne, Lord Louvaine, Mr. Hiley Addington, Sir R. Buxton, General Tarlton and Earl Temple, and opposed by Lord Folkstone, Mr. William Smith, and the Marquis of Douglas,

MR. WINDHAM rose and spoke as follows: — However painful I may feel the situation in which I stand, I feel that there is a duty imposed upon me that I am bound to discharge. Nothing can be more easy and satisfactory, than to comply with that advice which has been given to all parties, not to let their political hostilities be carried to the grave, and that on such an occasion as this, they should bury all animosities. For my part, the only difficulty I should find in complying with this advice is, that I have no political animosities to bury. Although I join sincerely in admiration of the great talents of the Right Honourable Gentleman who is now no more, yet I think that

those talents cannot be said to have been fortunate in the result, and I must observe, that by the custom of this country, and, indeed, by the custom of every nation, at all times, these extraordinary honours are only conferred where there is a certain union of merit and success. This should not be regarded as a mere question of feeling, but it should be considered whether the honours proposed to be granted are customary, or whether they are strictly merited. There is a sort of fortitude on which men sometimes pride themselves, —the fortitude of bearing well the pain of others: there is a sort of generosity also, that loves to indulge itself at the expence of others' feelings: let us take care in the present case, that we are not indulging our generosity at the expence of our public duties. I know of no function requiring to be discharged under a sense of more solemn obligation than that which relates to the adjudication of national honours; these are claims not to be decided by a momentary feeling, but by a strict and impartial examination of the merits of the case.

Let us understand the nature of the proceeding in which we are engaged; let us know upon what ground the supporters of this motion mean to rely. Do they mean to say, that the greatest honours that the nation has to bestow, should be always given to splendid talents exerted in the service of the country; or would they mean to make a distinction, and only give them to men of great talent, who happened to be in public offices? It appears to me, however, that great talents, exerted in the service of the country, are

as well entitled to a high reward, if the possessor should not happen to have been in public office, as if he had. Let us see how far this principle leads: it is said, you give the chief honours of the nation to those naval and military commanders who gain important victories; and why not to those who guide their operations? Must not their talents be presumed, at least, as great? Now, Sir, this can be easily answered. An important victory is generally a thing that admits of no dispute, no deception. The general who routs an enemy's army, or the admiral who destroys his fleet, leaves no doubt as to the service that he has performed, and is therefore, by the unanimous opinion of every body, considered as an object of high honour. When, on a late occasion, these honours were paid to an illustrious admiral*, all ranks and descriptions of people, the noble and the mean, the rich and the poor, the enlightened and the ignorant, all felt equally that those honours were due, and every heart vibrated to the general expression of national gratitude and respect. No man can mis-state or misrepresent such actions as those; they are not brought forward to answer any party views, or upon false pretences. It is for these reasons that there is a general concurrence in all countries to reward services of that description. Upon services of such a nature there is always almost an absolute unanimity of opinion; but how can it be expected that there will be any thing like an unani-

* Lord Nelson.

mity of opinion, when the question is concerning the merits of a long political life? It is for this reason that all nations make a distinction between the rewards given to a successful commander, and to the minister under whom he has gained his success.

But if it be said, that transcendant abilities, long and important services, long experience, and application of the mind to the important interests of the country, should claim as high a reward as is given to the most successful admirals or generals, I shall then ask, where were all those qualities and endowments more conspicuous than in the late Mr. Burke? Mr. Burke, however, was not honoured with a public funeral. And yet Mr. Burke was inferior to no man in the splendour of his talents, nor in the purity of his mind, nor in genuine and disinterested patriotism, nor in long experience and devotion to the public service. Where then is the difference of the cases? Do Gentlemen mean to rest it entirely upon this, that men of splendid talents and endowments, if they happen to be in office, are entitled to the highest rewards a nation can bestow; but should they be out of office, they are not entitled to honours, although they should serve their country with equal zeal, integrity, and ability? In general I should say, that the presumptions were in favour of him who had served his country out of office, official situations being those which men may covet from other motives. In every point of comparison that could be made, Mr. Burke stood upon the same level with Mr. Pitt, and I do not see the reason for this difference.

If the objections to Mr. Burke's having a public funeral had proceeded from my Honourable Friend (Mr. Fox), or those who voted with him in those times, I should not have been surprized: they might have conceived that bestowing such honours on a man who differed diametrically with them in opinion at that time, would imply a condemnation of their own conduct. But that was not the case; it was not from them that the objection came, but from Gentlemen on the other side of the House, who took Mr. Burke as the leader of their opinions, who cried him up to the skies, who founded themselves upon what he had done, but who were afraid, that if they consented to such honours, it would appear as if they approved of all the sentiments of that great man, some of which were, perhaps, of too high a tone for them to relish. They, therefore, would not, at that time, have agreed to a resolution which would have declared Mr. Burke an excellent statesman.

When the French revolution broke out, it not only broke up the whole system of European politics, but it broke up, at the same time, many of the dearest connections which had united men in ties of private, as well as political friendships. I then differed upon that subject materially from the opinion of my Honourable Friend (Mr. Fox), and being, in a great measure, induced by the authority, and pressed indeed by the instigation, of the great man I have mentioned (Mr. Burke), I connected myself with the administration of which Mr. Pitt was at the head. It is not to be supposed, that because I joined his administration,

that I necessarily approved of every part of his system. The question with me was, whether, upon the whole, the forming that connection, was not the most likely way to promote those objects, which, in my opinion, were desirable to be obtained. Whether in so doing, I judged right or wrong, or whether now, after the event, my opinion remains the same as it was before, are questions that are of little consequence. If I were to divide the whole of the political life of the distinguished person here spoken of, into two distinct periods, one the period before the breaking out of the French revolution, and the other the period subsequent to that event, and that I were called to declare, whether I thought that either, separately, or both conjointly, were of a sort to call for the honours now proposed, or to justify the character ascribed in the resolution, of an "excellent statesman," I must say, no. I have no wish to bring forward my opinion in that respect at the present moment; but, when compelled to declare myself, I must say what I think. I cannot consent to pronounce an opinion different from what I think the true one, and thus to contribute to mislead both the present time and posterity on a period of our history which it is most important for them to judge rightly of. With the fullest acknowledgement both of the talents and virtues of the eminent man in question, I do not think, from whatever cause it has proceeded, that his life has been beneficial to his country. For the earlier part of it, including the commencement of his power, I must contradict every principle, that I ever maintained, if I said that it was so. For the succeeding

period, the greatest in which a statesman was ever called to act, I cannot say, that he acted his part greatly. I do not judge merely from the event; though the event, for the present purpose, might be all that need be considered. The French revolution was, indeed, a storm, in which vessels, the best formed and conducted with the greatest skill, might easily founder: but, what I mean to say, is, that, in my opinion, the vessel was *not* conducted with the greatest skill, and that it is, in all human probability, to the fault of the pilot, that we are to ascribe our present fearful situation. This is no new opinion on my part: I must think so, if I think, as I have always professed to do, with the other great man that I have alluded to, Mr. Burke.

I think it necessary to say thus much, in order to free myself from a supposed charge of inconsistency, in denying generally, the merits of a minister, with whom, for a considerable time, I had acted. But all that would result from this denial is, that the parts, in which I agreed, did not outweigh, in my opinion, those in which I differed. I have stated, however, already, that even in those parts in which I agreed, my agreement was only qualified. I agreed, as with respect to my Honourable Friends near me, from whom I totally differed; but, as with respect to the opinion of Mr. Burke, I must be considered as widely differing.

I repeat, that I feel it painful to oppose the motion; but, I must say, that honours, of such a nature as is now proposed, ought not to be given hastily, from

any momentary feeling, but from a full conviction on the part of each person who consents to them, that they are strictly merited, not by the possession merely of talents and virtues, but by great and essential services, rendered, and acknowledged to have been rendered, to the state. Can this be stated to be the case in the present instance? An Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Hawkins Browne) has cited the flourishing state of the finances and commerce of the country, compared with what they were twenty years ago, as a decisive proof of what we owe to the eminent statesman that we have lost. But, woe betide us, if, in these times, we measure the prosperity of the country by its riches. When Honourable Gentlemen talk of our riches, we must ask how long we can be sure of enjoying them? 'Three thousand ducats a year, and but a year in all those ducats!' The prosperity of a country is to be estimated like a West-India estate, not by its annual produce, but by its fee-simple. What did any one think of the value of an estate in the West-Indies, at the moment when Admiral Villeneuve was reigning triumphant in those seas; and, till the illustrious hero, whose funeral we lately celebrated, had arrived to drive him back?

My great objection to granting the honours now demanded, is this: it has not been the usage of this country, or of mankind in general, to grant the highest rewards, unless in cases where merit has been crowned with success. Of the many admirals who have been rewarded with the peerage, in every instance there was a certain share of success as well as

of merit. If Lord St. Vincent had lost half his fleet in the action with the Spaniards, or Lord Nelson been defeated, either at the battle of the Nile, or off Trafalgar, although the highest exertion of courage and talents had been proved, the same rewards would not have been given. Lord Nelson displayed as much courage and enterprize at the unsuccessful attack of Teneriffe as in those glorious victories; but if he had lost his life at Teneriffe, it can hardly be supposed, that he would have been honoured with such a funeral as was given to him when he fell in the arms of victory. Now, as to the success of Mr. Pitt, it must be allowed that the change in the state of this country and of Europe, during his time, has been most fatal, and that the last periods of his life have been most disastrous. Can we, in the face of these facts, in the midst of the very ruin, which his last measures have brought on; whether by his fault or not, I do not enquire; decree the highest honours, that a grateful nation can render in return for the most distinguished services? The character of these measures, and still more the general merits of his political life, can they be now discussed? and should we not be complained of, were we now to attempt it, not only as opening a subject more proper for history than for a debate, but as cruelly raking up the ashes of the dead, now newly consigned to the tomb? The honours which are now proposed, are such as the whole history of our country does not afford a parallel instance of, except in the case of his illustrious father. The services, however, that the great Lord Chatham had rendered to the

country, and the success of his measures, were such as were never denied by any body; and therefore, the resolution which might be strictly applicable to the father, and which in that case was carried unanimously, stands in fatal contrast to the administration of his son; which, in all its later periods, was eminently unsuccessful, and which very many considered as meriting disapprobation.

For these reasons, I think we should exercise the great and solemn privilege we possess with the most mature deliberation, and that we should not, contrary to the usual practice of this and every other country, give the highest honours of the state to mark the memory of a minister, who, though possessing talents as great as ever appeared in any age of the world, a character and frame of mind fitted for every thing most arduous, and feeling, as must have been the case, a strong desire that the country should prosper in his hands, was unsuccessful in the result, and will not, I fear, be recorded to posterity, as having advanced the real interests and the character of the country.

After Mr. Windham concluded his speech, Mr. Ryder, Mr. Rose, Lord Castlereagh, and Mr. Wilberforce spoke in favour of the motion; Mr. Ponsonby and Mr. Fox against it. The House then divided, and the numbers were:

For the motion - - - - - -	258
Against it - - - - - - -	89
Majority - -	169

MR. PITT'S DEBTS.

February 3, 1806.

MR. CARTWRIGHT moved, "That an humble address be "presented to His Majesty, to represent to His Majesty that "this House having received information, that, on the death of "the late Right Honourable William Pitt, he left debts to a "considerable amount, for the payment of which his property "was found insufficient, and being desirous to shew every tes- "timony of their esteem and respect for the memory of the said "Right Honourable William Pitt, most humbly beseech His "Majesty to advance a sum not exceeding 40,000l. towards the "payment of the said debts, and to assure His Majesty, that this "House will make good the same." Mr. Bootle, having seconded the motion,

MR. WINDHAM felt satisfaction in thinking that it was as easy to concur in this vote, as it was difficult for him to agree to that which was proposed a few nights since. Every thing that related to great talents, long services, and those abilities that were ornaments to the country, demanded and received his approbation. The present motion had his assent, as it fell within the distinction he had already drawn respecting public honours and munificence. It called for no vote of approbation in favour of an individual for the whole of

a long and varied course of public measures and public conduct, in contradiction to the opinions held or expressed by any gentleman, on various occasions, in the course of that public career. No man had a right to call on another for any approbation of that nature, and he felt that every man so attempted to be called upon, had an undoubted right to complain. In viewing the character of the deceased, no one could ascribe to him any low attachment to pecuniary gain; his mind was above such considerations; his conceptions had too much grandeur to admit of any thing of that kind. He did not think that any dangerous precedent was set by this measure. If these debts had been contracted by profusion and excess, by dissipation and vain luxuries, they might admit of a question. On the contrary, they were contracted by no lavish expenditure, no useless ostentation. The great character of Mr. Pitt's mind was too sterling to descend to those means of prodigality; and he even neglected what, in these times, was due to the situation he filled. He had an entire superiority to any thing of the nature of affectation. His salary was not enough to provide the indulgencies fit for his station, and the consequence was seen in the incurring of these debts. Insufficiency of salary, want of pecuniary attention, and the necessary impositions to which he was exposed, must have combined to embarrass his affairs. He therefore considered, that, in the part the House were now called upon to act, they were not indulging themselves in an improper sentiment of liberality, nor catching at any transient reputation of

magnanimity, nor wasting the public money; nor should he think that the case, even were they to make some provision for those who were most near and dear to the deceased.

The motion was assented to by Mr. Ponsonby, Lord Folkstone, Mr. Rose, the Marquis of Douglas, Mr. Fox, and Mr. Canning. — Mr. William Smith opposed it. The question was put and carried, without a division.

List of His Majesty's Ministers appointed in February 1806.

Cabinet Ministers.

Earl Fitzwilliam	President of the Council.
Lord Erskine	Lord High Chancellor.
Viscount Sidmouth	Lord Privy Seal.
Lord Grenville	First Lord of the Treasury. (Prime Minister.)
Lord Howick (late Mr. Grey)	First Lord of the Admiralty.
Earl of Moira	Master General of the Ordnance.
Earl Spencer	Secretary of State for the Home Department.
Rt. Hon. Charles James Fox	Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Rt. Hon. William Windham	Secretary of State for the Department of War and the Colonies.
Lord Ellenborough	Lord Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench.
Lord Henry Petty	Chancellor and Under-Treasurer of the Exchequer.

Not of the Cabinet.

Lord Minto	President of the Board of Controul for the Affairs of India.
Earl of Derby	Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
Lord Auckland	President of the Board of Trade.
Rt. Hon. Richard Fitzpatrick	Secretary at War.
Rt. Hon. R. Brinsley Sheridan	Treasurer of the Navy.
Earl Temple Lord John Townshend	Joint Paymasters-General.
Earl of Buckinghamshire Earl of Carysfort	Joint Postmasters-General.
Rt. Hon. Nicholas Vansittart John King, Esq.	Secretaries of the Treasury.
Sir William Grant	Master of the Rolls.
Sir Arthur Pigott	Attorney-General.
Sir Samuel Romilly	Solicitor-General.

Persons in the Ministry of Ireland.

Duke of Bedford	Lord Lieutenant.
Rt. Hon. George Ponsonby	Lord High Chancellor.
Rt. Hon. William Elliot	Chief Secretary.
Rt. Hon. Sir John Newport	Chancellor of the Exchequer.

MILITARY MEASURES.

April 3, 1806.

MR. WINDHAM introduced his measures for improving the Military Establishment of the country in the following speech:—

SIR,

The measures which I am about to propose are little more than the application of those general principles, which I have frequently had occasion to urge to the house, when questions connected with the state of our Military Establishments have made the subject of its deliberations. The knowledge that such ideas existed in the minds of many of my honourable colleagues, as well as of myself, naturally produced an opinion that some change conformably to these ideas was likely to be the consequence of our appointment to office. And, so far, the expectation was reasonable and just. But, when it was further supposed, that this change was to be immediate, that our appointment to office, and the adoption of measures meant as a permanent foundation for our Military Establishments, was to be one and the same thing, such an expectation was neither warranted by any thing said by myself,

or by any of my Honourable Friends, either subsequently to our coming into office or previous to it, nor countenanced, in any degree, by the nature of the proceeding itself. — For, since what we proposed had more for its object to place the service on a right footing in future, than to devise expedients for meeting the present danger, the measures in view were precisely of that sort in which care was of more consequence than time; in which it was more expedient that whatever was done should be done rightly, than that it should be done speedily. — It is surprising, therefore, that the Honourable Gentlemen opposite do not see, that in calling so loudly for new measures, they are pronouncing a condemnation on those heretofore taken; that in carrying so high their expectations of change, when no change was announced from this side of the House, they betray a conviction that things had been left in a state in which change was absolutely necessary. I have said, and say still, that the Military Establishments of the country are on a false and vicious state, that they stand on a footing on which they cannot stand long; but I have never said, that they could not stand for an instant; that something must be done, no matter what, or the fabric must fall to the ground. It is the Honourable Gentlemen who are talking this language. There is an expression known in the army, applicable to what happens sometimes under an unlucky field-officer, and is called "clubbing the battalion," by which is meant, throwing the battalion into such complete confusion, so mixing the front with the rear, the flanks with the centre, the right with the

left, the grand divisions with the sub-divisions, that it is impossible for the most skilful adjutant or major, by any series of words of command, to bring it again into order. The Honourable Gentlemen seem to flatter themselves, and certainly not without reason, that under this head, as well as under many others, they have completely "clubbed the battalion," and then they stand by, grinning and rubbing their hands, exulting in the confusion they have made, and calling triumphantly upon their successors to shew what they can do, in putting things to rights again.

Sir; this task I am now to attempt, in that part of the affairs of the country which relates to its Military Establishments. I am to state to the House, those measures, by which His Majesty's servants are endeavouring to provide a permanent security against those permanent dangers, by which the existence of the country is threatened: for we have gone on too long in thinking only of the exigency of the moment, in supposing that our task was done when we had staved off the danger for the present year, though at the price of exhausting the resources and weakening the defence of the country, for years to come.

The first object that a person engaging in such a task must have to look to, though it may seem superfluous and almost pedantic, formally to lay down the position, is an Army: by which I mean, a class of men set apart from the general mass of the community, trained to particular uses, formed to peculiar notions, governed by peculiar laws, marked by particular distinctions; who live in bodies by themselves,

not fixed to any certain spot, nor bound by any settled employment; who "neither toil nor spin;" whose home is their regiment; whose sole profession and duty it is to encounter and destroy the enemies of their country wherever they are to be met with, and who in consideration of their performing that duty, and the better to enable them to perform it, receive a stipend from the state, exempting them from the necessity of seeking a provision in any other mode of life. I do not mean to say, that Great Britain has not at this time, as it has had at all others, a class of men answering to this description; that the men of this class are not as excellent in their kind as at any former period; and that the amount of their number is not great as compared with any thing but the exigency of the times. I do not mean to assert either, that we are not, in our language, ready enough to confess their importance, and to declare, that in all the steps we take, we have for our chief object the increase and improvement of this description of men: but, what I do mean to say is, that our conduct in this respect is at variance with our professions, as our language is, at different times, at variance with itself.

Of all the measures connected with military objects, in which the House has been employed for years, what is the number that have even had in view the improvement of the regular army, and how much fewer are those, which can fairly pretend to have been conducive to that end? Though the Army, it was said, was finally to be benefited, the first object of the measure has always been, not to create an Army, but

a substitute for an Army; and, in the course of this, we have so filled our minds with levies in mass, armed citizens, armed nations, and other ideas of that sort, that the very first conception and notion of an Army appear to be altogether forgotten. We seem to suppose, that whenever we have got a set of men together, no matter on what principle combined, have put them in a certain dress, ranged them in a certain order, and taught them certain exercises, that, as far as that number goes, we have created an Army; which is about as wise, as what we see of children in their sports, who, when they have fixed a piece of stick in the ground, fancy they have planted a tree. What is wanting in either case, is the vital principle. We perceive this in the case of the children, but never suspect that the same is true of our own attempts, when we suppose that we can create armies without danger and without discipline. Danger and discipline are the very sap and juices out of which all that has life and action must spring: it is from them alone must arise the real military character; as from the military character must proceed all that can really constitute an Army. How danger must operate to this end, is obvious to every one; but it would not be difficult to shew, that discipline is equally necessary, and that all the high military virtues, whose characteristic is courage, grow, like flowers out of dung, from a principle that is founded in fear. There must be some extraordinary property in armies, that can enable them to produce effects so far beyond the natural powers of their numbers.

I wish the house to recollect how little, at all times, the fate of nations, when contending against each other, has been decided by any thing but the operations of their armies. The times are past, or, rather, never existed but among rude and uncultivated nations, when one country contended against another by the general strength of its population, when the strength of the army was the mere amount of the physical force and courage of the individuals who composed it. Nations now, and in every more improved state of society, even before the great revolution produced in the world by the invention of gunpowder, were brought to act upon each other only by the intervention of their armies. The armies are the champions on each side, to which the countries severally commit their quarrel; and when the champion falls, the cause is lost. The parties are heard only by their counsel. In how many instances has it ever happened, that when the army was defeated, the contest was restored by an insurrection of the people at large? This notion, therefore, of a levy in mass, so far as experience has hitherto gone, would seem to be one to which it would be wholly unsafe to trust. The people in mass are like metal in the ore:—and as all the iron that ever came from a Swedish mine would never hew a block, or divide a plank, till it was wrought and fashioned into the shape of a hatchet, or a saw, so the strength of a people can never, perhaps, be made capable of producing much effect in war, till it is extracted partially, and moulded into that factitious and highly polished instrument, called an army.

The only instance in modern times, that would seem to contradict this opinion, is America. But America was enabled to resist by its distance, and by its vastness. The arm of this country could act but feebly, when stretched across the Atlantic; and the forces that arrived there were dispersed and lost in the immense expanse which they had to occupy. There was an ocean of three thousand miles in front, and a continent of boundless extent behind. America is therefore hardly an instance. In the cases that are properly instances, in what manner have things happened? The latest experience is the most decisive. What are the two events, which more perhaps than any other two, have decided the fate of the present world? The battles of Marengo and Austerlitz. Yet, what were these events, except as marking the power of armies, compared with the consequences which they severally produced? What were the numbers concerned, the space occupied, the time employed, the lives lost on those days, compared with the states and kingdoms whose fate was then decided? Why were the millions of people composing those states to receive their doom from the issue of a combat between a few thousands, on the plains of Austerlitz or Marengo? Yet such was the fact. The battle is lost, and Europe submits instantly to the will of the conqueror.

But it is not merely that the fact is so; our own opinions are in perfect conformity to this fact, whenever we reason upon the affairs, not of our own, but of any other country. When the Emperors of France and Germany drew forth their armies lately to their re-

spective frontiers, what did we ever expect was to stop the progress of either army, but the army opposed to it? Why, in fact, were the armies drawn out at all, if to stop the progress of an army the population of a country could be sufficient? When general Mack was defeated, we looked to nothing but the Russians. No one ever dreamt, if they likewise were defeated, or withdrawn, that Buonaparté was not to proceed to Vienna, with as little trouble, and in as short a time, as was necessary to march that distance. Yet, it was not because there did not exist in those countries a brave and warlike people animated by the usual feelings of men attached to their prince, and loving their ancient institutions, and abhorring the idea of a foreign yoke. All these there were; yet of five and twenty millions of loyal subjects, by whom the Emperor boasted to be surrounded, not five-and-twenty perhaps were found, by whom the smallest resistance was attempted, when once the armies were overthrown. If ever there was a country calculated to be defended by its inhabitants; if ever there were inhabitants qualified to defend a country, it was Swisserland, and the Swiss. The country was a succession of passes, where an handful of men might defend themselves, one should suppose, against thousands: the inhabitants were a nation of warriors; strong in limb, stout in heart, whose courage in Europe was proverbial; who had all seen service, and who were attached, beyond measure, to their native soil. Yet, without any falling off, perhaps, from their ancient character, how little were these people able to do, even in defence of such a country,

against the force and skill, and active powers of a regular army!

The case may possibly be widely different here. I hope, and trust, it will be so. I am willing to push as far as any body the hopes to be entertained from the zeal, the energy, the patriotism, the intelligence, the creative talents, the enterprising spirit, the high mind, and determined valour, of the inhabitants of these islands; but, though I will hope every thing from these qualities, and do feel sanguine that the hope will not be disappointed, I will not, when I can avoid it, make them part of my calculation. And here it is whimsical to observe, that while certain gentlemen are charging me as indulging my fancy, and dealing in theoretical opinions, it is they themselves, if their modesty would suffer them to perceive it, who are the real theorists, and who, like the gentleman in the French comedy, are talking prose without knowing any thing of the matter. Their opinions are, I trust, perfectly well founded; but still, as leading to conclusions different from those which experience has hitherto taught, they are no more than theory; whilst I, whom they accuse as theoretical, am keeping close in my conduct, whatever I may do in my hopes, to the dull and beaten road of experience.

In the mean time the facts and reflections above set forth, the object of which is to recall to gentlemen's minds the importance of regular armies, will not be deemed superfluous or misplaced, if we either consider the system which has been pursued by the country for some years past, or turn our thoughts at once to the

result, namely, the very important, and, as some may think, very alarming fact, that of the regular forces, (as it is now the fashion to call them) to which the defence of this country must be entrusted in case of invasion, not less than one hundred thousand are composed of troops, who, by the very tenure of their service, can have never seen a battle, till they come to fight that first (and perhaps last) battle, (against troops, too, such as they will have to contend with), which must be decisive, probably of the fate of the country.

Assuming, then, the importance of regular armies, which no one denies, but which every one seems disposed to forget, the next enquiry is,—how they are to be obtained? that is to say, in the present instance, how we are to insure to the country, what, for many years, unquestionably, it has never had,—a constant and permanent source of recruiting adequate to the supply of its regular forces?—The nature of things here yields us but the option of one of two modes; force or choice. In most of the countries of Europe, the nature of the government admits of a recurrence to the former of these modes; and, undoubtedly, whenever that is the case, where the power of the government is such, that persons acting in its behalf, have no more to do than to go forth among the artisans and the peasantry, taking with them the standard they mean to observe of age and size, and selecting, of those who are found to answer it, as many as will suit their purpose, there can be no process so easy, so effectual, so certain; but, unluckily

for the present object, though happily for every other, this is a process to which this country cannot resort. It is not that the abstract right is wanting; there must be in every country a supreme power, and, in theory, nothing can limit what is supreme; but practically, the exercise of this power is so fettered and controlled, the measures of force which we can employ are so confined to legal forms, so abridged, restricted, constrained, and modified, that the effect is reduced to almost nothing; the machine is stopt by its friction.

But, it is not merely on the score of inefficacy that measures of this sort are objectionable. The force of free countries, while it is inefficacious often in respect to its object, is ten times more efficacious than that of the most arbitrary, with respect to the severity of its operation. A purely arbitrary power is, by its nature, a discretionary one; and discretion, when vested in proper hands, and where no temptation exists to the abuse of it, is the best and mildest of all rules. A German prince, or Russian nobleman, who had his subjects or vassals before him, could dispense with the man to whom service was a hardship, and say to another, to whom it might be no burthen at all, you shall serve in his room. But the law can make no such distinctions, can have no such feelings; it must take whatever comes before it, without considering the hardship it inflicts, or whether it is operating upon a live subject or a dead. It works like a machine, like a mill, and would grind the miller, if he should happen to fall in, with as little compunction as it would the corn.

These are, speaking generally, the objections to the use of coercive means, in a country like this. But, after all, our measures of force, as applied to military service, are measures of force only in name. We force nothing but the money. That we can do; we can make the men pay; but the service is at last performed by the man who engages voluntarily. The real character, therefore, of our measures of compulsory service, is only that of a tax, and of the worst of all taxes, that of a tax by lot. Let a tax be imposed equally, so as to bear in its due proportion upon all parts of the community, and there is nothing hardly which a country like this cannot sustain. One may venture to say, that if a tax of a million could be laid on in the course of a night, without any notice from discussions in this house or otherwise, and with the art possessed by a late great financier, whose race is run, or by that of my Noble Friend, whose star is now beaming above the horizon, and rising, I trust; to equal glory, the country might never discover that any new burthen was imposed upon them. Some might conceive, perhaps, that they felt a little heavier; as men do in different states of the atmosphere; but having no barometer to ascertain the fact, they would ascribe the opinion to fancy, and think no more of it. Were this million, however, instead of being dispersed in the way which I have supposed, divided into 20,000 shares of 50*l.* each, or even into 50,000 shares of 20*l.* each, and levied on those who might be selected for that purpose, and on many of whom it must fall by lot, it is easy to see what calamity it must produce; that it

might crush some one at every step it took; would draw blood at almost every stroke.

Nothing therefore can be either so false in principle, or so oppressive in practice, as what we entitle measures of compulsory service, and which so many, without consideration, are perpetually calling for. We hear every day that the crisis of the country demands sacrifices, that half measures will not do, that we must have something strong. These calls come, I am afraid, in general, from those, who hope, after all, that the strength of the measure will not fall upon them. Let us settle our minds distinctly upon the subject. Do we mean a conscription, which, proceeding by ballot, (the only mode I presume we think of) shall be conclusive as to the person on whom the lot falls, and compel him, whoever he may be, to serve for a limited term as a soldier? If we do, the hardship will be found to be such as no country could endure. If we do not, if we mean that he shall be at liberty to commute his service, then he either commutes it for a fixed fine, which brings us to the sort of tax, which has been just spoken of, or for a substitute, and then we instantly run up the bounty to an amount which, besides being a tax, and a tax still more heavy, makes it impossible in future to supply the army by any other means. — We have, in fact, had experience of these measures; and the effect of the trial, though necessary perhaps at the time, and certainly productive of much immediate advantage, does not encourage a repetition of the attempt. If a conscription is proposed, numbers are instantly ready to declare in its

favour; but, if you only change the name, and ask whether we shall renew the act for the army of reserve, however productive that measure was, raising certainly a greater number of men than has been raised before or since in the same time, the feeling is instantly reversed, and we declare decidedly against any measure of the sort.

I will not pretend to say, that no such measure can at any time be resorted to. It is impossible to say, to what the exigencies of the times and the necessity of the state may drive us. But of this I am sure, that without a more urgent necessity than exists at this moment, measures so oppressive in their immediate effects, and so injurious in their lasting consequences, should not be resorted to, till it was seen that milder and more legitimate methods were incapable of succeeding. —These methods are many of them so obvious and simple, that it seems to be matter of no small surprise, if in all this time we should never have thought of having recourse to them? If our army is to be composed of men who enter voluntarily, in what possible way can we hope to fill it but by bringing the service to a state in which it may be an object of their choice? Our attempt, on the contrary, seems for many years to have been to induce men to engage in a service which is not the object of their choice. Can it be surprising that we should have failed? We complain that the part of our population willing to engage in military service, upon the terms on which it is now offered, is not sufficiently numerous to furnish the supply required. The answer is, if you cannot change

the state of your population, change the state of your service; improve it till it becomes an object to greater numbers than are at present inclined to engage in it. Without this, our means of recruiting must, for a part of it, be mere deception and artifice. We are in the state of men selling wares inferior in value to the price we ask for them; and, accordingly, are perpetually saying, that none but the ignorant and the thoughtless will ever be tempted to become buyers. To such a pass has this got, that of late years one of our chief resources has been by recruiting boys. Men grown up, with all the grossness, and ignorance, and consequent want of consideration incident to the lower classes, are too wary to accept our offers: we must add to the thoughtlessness arising from situation, the weakness and improvidence of youth. Why this, unless the trade of a soldier is incapable of such improvement as may bring it into competition with a sufficient portion of the trades and callings in lower life?

Nothing can shew more the false state into which our system of recruiting is fallen, than the practice, now so long familiar to us as to be received as a matter of course, of engaging men to serve by bounties. We forget that this was not always so; that within the memory of many of us, so late as within a few years of the breaking out of the American war, the idea of bounty, properly speaking, was unknown. A guinea to provide the recruits with necessaries, and a crown to drink the king's health, was all that was given upon enlistment. The service itself was the bounty. Whatever is added, shews decisively, that the service does

not stand upon its true footing; and the amount of the bounty, bating the change in the value of money, would be the measure of the deviation, if it was not that by our injudicious methods and the competition that has been thus excited, we have raised these bounties beyond their natural amount. All that is given by government to induce any man to enter the service, is a confession that the pay and condition of a soldier is not what it used to be, a real equivalent, in the estimation of the man entering, for the value of his service. We are paying a man to accept what we offer: we are buying the buyer.

Never, therefore, can the system of supplying the Army be considered as resting upon its proper basis, till the necessity of bounty shall have ceased; and till the trade and calling of a soldier shall be brought to the state of other trades and callings, for entering into which no man receives a premium, but where, on the contrary, a premium is often paid for permission to enter. Such a change cannot be brought about at once. When things have long gone on in an improper channel, time must be required to turn them. But this must be the end aimed at, and I know not what there is to prevent its being ultimately attained.

Two things are necessary: the first and most important is, that the condition of service should be such, as that a sufficient portion of your population, knowing what it is, should consider it as an eligible calling; — that there should exist, at all times, dispersed in the community, a sufficient number of individuals, if they can but be found out, to whom the life and condition

of a soldier, such as it may be made, with all its advantages and all its disadvantages, should, instead of a hardship, be considered as preferable to the conditions and callings in which they must otherwise have to seek a livelihood. Without this, the supply of the Army by voluntary enlistments is impossible: it must be by force or fraud; or, what is much the same thing, by bribing men to do, through the influence of some sudden temptation, or momentary passion, what they will be ready to destroy themselves for having done the moment after. But supposing the state of the service to be such as is here described, something yet remains to be done, namely, to make the fact generally known and understood among those with whom it is to operate. It is not sufficient that your wares are good, that they are worth the price you ask, you must have them properly advertised; you must expose them in proper situations; must shew them advantageously in your shop windows; must carry them to the proper fairs and markets. If you put your shop in a back street, or if you do not have your advertisers, your clickers or barkers, or whatever they are called, there your goods may lie. If you have your recruiting officers in the Isle of Wight, you cannot expect a young lad to walk from Cumberland or Yorkshire in order to offer his services to them. You must act upon the same plan they do at wakes or fairs; you must place your goods in situations where they are most conspicuous. — The Honourable Gentlemen opposite me will, perhaps, say this is what is done in order to carry into effect the Additional Force Act;

that bills are posted up in shops and markets, inviting recruits to enter. This is what I call an unfair trade, carried on by persons unfit to be employed or trusted, and what I by no means wish to recommend.

We now come to the application of the principle I am inculcating; and, first, what can be done to put the service on the best possible footing. The first plan that naturally strikes the mind is to raise your pay. — If you could raise the pay to 5s. a day, you would never want soldiers; but, besides the objection to the expence, there is another which necessarily confines you within a more moderate limit. You cannot increase the pay to such an extent, without rendering the Army licentious; and in proportion as an army is licentious, severity of discipline must be necessarily resorted to, and that severity would have the effect of deterring persons from entering. You are therefore, with regard to the pay, confined to narrow limits; for you cannot, as I have already said, have an army without discipline. It is also to be recollected, that military service is not a mode of life favourable to longevity; but, notwithstanding this consideration, recommendations in its favour are not wanting. There is an invincible sense of dignity in the profession of arms, which makes men assume it in spite of all the inconveniences attached to it. The service is one with regard to which you can reward men by distinctions. You have certainly invaded those distinctions, and, as far as you could in that respect, have done the service a material and almost an irreparable injury. Though you cannot increase the pay; though you

cannot take from the service those measures of discipline which deter the indolent from entering; yet you have left sufficient means of encouragement to make the Army infinitely beyond what it is at present. Under the head of encouragements may be enumerated, provisions for old age; provisions for persons disabled, which may be increased *ad libitum;* various distinctions which government has the means of distributing, not in the way of pay. They have the means of giving whatever advantages they may choose, suited to the rank, situation, and condition of the party. There is one great head of encouragement to the service, which the system I propose admits of. It is one by which I think the temptation to enter will be increased to a prodigious extent, without any prejudice to the service, and very little inconvenience to the soldier. It is a measure which has been supported by many of the first authorities in the country. I mean that change of condition which will place our regular troops on the same footing with those of every other power on the continent. I propose that, instead of general service for life, they should be enlisted to serve for a term of years. This is the system of service in all the states of Europe except our own. I say of Europe, though a large proportion of our own force, the 100,000 men to which I before alluded, are engaged for a limited term. Those Gentlemen, who calculated on those troops, as equal, or nearly equal to regular troops, cannot consistently make any objection to this alteration. It would be rather strange if they should contend that such a change in the term of

service will destroy the character of an Army. I admit there will be a difference, but that difference will arise not from limitation of service but from limitation of place, which gives them different officers who never can have acted in times of danger. That this change will have the effect of inducing men to enter, is so clear, so certain, so totally incontrovertible, that it is unnecessary to urge it. Undoubtedly a man would prefer having an option rather than no option. This is one of those things which no evidence can overrule. When I hear it said that corps of different durations of service will obtain men at the same price, I reply, that the argument may be met by the fact that corps of the same duration of service give different prices. Strange as it may seem, there are men who appear to like 5 guineas as well as 10. I cannot account for this, though I know it is so. A man may be in doubt, and half a guinea may make the difference; when, if he hesitated longer, he might obtain the larger sum. I see bodies rise in the air, though I know there is a principle of gravitation which carries them downwards. I must know that men, generally speaking, do like 10 guineas better than 5, but I find some acting otherwise. I see some men take the lesser sum when they might get the greater. Therefore upon this part of the subject I shall dwell no longer.

Another principle which I propose is, not so much the introduction of a change, as with a view to do away a restriction injurious to the service. This principle, if adopted, must have the effect of filling the armies, and providing a supply for them equal to the

necessities of any emergency. On this subject I know that I am opposed by many high and respectable military authorities, but I know also that I am supported by others as high and as respectable. If I pause on the subject, it is because of its magnitude, and not because I feel the smallest doubt of the value or the rectitude of the principle. — The first consideration is, what we see in all the services of Europe. — Do we think, that in the armies of foreign powers the sort of soldiers' character we admire does not exist in as high a degree of perfection as in our own army or navy? Then am I to be told that what will do on the continent for all nations, and for different operations, will not do for us? I see great distinctions in national character among ourselves; but it would be against all presumption to say, that we, England, Ireland, and Scotland, should differ so from the Continent, that what produces an effect on them should produce none upon us. This is so much against all presumption, that it would be impossible to adopt any supposition so perfectly gratuitous. The military service continues the same up to the very last period of its duration. It is not a thing that ends gradually at the end of seven or eight years: the power of controul is the same. It is as strong when it ceases, as at any former period. Why should we suppose that will happen here which we know has not happened elsewhere? And here I must take notice of the 100,000 men before adverted to. Will any one say, that the corps raised for limited service are not in the same state of discipline as any other regular troops? Turn to your

head of service in the Indian armies. Are not the armies of India in high estimation though all raised for limited service? The principle I am contending for is, then, on the one side so uncontradicted by experience, as far as we can trace it by any authority, that I must say, fearful as I should be of making any change or innovation, I have never been able to persuade myself that there is any foundation for the apprehensions entertained upon the subject, and that if we suffer ourselves to be stopped upon considerations so perfectly gratuitous, there is nothing which might not be stopped. The same objections would apply to any other species of improvement that can be proposed.

Another mode of inducing men to enter is certainly open to us. It is by introducing a series of rewards; a part of discipline you have too much neglected. The less you require of the severity of discipline, the more will men be induced to enter the service. There is nothing which has done more harm than severity of discipline, and its relaxation will of course reconcile people to the army. I would not here be understood to mean that corporal punishment should be wholly done away; for there are some men of high and turbulent spirits who must be kept down by the fear of it; but the discipline may be rendered infinitely less rigorous. By this means, a better description of men will be induced to enter the army, and the better the men you get, the less necessity will there be for severe punishments. Therefore, with respect to discipline, my own opinion is, that to temper it would tend to the improvement of the army. — There is another,

and a very material effect it would have: it would lessen Desertion. I would ask gentlemen on the other side, whether they do not know that the Desertion under their bill, the Additional Force Act, has amounted to more than one fifth? Of 13,000 men raised by it, I believe it will be found that 2800 have deserted. What has been the desertion with regard to the general service of the army? We know that the vicious system which led to our buying men by high bounties, has been not more wasteful to the funds of the public than injurious to the service. We know that high bounties, combined with other bad regulations, have tended to produce Desertion.

There is another objection urged against this change, which applies to this country more than to any other, because of our foreign and colonial service. I shall not be the person to say that it is not a consideration which ought to weigh of itself, and that in adopting the measure, the objection ought not to be provided against; but it is so distant, especially with respect to a plan intended for permanency, that it is hardly worth attending to. The objection may be reduced to so narrow a compass, as to have hardly any effect. Expedients may be adopted within certain limits, by which the colonial service will not receive the least injury. Additional allowances may be granted to colonial services; application of the men already enlisted; additional advantages in various respects; all these collectively will be so far found to narrow the objection, as that the value of it cannot be set against the advantages in other respects. It is in that

way only I dwell on the circumstance. The inconvenience cannot be felt for a number of years to come. Unquestionably, if there were any of our distant possessions to which this objection could apply, it would be those in the East Indies. Now, we know that all the armies of the East-India company are recruited for a term of years, and for a very short term too. I have heard it said, that the East-India company did not keep faith with their troops, and I once was of opinion that there was some foundation for the assertion; but I am now persuaded, by what I have learnt from an authority on which I can rely, that my opinion was erroneous. I am convinced, that had the East-India company done otherwise than they did, their recruiting could not have gone on. I am assured, on the authority of an officer of high rank, that they were scrupulous and exact to a degree, as to providing for the men's return whose terms were expired, and that they sent them home with the accommodation of the company's own ships, which was the best accommodation they could have. Therefore there was nothing that the men could complain of. This is a most powerful argument and authority; for if you can, with no inconvenience, carry on the service by enlisting for a term of years in so distant a colony, you can surely do so here. Among the remedies, would be the establishment of that branch of the army which has been approved by the highest authority; I mean the Second Battalions. — If I were asked what I would do with the men whose terms of service were near expiring, I should say, put them into the second battalions.

It is curious to observe how carelessly many plans

are objected to: for among many well-written opinions, drawn up with much care and industry by persons who are supposed to be best acquainted with the subject, one is the immense expence that will consequently attend the having so often to renew the bounties. This is to suppose, what I think will not be the case, that the bounties will continue as they are at present. It does not follow that they are to be always the same, though the reduction cannot take place all at once. If the system I propose is persevered in, I am convinced the bounties will be reduced to nothing. It is urged that if limited service is adopted, we must be losing constantly a number of men at the expiration of the term of their service; that is, if you enlist for eight years, you must, at the end of eight years, lose an eighth of your army. Such a calculation might do, supposing that none of the men were to die, but delivered up their services at the end of their time. But you cannot make the calculation as you would with reference to annuities or leases. The fact is, the number of people you would lose that way, would be very inconsiderable. Many would not be alive, but would be replaced by others, and many would have received encouragement in the way of promotion which would attach them by interest to the service, and others would, from having become habituated to a military life, not be disposed to claim their discharge. With respect to men on foreign service in the East and West Indies, I am aware I am not at liberty to argue as to the number who would claim to be discharged. It may be said at the same time, that this

circumstance may give rise to competition amongst regiments who would wish to have those men at the expiration of their service. I do not apprehend any thing of this kind; but if it were possible even to happen, the remedy for it is obvious and easy. If a soldier should have a strong desire, at the expiration of his term of service in one regiment, to go to another regiment, I do not see why this desire may not be gratified, on certain terms. If, from any circumstance, he should so much prefer another regiment as to be content to purchase the exchange with the loss of three years' service out of seven, I should consider it hard to prevent him. It will be sufficient for the sake of discipline, that there should be this considerable discouragement to the changing his regiment, at the expiration of his term.

I have been urged by the calls of the Right Honourable Gentlemen opposite to bring forward the measure this day before the minute details of it are in every instance completely arranged. It is not however very material whether those details are brought forward to-day or a few days later, as the holidays will afford Gentlemen a convenient opportunity of considering the particulars of a subject, of which every body knows a little and nobody knows much.

With respect to Desertion, I think there might be a power vested in courts martial to restore the unfortunate persons who may have transgressed, perhaps from intoxication, if not to a whole, at least to a part of what they would be entitled to at the regular expiration of their term. It would be cruel to deprive a

poor man of those privileges and rewards to which by service he was entitled, because in a moment of inadvertency or intoxication he had been prevailed upon by others, or felt an inclination to desert. This must produce a gradual effect upon the army. It is certain that desertion prevails even in the most limited service: but to say that the prevalence of desertion would not be counteracted by the prospect of release at a certain time, is to argue against the first principle of human nature. But then, it may be started as an objection to this, that men desert from corps, whose services are limited, as well as they do from those of a different description. Certainly they do so, but I still contend that they desert in the one case when they would not in the other. I might here use the same argument as in the cases of high and low bounties. The truth is, that these things happen often by chance, or from circumstances, independent of bounty or term of service. Men desert when they see others deserting around them, from the influence of bad example or persuasion, and a variety of other causes. But still here I must look at the general principle which must influence the mind in a greater or less degree.

It is also urged, that those who enter into the service are, for the greater part, thoughtless, inconsiderate, and often unprincipled men, who never look to distant advantages of any kind whatever. I will not deny, but that, in a great degree, it is so; and that is one of the principal defects I complain of in our present system. But the great benefit which may be fairly expected from a measure of the sort now proposed,

is, that it will introduce a new and better description of persons into the army, not altogether so thoughtless nor so inconsiderate, but who are attracted by the advantages that the military service holds out. — I may be told that to hold out to a young lad the prospect of an advantage at the end of seven or fourteen years, is to hold out an advantage that will have no weight with him. Certainly, it may have no weight as applied by the young man directly to himself; but, when he sees the influence it has on those around him, he cannot fail to be equally influenced by it himself. He will perhaps converse with his uncle Tom, who, fourteen years before, had gone for a soldier. He will see him, after completing his terms, enjoying in full health and vigour, with constitution unimpaired and in the prime of life, the honourable allowance granted by his country in reward of his services: while some other relation, perhaps his father, who remained at home, is reduced to poverty and want, and wringing a scanty pittance from the parish. An example such as this, in his own family, cannot fail to induce a young man, more than any profound calculation, to prefer the military life; for it is not so much from individual judgment as from the estimation in which the service is held by others, that it derives its principal attractions.

As to the period of service, that may be varied as may be deemed most conducive to the object proposed, namely, the supplying and augmenting the regular army. The inclination of my mind is, that seven years is the properest term. Seven years is a term familiar to

this country, and nothing more than the generality of all apprenticeships to trades. I think it is also such a term as will combine that mixture of the service of the man, which the army would require, with the attractions, that will be necessary to induce him to enter it. After the first period of seven years, I should propose that the soldier should have the privilege of his discharge, and all the advantages which are at present enjoyed by those who have served in the militia, such as the right of exercising his trade in any place where he may choose to settle. These should be all the advantages for the first period.

If the soldier should wish to renew his engagement for a second term of seven years, I should then propose, that in addition to these, he should have a small increase of pay, not so large as to do any injury to the service, and yet sufficient to form a mark of distinction. For this purpose, six-pence a week will, I think, be enough. — For the third period, it might be proper to have a farther increase of pay. But, reverting to the second period (on the suggestion of a friend near me); with regard to the second period, the soldier will again have a right to his discharge. I am speaking here of the infantry. For the cavalry, different terms may be fixed, perhaps ten years for the first term, six for the second, and five for the last, as more time is necessary for training the cavalry, and still more for training the artillery. At the end of the second period it is the inclination of my mind, that the man should have a pension for life. At that time, undoubtedly, he might be perfectly entire and fit for

further service, full of health and strength, and in the prime of life; but still, by going home in this condition, and holding out to all around him an instance of the advantages offered by the service, he would perhaps be of no less advantage, probably he might be of more, than if he had continued to serve for the third period. Invaluable as it would be to retain a soldier of this description in the service, it is infinitely more valuable that he should go back into the community, and exhibit a beneficial example in the enjoyment of the merited bounty of the country. The sum may be hereafter regulated. Whether any service should be required of them, and whether they should be at the option of the Chelsea board for home service in the garrison battalions, I shall leave to be hereafter determined.

For the third period I should propose an increase of pay of one shilling per week, for they would then be soldiers fully tried and worthy of having the highest confidence placed in them. At the end of the 21 years it is fit that they should retire with the full allowance of Chelsea, such as it has been settled by the late government and the commander-in-chief, for those who have distinguished themselves in particular places, or have undergone particular services; such as those who have lost their sight in Egypt. By judicious regulations this allowance might be raised to a shilling a day. The men who shall entitle themselves to this allowance, shall be free from all further service in garrison battalions, or in any other line: and if they carry off robustness of frame and strength of constitution, so much the better. After being so long enployed in

the service of his country, it would be but fair to exempt the soldier from further service of any kind, and to allow him to return to the bosom of his friends and relations. The more capable he is of enjoying the reward of his services, the more striking his useful and honourable example will be. He may still promote the advantage of his little family by some trade or calling, and contribute essentially, by example, to spread a martial spirit throughout his neighbourhood.

One thing I omitted to mention, and that is, the inconveniences that may be supposed to result from these regulations with respect to the Colonial service. In order to remedy or prevent any such inconveniences, a power may be vested in the commander of a regiment, or in him who may have the chief command on the station, to discharge the man at the end of their several periods as the case then may be, with this proviso, that in case of actual war they should be empowered to prolong the service of those whose term shall have expired, for six months, and no longer; at the end of which time they shall at all events be entitled to their discharge, and be treated as the East-India company treat the troops in their service; that is, they shall be sent home at the expence of government with every possible accommodation.

These are the principal changes I propose to make in the condition of the soldier, and from these I look forward to the most beneficial effects. There are many subordinate changes, which I consider not so

much matter of legislative provision as of military regulation, and which I conceive may be left with confidence to the illustrious personage at the head of the army.

There are many other provisions that may be calculated to increase the estimation in which the service is held, which may contribute to raise the consequence of the officers, and through them that of the men. These, however, I shall omit for the present; first, because it is not necessary to state them, and, secondly, because as they may be of a delicate nature, it may be improper to enter upon them till they can be mentioned in detail. Among these, however, I may certainly state the allowance to officers' widows, which I wish to make somewhat more than it is at present; the allowances now are so scanty, that the dispensation of them is really heart-breaking to those employed on that painful duty.

The principle of recruiting for a term of years, will of itself go far towards filling up the Army. To place the character of a soldier in a state that its own attractions may operate as a bounty, ought to be the great object of our consideration. We must increase and add to that respect which, amidst a thousand disadvantages, still renders the trade of a soldier attractive.

Before I proceed further, I beg leave to observe, with respect to the cavalry and artillery, that the terms of service should be five, six, and ten years. This difference arises chiefly from the length of time necessary for training and disciplining the cavalry and

artillery in the first instance. These things will certainly operate in a considerable degree, generally and individually, on the recruiting service; but I despair of succeeding to the full extent required, until the Army is rendered worthy the attention of the lower orders, as a trade as beneficial in itself as others, and more respectable than many. Under the present circumstances, I cannot think of putting the Army on such a footing as would attract numbers by ordinary recruiting, but, in my opinion, the Army may be increased, and a *quantum sufficit* of men procured without much difficulty. With these observations, I leave this, which is the most material part of the subject. — (here Mr. Yorke asked, what was to be done with the present Army?)

On a subject so complicated, one is apt to forget many things. It is asked, what I mean to do with the Army now existing? To this I answer, that in strict justice and in equity we can do nothing. The men who have already formed the regular service, have done so on certain conditions, and can have no ground of complaint, provided those conditions are fulfilled. We see men entering into the army of reserve, without producing any discontent or desertion in the troops of the line, though the service of the former is limited, and their bounties are excessively high. — It might be supposed, that the regular army would expect similar advantages, or be dissatisfied, yet we know that no envy or discontent prevails on that account. In the American war, the Fencible regiments received higher bounties for limited service, than others

did for unlimited, and yet there was no complaint on the part of the latter. The same case occurs in every war, and as no discontent has ever been shown on this more obvious ground, it is not to be expected that any will be shewn with regard to the different length of the term of service.

But though in justice and in equity the Army now in existence is entitled to no additional advantages, yet it may be, no doubt, expedient to extend to it some of the benefits of these changes. And first, I propose to make a great increase in the Chelsea allowance, to which I mean to make an immediate and considerable augmentation: The lowest class of pensioners to be entitled to *6d.* the next *9d.* and the third to *1s.* per day. This advance I should wish to take place immediately; from motives as well of just consideration of past services, as of policy to give immediate effect to the influence of the example. It will demonstrate to the men the concern which the country takes in their welfare, and will hold out an inducement for others to embark in the military profession. If this be done, and in my opinion, it ought to be done immediately, every man in the Army will see that he has a chance, however distant the period, of partaking in what the bounty of the nation has provided for its defenders, when they shall have merited the rewards from their long services. No man of those now in the service will be entitled to his release till after the expiration of twenty-one years; but all those who have now served seven years and less than fourteen, will be immediately put upon the list of the *6d.* a week additional

pay; and all those who have served fourteen years and upwards, will be entitled to 1s. a week additional pay. This is all that I shall do with regard to the Army which already exists, and it is to be regarded as a liberal boon, to which they could have no right by the conditions of their engagement.

Having answered the Right Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Yorke) as to the army now in existence, I shall next proceed to that great branch of political science which circumstances, and the nature of the times have forced on our consideration; namely, what is to be done with that part of your population which does not exist in the shape of an army? I am well aware of what weight, properly speaking, the physical force of a country is capable. But, it must be admitted, that the real military force has had an almost exclusive sway in determining the fate of nations. In modern history, there is scarcely a single instance of the mere population of a country assisting materially in its defence, except in the case of America; which, indeed, can scarcely be called an exception, for it must be recollected, that there success arose more from the great distance of America and its vast extent, than from any force which the American people could immediately bring against our army. It is evident that at a distance of more than 3000 miles, and across the Atlantic Ocean, the power of this country could not bear with full force upon the population of America; and, besides, from the vast extent of the country, the people could always retire from our armies, and by that means they were enabled to protract the war until

habits perfectly military were acquired.—The instance of America will not, however, at all apply to Europe; certainly not to this country, where the population is cooped up within narrow limits, where they have no countries to retreat to, and where, consequently, they would soon be obliged to come to close contest.

But although we cannot calculate on making exactly the same use of our population that the Americans did, yet it becomes a question of the most serious importance, how we are to derive the greatest possible advantage from it; how we can best bring it to bear against an invading army? I am confident, that if ever the contest should be brought to an issue, the people of this country would prove that they would not fall a sacrifice without a struggle, to an invading enemy. But, the question is here, what can be got from the loose part of your population in aid of the regular military force? and care must be taken, that what is got in aid of the regular force should not tend to weaken it.

With respect to this point, different persons have entertained different opinions at different times. My opinions are, with a few alterations arising from circumstances, that is, *mutatis mutandis*, the same as before, and those opinions will be so found in the only records which we have of our proceedings, and which in the present instance, are at least more accurate than usual. I am ready to allow that the errors that have been fallen into on this subject in the first attempt, might be in some instances the necessary

result of the novelty of the case, and the difficulties in which it was involved. Nay, I am also ready to allow, that those who now have to improve and remodel our Military Establishments have the advantage of their experience; but, on the other hand, I have also to complain, that unfortunately they have not a clear, unincumbered ground to enter upon, and which circumstance cannot fail to add considerably to the difficulties they have to encounter. Perhaps their predecessors were obliged, at the sudden commencement of the war, to run into voluntary efforts from the pressing urgency of the occasion. For myself, my idea was, that every thing that was the most simple and obvious, should have been preferred to what was most complex and intricate. The situation of the country then was, that hearing of the great preparations made by the enemy to invade it, there was an unanimous spirit to resist the threatened invasion, and to frustrate the attempt of the enemy. The people were alarmed, but in no degree dispirited. As to their feelings, they might be said to be "*trepidi, non pavidi.*" There was a general ardour and zeal, and a strong wish to be serviceable, if only the means of being so were pointed out to them. In these circumstances, when others were speaking of compulsory service, I expressed my opinion, that when there was so much zeal and alacrity in the country, it would be far better first to try what could be done by voluntary service. Indeed the difficulties of carrying the compulsory enactments of the Levy en Masse act into force, were such, that it appeared to me much better first to try what voluntary

service would do. Although that suggestion did not originally come from me, it certainly was not then in my contemplation that this voluntary spirit was to be employed in such a manner as it has been in the Volunteer corps which were afterwards formed. I saw that the spirit of the people was then at such a pitch, that they appeared only to demand of government, or of the house, "Tell us what we are to do to be useful to the country." Under these circumstances, it was my firm opinion, that the people should have immediately been allowed an opportunity of training themselves, under the instruction of officers from the regular army appointed for that purpose. I thought there should have been depôts of arms in every district, and, as I might say, shops of military instruction opened all over the country. Besides the assistance of the regular officers, I conceived that the zeal of the gentlemen of the country might assist powerfully in training the people to arms, both by their own example, and by giving small prizes for firing at marks. All this could have been done with infinitely less trouble, and infinitely less expence, than have been bestowed on the Volunteer system. At the same time I thought it was proper, that there should be armed associations of the better sort of people, entirely at their own expence; but it was not upon such armed associations that I conceived the country should principally rely in aid of its standing army. What I considered as much more likely to be effectual, was the mass of the people of the country trained to firing, with the neighbouring gentlemen, and military officers

ready to combine them in whatever manner they could prove most destructive to the enemy. Although I did not rely on such a force, for giving battle to an invading army, yet I thought they might be brought into action in such a manner, as would fret, harass, and wear down an enemy. Independent of the mischief that I conceived they would do in action, I relied upon such a force as this, as one that was likely to afford an inexhaustible fund to recruit from.

Such were my ideas at the commencement of the present war, of the manner in which the zeal and spirit of the people might have been rendered most useful in the defence of the country. As an experiment, nothing could have been cheaper, for there would have been no occasion for all those distinctions and military trappings which formed so considerable a part of the expence of the Volunteer system, as it was afterwards established. Instead, however, of the system which I proposed, the country from one end to the other was all thrown into Volunteer Corps. This mistake was not the fault of the people, but of the government. The desire of the nation was, "Tell us what we are to do?" but when nobody told them, it was highly natural for the people, when left to themselves, to say, "Let us imitate the soldiers, and dress ourselves, and train ourselves as they do; let us learn the manœuvres they practise."

After the Volunteer corps were so formed, the great man (Mr. Pitt), whose opinions were always to be heard with deference, maintained, that those corps might, with care and instruction, be brought into

the shape of a regular army, and act as regular troops. Whether the institution of the Volunteer corps had first taken place, and this opinion of their efficacy followed, or whether the institution was framed on any pre-conceived opinion, that they would arrive at such a state of discipline, is a point which I shall not pretend to determine. It, however, always appeared to me, that it was a most impracticable project to attempt to bring those masses of men, who had neither the habits nor the feelings of soldiers, who were not inured to hardship, or accustomed to military discipline and subordination, to act either with regulars or directly against a regular enemy. That Right Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Pitt), in speaking of what he expected from the Volunteer force, said, they would be able "to push the invaders into the sea." This was an expression which I am persuaded proceeded more from his heart than his judgment, and might have proved fatal to the country. It was, however, a most dangerous error in judgment to suppose, that, because a body of men appeared well to the eye, or made a tolerable show upon a parade, that they were, on that account, to be relied on as effective soldiers; and I am much surprised indeed at the number of inspecting officers who have returned those corps as fit to act with regular troops. In my judgment, it would have been impossible they could ever have acted with a regular army, because, being officered in the manner they are, the regular army never could place that implicit confidence in them, which is absolutely necessary to make one species of troops act effectually with others of a dif-

ferent kind. The Volunteers might be well trained, they might be good soldiers, they might positively know themselves to be so, but then it was also necessary that the commanders of the regular army should be equally sensible of this :

Scire tuum nihil est, nisi te scire hoc sciat alter.

If ever we attempted to do this, and put them to act with the regular army, I fear the fate of the country would be decided; for I cannot possibly conceive, that the enemy would desire any thing better than that the country should trust its defence to the Volunteer corps. If the Volunteers were to be opposed to the attack of a regular invading army, it is impossible not to suppose that many must fall, though many would do their duty. A man may be in himself fully capable of doing what is right, but he may be infected with the bad example of those about him. As for courage, or confidence, it is well known, that in an army it is not sufficient to have confidence in oneself, it is also necessary to have confidence in one's neighbours. It is like the defence of a long line, which, if broken through in any point, the valour with which other points are defended will be of little consequence. If a regular regiment were to come into action, it cannot be supposed that their confidence would be the same if they were flanked by a corps of Volunteers, as it would be if they saw on their flank, the 14th, the 28th, the 17th, the 42d, or any of those brave and well tried regiments that have distinguished themselves in the service of their country.

I do not, however, deny that essential services may be derived from the Volunteers, even under the present system. In the first place, they are enrolled, and I consider the very circumstance of enrolment as a great foundation of strength, because in that they have given a pledge to their country, and to each other, that they are to be found whenever their attendance shall be absolutely necessary. In the second place, they have been trained, and even in the manner they have been trained, many of them may, in time, be made extremely useful under the direction of an able general. They must, however, purge off a great deal of their grosser stuff, before they can well be brought into action. There are many individuals who entered into those corps from the best of motives, and from the most laudable intentions to serve their country, but whose age, whose constitutions, and whose habits of life, render them altogether unfit for the active duties of real service against an enemy.

My general objections to the present mode of dividing the country into Volunteer corps, were, first, the immense expence of the system on its present foundation; and secondly, I conceived it intercepted and locked up in corps, which could not be brought against an enemy, men who, by another distribution, might be brought against them in the regular army. I therefore thought that the system was like throwing good money after bad, and that it never could succeed. I wished, however, that there should be many voluntary associations of the better sort of people, armed and disciplined at their own expence; but as to the great

mass of the people, artisans and peasants, I did not wish that they should be locked up in those corps, but would rather have had them loose, so that they might be attached to others of greater consequence. The mass of the people I wished to see loosely trained, and only so far as to be able soon to take their place as recruits in the ranks of the regular army. A training of that description would also have been sufficient to make them very formidable to an enemy, as an armed peasantry, under the direction of intelligent officers; and in either of those ways I thought they would contribute much more to the defence and security of the country, than by their being placed in Volunteer corps. This was my view of the matter; but the system that has been followed, goes to include all volunteer exertions in Volunteer corps.

The first objection made, most probably will be, that the expence of such a system will be too heavy. Granting, for argument-sake, the truth of the objection, what is the expence compared to the preservation of the independence of the country? But, it is idle to talk of the expences which new-modelling the military system will create, compared with that of maintaining only the Volunteer Establishment. It is a fact that during the three years and a half that this system has existed, it has cost government no less than five millions sterling in allowances to the Volunteers. The expence that the Volunteers have themselves gone to, and the various subscriptions and contributions that have been made in aid of the system, amount to at least as much more. I am stating it below the mark,

when I say, that the security which the country has derived from the Volunteers for the last three years and a half has been purchased at the enormous expence of above ten millions sterling, besides the depriving our more efficient descriptions of force of many men who would otherwise have entered into them. The expence of the Volunteers then has been nearly equal to the whole of the Property Tax for a year. Great as this expence is, had it produced as much security as could have been procured for the same money in any other way, there would now be no occasion to attempt to change it.

In considering, however, the best way of deriving advantage from the assistance of the population of the country, without citing the example of the Tyrolean peasantry, or the peasantry of any other country, I conceive the general question to be, whether it is better that the mass of the people should be loose and unattached, but under the idea of their being liable to be attached, if necessary, to any corps that His Majesty, in the exercise of his royal prerogative, may think most proper, or whether they should be put into Volunteer corps under the idea that they are not to be attached to any other body? I again repeat that my wish was, that the Volunteer corps should consist of a higher class of life, of a better condition, of such a description as it would not be proper to mix with soldiers of the line, and whom no one would wish to see obliged to serve in the condition of a common soldier in a regular regiment, but that the great body of the peasantry, that description of men from whom

the regular army ought to be recruited, should not be shut up in those Volunteer Corps. Could I realize my wish to see the great mass of the population of the country so far trained, as to be able, either to act as an armed peasantry, or to recruit immediately whatever losses the regular army might receive in action, then, indeed, I should consider the country as invincible. Should its armies receive a check, it could immediately repair the disaster, and would rise like Antæus, when flung to the earth, with redoubled vigour. The certainty of immediately repairing our losses, while the invaders could not repair theirs, would inevitably turn the victory in our favour. Suppose five regular regiments were to lose 1000 men in a battle with the enemy, I contend that those regiments would be much stronger if they were filled up with recruits such as I have described, than if a regiment consisting of 1000 men were to come up to their support in their skeleton state.

These are the ideas that govern me, and on which a wise and permanent system may be established gradually, for I am no friend to sudden change; the Volunteers may gradually be brought to the state described in 1798, in a letter of Lord Grenville to the lords lieutenants of counties: I mean, that state which would give the country, men of a better condition, and supported at their own expence. In order to effect this purpose, there would be no necessity for any violent measures or severe compulsion. I should propose a very different course from what has been hitherto adopted: instead of requiring a rigid discipline, from

the people, I should propose that sort of training which will be very easy for them to acquire, and which will answer all the purposes I have stated.

Now, to bring things to this state, the first object is, to reduce the scarcely tolerable expence of the Volunteer system. No longer looking to the Volunteers for assistance in the field to the regular force of the Army, I shall propose to relax their discipline, and retrench their allowance. I shall leave their allowances infinitely above what they ought to be, though much below what they now are. Now, upon this plan of refusing pay to the Volunteers, leaving them at the same time some privileges, I am aware, that the effect will be a very considerable reduction of that force. I do not wish to do this suddenly, till some other force can be provided in its stead; but, the reduction of the Volunteers is not like the reduction of a regular regiment. When you reduce a regular regiment, it is annihilated; but when you reduce a Volunteer Corps, you have the men on the spot still, and however valuable they may be, that value is not reduced. But at the same time, out of regard to the public feeling, and to other circumstances, it may not be desirable to reduce these corps suddenly, but this, however, is not to prevent the reduction of the great expence in maintaining them. For if these expences were to continue, they would rise much higher than they have hitherto done, because the subscription funds are gone, and the corps must lean more and more on the government, as is generally the case when government enters into partnership with any private bodies or individuals. Government must at

last be at the whole expence, because their funds were not, perhaps, regarded by the Volunteers themselves as a permanent resource; and if the Volunteers were to continue as they are at present, the expence of the next three years and a half would be double what it was in the former period.

Now, looking to this situation of the Volunteers, that they should be liable to serve at their own expence, and that the rest of the people should be loosely trained, the lessening of the expence may be the means of the reduction of the Volunteers, and putting things on the footing on which I wish to see them placed. Why, then, this brings us to the question of training; and once indeed, such a system of volunteering as I propose, and the training of the mass of the population, might have gone on side by side; but since the present system has been established, the training cannot be voluntarily conducted, and the only alternative is to have recourse to compulsion. All, therefore, that can be done in this case is to make the compulsion as light as possible. (A cry of hear! hear!) The Gentlemen on the other side may cry hear! hear! but they may be assured that I do not like this one jot the better for coming from their shop. While they were on the treasury side of the house, they may remember how many compulsory acts they passed, how the whole smithery was at work, how they laboured about the armour of Mars like a set of Cyclops, more blind than their one-eyed brethren, till they locked the country in armour, so cumbrous and clumsy that it was unable to stir hand or foot —

" For never did the Cyclops' hammers fall,
" On Mars's armour, forg'd for proof eterne,
" With greater force."

I can assure the Gentlemen, that my fetters shall not be like theirs. It is one of the advantages of my plan, that it can be easily got rid of. The compulsion that I propose, goes merely to the point of training, and that at their own homes, and only for the space of one year; and the discipline necessary to enforce this training shall be made as mild and as voluntary as possible. It may be said, that I here follow the steps of the Right Honourable Gentleman over the way (Mr. Yorke), and that I tread on old foundations. The basis of the scheme which I am proposing is undoubtedly the same with that act which pretty nearly fits the present building; I mean the Levy en Masse act. I partly blamed that act and partly approved of it. That act says, that the people shall be compellable to train as an intermediate duty, and compellable to serve in case of invasion. I so far approve of it now, and I approved of it then. I concurred in the commutation for voluntary service, though that afterwards took a wrong shape. My plan will give a preference to voluntary training, but with a power of resorting to compulsion if necessary. It will also go to assert the King's prerogative right to every man's service in case of invasion. It will exclude the exceptionable part of that Act, the training of all classes together. This objection was one of my reasons for preferring voluntary service to the Levy en Masse, though that voluntary service soon after took a false shape.

The first part of the reduction I shall propose in the Volunteer expences, will be a change of the June allowances to the August allowances; of a training of eighty-five days, to a training of twenty-six days. The total reduction that will be thus made, on the estimate of this year, which is 1,479,000*l.* exclusive of cloathing, which is 347,000*l.*, will be 807,000*l.* The allowance to the yeomanry will also be considerably reduced. The reduction of the officers' pay, in the substitution of the August establishment, will be 210,000*l.* A reduction of the allowances and pay to drill serjeants, the present number of whom is far beyond what is necessary, will amount to 54,700*l.* Under the head of Permanent Duty, a reduction of no less than 300,000*l.* may be made. It is the unanimous opinion of persons conversant in military affairs, that the expence of the inspecting field officers may be spared, and that their duty may be as well executed by the lords lieutenants, or the civil officers under them. This will yield a saving of 35,000*l.* To all which are to be added, the payments by the receivers general for marching guineas, amounting to 198,000*l.* making a total reduction of 807,700*l.*

These reductions, which are of considerable importance, I propose without any hostility whatever to the Volunteers, but, to begin that retrenchment of expence, which would soon become enormous from the constitution and nature of the Volunteer system at present, and with a view to the necessary improvement of the military state of the country. The Volunteer bodies will still be preserved, at least with regard to all

who serve without any idea of what is to be got. The continuance of the system will afford a more desirable mode for training to those who may be unwilling to be trained in the mass, and this opportunity will be to them a sufficient reward.

With respect to Volunteers who may henceforth enter, government will not allow any thing but arms. With regard to those now established, it is but equitable they should be exempt from the immediate operation of the new system; but I wish it to be understood, that though they may receive pay and clothing this year, government do not engage to provide it in the next. Nothing in future shall exempt any man from the general training, but his becoming a Volunteer at his own expence, the advantage of which will be that he can train himself if he chooses, and fight if occasion require it, in the corps to which he shall belong, instead of being liable to fall in among the regulars.

With respect to the mode of compulsion, if compulsion should be necessary to carry the training into effect, selections may be made of that portion of the mass trained in every year, for the training of the whole would be, if not impracticable, at least inconvenient: for, out of the immense mass of general population, some selection must be made; and for the purpose of making this selection, I know of no way more preferable than to do it by the way of Lot, a term which I prefer to the odious one of Ballot. This is unavoidable. Suppose you have 200,000 to train, if you cannot take the whole of your proportion, why then there is no other way to choose than by the ballot. That

species of lot familiarly called Ballot, seems to me to be the most convenient. I would have the people divided into three classes, between the age of sixteen and forty. The first class to comprehend all from sixteen to twenty-four; the second from twenty-four to thirty-two; and the third all from thirty-two to forty. I should propose that a discretionary power should be vested in the crown to call out such classes as from the emergency of the case might to the government appear proper, and in such parts of the kingdom, as it should find necessary, according to the imminence of the danger. The act I should think ought to be annual, that whatever errors should be found in it, they might be speedily remedied. As a farther mitigation of the compulsion, I would still follow the steps of the Right Honourable Gentleman, and if any should voluntarily offer themselves to be trained, the operation of the ballot should be so far diminished.

The number of days for training I should limit to twenty-six, with an allowance of no more than a shilling each time, as a compensation for their half-day's work. Voluntary trainings are to be accepted at the discretion of the officers, and to go in diminution of the ballot. I do not mean to propose that there should be any particular cloth or dress, or that the men should be embodied; but it will be left to the power of the crown to collect them together in some town or place, in fourteen days, for the purpose of more speedy training, and those who absent themselves

from training on any other ground, than that of their belonging to Volunteer Corps, to pay a small fine. The training I wish to be performed by detachments of militia, and of the regulars now nominally connected with the counties. By this they will gain a real connection, which will enable them to recruit much better, than by means of parish officers. They will exert themselves in the training, in the hope of afterwards getting the men in their own regiments.

I shall also beg leave to propose, by way of mitigation of the act of training, that if a sufficient number of persons volunteer for training, the act shall not be carried into effect, and also that if the whole number required should not volunteer, yet that a diminution of the number liable to training under the act, shall be allowed in proportion to the number who volunteered themselves. The plan I propose, will employ to advantage the officers appointed to the fifty-seven battalions, before a man was raised, and who stood waiting and gaping for them like oysters at ebb tide. But the officers who have been appointed to these battalions with such inconvenience to the service, cannot be sent adrift without hardship. The officers of these skeleton battalions will now be turned into good pasture and have an opportunity of getting some flesh on their bones. The bill which professed to create the fifty-seven battalions, has not had the effect of raising them. All that has been done by the Additional Defence Bill has been, at the very utmost, to supply about 9000 men to the line. All that can be

expected from it, if it was to continue in full vigour, is a supply of as many every year, and that in a very bad way.

With regard to the Militia, though in its original constitution it cannot be ranked under the head of the regular army, yet it is now carried to such perfection, that it must be considered as our army for home defence, and as fully adequate to that object. The Militia may now be considered as a part of the regular army, and for home service is certainly equal to any part of our force, with the single exception, that it never has seen actual service, and if it should have to meet the enemy's attack on British ground, the battle in which it would have to fight for the existence of the country would be the first it would have seen. With respect to the militia, I shall not therefore meddle with it any farther than to continue the suspension already existing, and instead of raising men by ballot, to raise them by the mode of recruiting at a limited bounty. Whether at a future period it may not be politic to diminish this department of our military establishment, will be a fit subject for subsequent consideration; but I would certainly recommend recruiting for this service on the scheme projected in Ireland, and at a limited bounty. A measure has been suggested, which has at last been settled, at least by a sort of common consent, that the Irish militia should be permitted to enlist in the line; this I am disposed to promote, by some regular and permanent arrangement, if, in conjunction with the Irish government, the plan should be approved of.

I must again shortly revert to the Volunteers; for in the great variety of matter to which my attention has been necessarily directed, I have found it difficult to assign to every observation its exact place. With regard to the Volunteers, the allowance for clothing may continue for one year more; but I wish it to be clearly understood that there is no engagement whatever on the part of government, that this is to continue for the next year. There is one other topic which I had almost forgot, and that is the rank granted to the Volunteer officers. There never was such monstrous injustice done to any body of men, as has been done to the regular army in granting rank to the Volunteer officers. If the officers of the line are not to have command in their own peculiar province, in God's name where are they? To what new state of humiliation are they to be next exposed? What should we think of such a proceeding in other cases? What would the learned Gentleman over the way (Mr. Perceval) say to one who should take precedence of him at the bar, merely because he had a larger fortune, and, perhaps, when he had no fortune at all? If we do not give officers these distinctions, what are we to give them? Their pay is certainly not profuse, nor have they much in their profession to recommend it, except the honours attached to it. There never was such an outrage as that offered to the regular officers. What would the Honourable Officer opposite (General Tarleton) think, if a man in a red coat were, addressing him, to say, he was the son of a nobleman having rank in Volunteer corps, and

therefore expected he (the General) should bow to his opinion on military affairs? Is a young lieutenant, whose parents may happen to possess abundance of wealth, to be permitted to say to his superior officers, "I will buy you all out, and take the command of the regiment?" Is the sensibility of the regular army to be so severely wounded? and what, I ask, is the advantage to be gained by this violation of individual honour? Is a gentleman, who has distinguished himself in the most dangerous services, to be placed under the controul of a man utterly ignorant of the duties of the profession of arms, and who has experienced none of the perils and suffering to which that honourable occupation is exposed? In future I would recommend that no Volunteer should hold a higher rank than that of captain; that is, that no officer of the line of a higher rank than that of captain, nor any captain commanding a corps, shall be commanded by an officer of Volunteers.

These, Sir, are the principles from the adoption of which I look for a permanent and great supply to the regular army. On the other hand, our population will be prepared to harass the enemy on his march, and nearly every individual of the country will be prepared to fill the station of the man who shall fall, at least he will be so far trained as to make a soldier in a very little time. This measure, if authority were wanting to recommend it, is calculated to do what was recommended by the eminent statesman we have lost. It is calculated to obtain that point most desirable for the country — to get our whole population gradually

into that trained state, in which every one would be capable of being made a complete soldier in a very short time and with very little trouble. The measure I propose, will give one general training. It will give it with very little trouble, and without taking the men from their homes. It will give it by portions without much expence, and commutable for voluntary service in a corps. It is to be but an annual measure, in order that the opportunity of revision and amendment may recur as often as possible. Compulsion will have no place in the system, unless it should become indispensable. As to the operation of the measure; so little do I look to it for immediate effect, that I expect the seed will be some time in the ground before it shews a blade. I promise no rapid growth. I do not profess to be able instantly to remedy the evil. When things have been so long going wrong, it is unfair to expect a nostrum that shall without delay cure the disorder. The number to be raised under the Levy en Masse will, I should conceive, be about 200,000 men; with regard to the bounties, I do not conceive that an immediate operation ought under the present circumstances, to be expected, but they will, in the language of 'Change, be "looking down." I trust the measure will tend to reduce the present exorbitant bounties. I do not mean to state that the measure now propoſed is one of more confidence than others, but I hope it will wear well. I have now, Sir, only to return my thanks to the house for the indulgence afforded me during the long time I have trespassed on its

attention, and shall conclude by moving, for leave to bring in a bill to repeal the act passed in the 44th of His Majesty, called the Additional Force Act.

Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Yorke objected to the proposed measures, which were warmly supported by Mr. Fox. Leave was given to bring in a Bill for the Repeal of the Additional Force Act.

APPENDIX

TO THE FOREGOING SPEECH.

IT has been thought proper, as an Appendix to the foregoing Speech, to furnish the Reader with a Copy of the Rules and Regulations, which, in conformity with Mr. Windham's proposals for benefiting the Regular Army, were subsequently carried into effect.

RULES AND REGULATIONS

FOR THE BETTER ORDERING OF HIS MAJESTY'S ARMY, AND FOR IMPROVING THE CONDITION OF SOLDIERS AS CONTAINED IN HIS MAJESTY'S WARRANT OF THE 7th OCTOBER, 1806, AND IN CERTAIN ACTS PASSED DURING THE LAST SESSION OF PARLIAMENT.

Periods and Terms of Inlisting.

In the Infantry	7 Years.
Cavalry	10 Do.
Artillery	12 Do.

Men willing to engage for a Second Period of Service will be re-inlisted,

In the Infantry for	7 Years.
Cavalry	7 Do.
Artillery	5 Do.

Men willing to engage for a Third Period of Service will be re-inlisted,

In the Infantry for	7 Years
Cavalry	7 Do.
Artillery	5 Do.

No non-commissioned officer or soldier to be allowed to re-inlist for a second period of service, until within twelve months of the end of his first period, nor for a third, until within two years of the end of his second. The new period in each case not to be considered as commencing until after the expiration of the one preceding.

No non-commissioned officer or soldier to be allowed to re-inlist, or engage to re-inlist into any other than his own regiment, until after his complete discharge.

Non-commissioned officer or soldier, changing from one service to another, viz. from infantry to cavalry, cavalry to artillery, &c. to engage for a term of years equal to the first period of the service into which he enters.

For young men inlisting under eighteen years of age, the time wanting to complete eighteen to be added to the seven, ten, or twelve years.

Periods of service may be extended by the commanding officer of the government, colony, island, or station, as to non-commissioned officers and soldiers serving abroad, for six months; and by the King, with respect to non-commissioned officers and soldiers serving either at home or abroad, until six months shall have elapsed of continued peace, subsequent to the expiration of the period of service for which they were serving, provided always that no such extension of service shall in any case exceed three years.

No non-commissioned officer or soldier, having inlisted for, and serving in his last period of service, to be compelled

to serve under any such extension of service beyond six months after the expiration of such last period.

Non-commissioned officers and soldiers may be transferred from one battalion to another, of the same regiment; or, if disabled, to a veteran battalion; but not otherwise drafted from one regiment to another without their consent.

Every non-commissioned officer or soldier entitled to his discharge, if then serving abroad, to be sent to Great Britain or Ireland, free of expence, and to receive the Pay allowed to non-commissioned officers and soldiers, on a march, from the place of his being landed, to the parish or place in which he shall have been originally inlisted, at the rate of twelve miles for each day's march, with the usual number of halting days; and every non-commissioned officer and soldier, so entitled to his discharge, who shall be discharged at any place in the United Kingdom, other than that to which he belongs as above, to have the like pay, from the place of discharge to the place of his attestation as aforesaid.

Rates of Pay voted by Parliament for the Non-commissioned Officers and Privates of the Army, commencing from the 25th of June, 1806, inclusive.

DRAGOON GUARDS AND DRAGOONS.

	per Diem. £.	s.	d.
Serjeant-Major - - - - - -	0	3	2
Serjeant - - - - - - - - -	0	2	2
Corporal - - - - - - - - -	0	1	7½
Do. after 10 Years' Service	0	1	8½
Do. after 17 Do. - - - -	0	1	9½
Trumpeter - - - - - - - -	0	1	7
Private - - - - - - - - -	0	1	3
Do. after 10 Years' Service	0	1	4
Do. after 17 Do. - - - -	0	1	5

INFANTRY OF THE LINE FOR GENERAL SERVICE.

	per Diem. £.	s.	d.
Serjeant-Major or Quarter-Master-Serjeant	0	2	6
Serjeant	0	1	10
Corporal	0	1	4
Do. after 7 Years' Service	0	1	5
Do. after 14 Do.	0	1	6
Drummer or Fifer	0	1	1¾
Private	0	1	0
Private, after 7 Years' Service	0	1	1
Do. after 14 Do.	0	1	2

ORDERS AND REGULATIONS

IN RESPECT TO NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS WHO SHALL HAVE COMPLETED CERTAIN PERIODS OF SERVICE, OR WHO SHALL BE DISCHARGED AS INVALID, DISABLED, OR WOUNDED,

Rates of Pensions of Men who shall have inlisted for, and be discharged after having served the Second and last Periods of Service.

CAVALRY AND INFANTRY.

After Second Period.	per Diem. £.	s.	d.
Serjeant-Major, Quarter-Master-Serjeant, Serjeant, Corporal, and Private	0	0	5

After Third Period.

Serjeant-Major and Quarter-Master-Serjeant, having served three years as such, so much in addition to his claim for pension as Serjeant, as will make in the whole	0	2	0

	per Diem. £. s. d.
Serjeant - - - - - - - - - -	from 0 1 0 to 0 1 10

One halfpenny a day to be added to the shilling for every year of service as a Corporal, and one penny for every year of service as a Serjeant, but the Pension in no case to exceed 1s. 10d.

Corporal - - - - - - - - - -	from 0 1 0 to 0 1 6

One halfpenny a day be added to the shilling for every year of service as a Corporal, but the pension in no case to exceed 1s. 6d.

Private - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 1 0

To Serjeant-Majors, Quarter-Master-Serjeants, Serjeants, Corporals, or Privates, serving after third period, one halfpenny a day to be added to the pension for every year of service after the expiration of the last period, without limit as to the amount.

Soldiers discharged before the Expiration of their Periods of Service.

Non-commissioned officer or soldier, discharged during first period, and re-inlisting into his own regiment, or into any other regiment into which he may be permitted to inlist, to be allowed to reckon, for the purpose of claiming pay and pension, all years of former service.

Non-commissioned soldier or officer, discharged during second period, to be allowed to reckon, for pay and pension, all former service, and one year for every two of absence, subsequent to such discharge, and to be entitled to pension of five pence on the expiration of the period so computed.

Non-commissioned officer or soldier, discharged during third period, and not receiving a pension, as invalid, wounded, or disabled, shall immediately receive the pension due at the

expiration of the second period, and for obtaining the difference between it and the pension due on the expiration of the third period, be allowed to reckon one year for every two years of absence subsequent to such discharge, so as to be entitled to the full pension of one shilling a day, at the expiration of the third period so computed.

Soldiers quitting at the Expiration of their Periods of Service.

Non-commissioned officer or soldier quitting the service, and afterwards re-inlisting into his own regiment, not to reckon, for the purpose of claiming any increase of pay, the first two years after re-inlisting.

Non-commissioned officer or soldier so quitting, and re-inlisting into any other regiment, not to reckon, for the purpose of claiming increase of pay, the first three years after re-inlisting.

Service in East or West Indies.

Non-commissioned officer or soldier, to be allowed to reckon three years for every two years of service in the East or West Indies, for the purpose of claiming increase of pay, and pension in case of discharge, but not for the purpose of claiming discharge, before the actual expiration of the second period of service.

Increase of Pay and Pensions, how forfeited.

Non-commissioned officers and soldiers, discharged before completion of service, and not conforming to any rules or regulations, prescribed by the commissioners of Chelsea Hospital, as to registering their names and places of abode, and notifying the same from time to time; or not offering themselves on any proclamation of His Majesty, or not joining any garrison or veteran battalion, if required by the commissioners of Chelsea Hospital, to forfeit all claim to in-

crease of pay, or to pension, on account of service; but no soldier to be liable to be so called upon to serve, either under any proclamation, or under any order of the commissioners of Chelsea Hospital, who shall have completed his three full periods of service, as computed under these regulations.

Non-commissioned officer or soldier may be deprived, by *sentence of General Court-Martial*, of all, or any proportion, of claim to increase of pay, or to pension, on account of former years of service.

Rates of Pensions of Non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers discharged as disabled or unfit for Service.

	per Diem.	
	s.	*d.*
If incapable of contributing to earn a livelihood - - - - - - - - - - - - from	1	3
to	1	6
If disabled, but able to contribute something towards their livelihood - - - - - -	1	0
If disabled, but able materially to assist themselves - - - - - - - - - - - -	0	9
If unfit for service, but able to earn a livelihood - - - - - - - - - - - -	0	6

Men who, in respect merely to their disability, would be placed on either of the two lower classes, shall, if discharged during the third period of service, be entitled to the pension of one shilling.

No non-commissioned officer or soldier to be allowed to claim, of right, any such pension, whose disability or unfitness has arisen from vice or misconduct.

Commissioners of Chelsea to determine to which class of pension each man belongs, with power of removing from one class to another.

Non-commissioned officers or soldiers, having had such pension allowed, may, by the commissioners, be required

again to serve till they shall have completed their periods of service.

☞ The foregoing orders and regulations are to be understood as referring to those non-commissioned officers and privates only, who have inlisted subsequently to the 24th of last June; but non-commissioned officers and soldiers having inlisted (for general service) previously to that period, are to be entitled, in virtue of their former services, to the full benefit of what is therein contained, in all that relates to pay and allowances, and also to pensions, if discharged as invalid, disabled, or wounded, or after a period of service of not less than fourteen years.

REPEAL OF ADDITIONAL FORCE ACT.

May 13, 1806.

MR. Secretary WINDHAM moved the order of the day, for the third reading of the bill for repealing the Additional Force Act. After some opposition to the measure from Sir James Pulteney and Mr. Yorke,

MR. WINDHAM said, he did not feel himself called upon to enter at length into the arguments which were now brought forward: but as a Right Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Yorke), had seemed to consider his silence as in some degree contumelious to the house, he must say that there could be no contumely in not replying to arguments which did not properly belong to the subject of debate. He did not mean to say, that there was any impropriety in the Right Honourable Gentlemen's introducing those topics, or that they ought not to have been introduced, but he must complain that they dwelt exclusively upon topics that had a very distant connexion with the subject, and hardly said a word upon the subject itself. Surely the nature of the bill that was to be repealed, was a consideration as material as any topic

that could be connected with it. He had expected a different line of argument when the Noble Lord (Castlereagh) moved for such an immense mass of papers; but instead of that, he was much astonished at hearing that Noble Lord himself afterwards say, "that he gave little weight to arguments that were drawn from papers." The argument from the papers must have been much against the Noble Lord before he could make such a declaration. It reminded him of the very bad symptom in the case of Sir Roger de Coverly, when he "lost his roast beef appetite;" and when the Noble Lord could speak with contempt of papers and details, it was pretty evident the arguments they afforded were much against him.

Not being willing, however, to imitate the example of the Gentlemen opposite on this subject, he would confine himself to the consideration of the act, the repeal of which was now before the house. For a year after it had passed, nothing was heard of it; not only in the town but in the country. Every body was asking what had become of it. At last it was considered dead. Then came the famous letter from Lord Hawkesbury, and, as appeared by the first volume of papers on the table, a kind of coroner's inquest sat on the act. As it seemed to be the fashion in modern novels, to begin instead of ending with a marriage, by way of giving a new turn and astonishing their readers, so, in the details in these papers, they commenced with the death of the hero of them. He should be very unwilling to disobey the admonition "*de mortuis nil, nisi bonum*," but

the fact was that he was not really dead. This was soon suspected. A looking glass was applied to his mouth, and it was with joy found that he stained it with his breath. Immediately the whole apparatus of the Humane Society was set to work. Bellows, flannels, hot water, and friction, were used with persevering industry, and by slow degrees resuscitation began to take place. The act, it seemed, was like those aromatic plants which would not yield their scent, until they had been chafed and rubbed a little.

The title of the bill was "a bill to provide a permanent force for the defence of the country;" but in its operation it was any thing else. There was a mortal principle in the very stamina of it, which went to destroy it. If it succeeded, it would have been but a temporary measure. He must, indeed, allow that there never was any great danger of that, or any likelihoods of its becoming *felo-de-se* on account of its success. If the quota it was to raise was 9000 men, after a certain time, no more could be expected from it than to supply the casualties of that quota; it could not be expected that it should repair the casualties of the whole army. The bill was as dangerous in the case of success as in the case of failure; for there was no other way in which it could succeed, but by cutting up the sources of the general recruiting of the army. Instead, then, of allowing that any men had been raised in addition to the general recruiting, he should say, that whatever men were raised under the bill, were raised in derogation of the recruiting service. He did not know that a single man had been

gained in all England from this bill. Those who were said to have been raised by it, could, as he believed, have been as well got, if no such bill had ever been passed.

He thought nothing but mischief had resulted from employing parish officers to recruit. The men were only to be raised by the operation of money, acting, in such cases, through the medium of oppression. How very incompatible was the character of churchwarden and recruiting serjeant. The churchwarden or overseer was generally looked upon to be a grave and solemn man, whose conduct and behaviour were expected to set a good example to his fellow-parishioners; a kind of *custos morum* in the parish. Would you have such a character go skipping about the parish, from alehouse to alehouse, diverting and seducing the lads of the village; and like Serjeant Kite, with his jovial recruits, Thomas Appletree and Costar Pearmain, singing—

"We shall lead more happy lives,
By getting rid of brats and wives,
That scold and brawl, both night and day,
Over the hills and far away."

When such language, however, should come from a churchwarden, it would not exactly produce the same effect. There was a story of two French officers, who, in addressing their men, differed in this point: the one said, "go;" the other, "let us go," and the men liked the one who said, "let us go," much better than the other. In the same way, if a

constable were to come up to a young lad, and tell him, "It is a pity such a fine young fellow as you should wait behind your master's chair, or clean your mistress's clogs; you ought to be a soldier, there is no life like a soldier's;" the fellow would very naturally reply, Mr. Constable, if a soldier's life is so very pleasant, why are not you a soldier?

It really appeared to him, that parish officers could not entice young men to enter the army without destroying the morals of their parishioners, which it was their duty to protect. He was aware that some Gentlemen would call it merely philosophical and sentimental to speak of morality or justice in the manner of raising men for the army. He hoped, however, that the house would not be of that opinion, but would consider it a most serious objection to any military plan, if it could not be executed without a havock of the morals of the country, and without injustice and oppression. There were gentlemen who appeared entirely indifferent about the means, provided men could be got. Their sentiment was like that rant, "Ye gods! annihilate both space and time, and make two lovers happy." But whatever confidence they professed in their schemes for raising men, experience had shewn that they were inefficient. Although the parish officers were so stupid and incapable of understanding the bill, there was one who, it seemed, most perfectly understood it. This parish officer lived in Leicestershire, and by his knowledge of the bill had made pretty pickings for himself, probably about fifty guineas a month, for a considerable

time. In short, this famous recruiting parish officer was one of the most experienced crimps in the whole county. Thus men were raised by the most immoral means; and to the perversion of all the decorum of society, besides the tyrannical power which every overseer was enabled to exercise over the miserable wretches of his parish.

He recollected to have heard the supporters of that bill protesting, till they were black in the face, that they wanted the men only, not the money which they proposed to levy by way of fines on the parishes; but the people of the parishes did not believe them: they said, "we know better; it is money you want, and money you shall have." They saw very clearly that the avowed object of the bill could never be attained; and they never could persuade themselves that such was the intention of the legislature. The vestries seemed to be better judges of these matters than the politicians of Downing-street; they therefore agreed to pay the money at once.

He would only say one word more, which was in answer to the objection started by an Honourable Friend of his on a former night, against the clause for returning the bounties. He thought the evil of refunding was the least of the two. If those who had already paid the fines, were to be held to it, and obliged to lose the money, injustice and oppression would take place; they had been compelled to pay for not raising men, which it was not in their power to raise, and the house should not lose sight of that excellent adage—"Nemo tenetur ad impossibilita-

tem." This was not a tax, but a penalty; and there was no proportion between the inconveniencies that would result from the exaction of the fines, and the expense to the public of repaying them. Under all these considerations, he must press the third reading of the present bill.

Mr. Perceval replied to Mr. Windham. Mr. Sheridan supported the repeal. After which the question for the third reading of the bill was put, and carried without a division.

LIMITED SERVICE.

May 30, 1806.

THE Secretary at War (General Fitzpatrick) moved the order of the day, for the House going into a Committee on the Mutiny Bill.

MR. SECRETARY WINDHAM read the alterations, which it was his intention to propose in the form of the oath. After specifying the age of the recruit, and that he did not belong to the militia, he proposed that it should proceed to declare that he engaged to serve His Majesty for years, which he would fill up with the word "seven;" and also for such further period as His Majesty should please to direct, not exceeding years, which he proposed to fill up with the word "three," but which should terminate at the expiration of a period of six following months of uninterrupted peace. That if the recruits should happen to be under eighteen years of age, so many years should be added to the period of service, as should prevent the term of seven years from beginning to run till he was actually eighteen years of age. That every soldier abroad, at the period of the

expiration of his service, should be sent home free from expence, and, on his arrival in Great Britain, should receive the usual allowance of marching-money, to carry him to his particular parish or place. If in Great Britain at the time he was entitled to his discharge, then also that he should be entitled to the allowance of marching-money.

These were the only alterations he had to propose, and with what the house was already in possession of, from what he had formerly stated on the subject, and any other alterations he might have to propose in the course of the business, formed the general system by which he submitted that the army might most properly and successfully be recruited at the present time. He had to submit that it should be left open to the executive government, to vary the terms of the bargain in future years, as they should see cause. It was impossible, in a case so varied, to provide for every contingency which might possibly present itself, by legislative provision.

In saying this, he wished to be understood how false and unfounded the clamour and alarm were which had been sounded, of our resorting to a measure which was irrevocable; that we were now binding ourselves up by an irrevocable rule, from which we could not at any future period recede. The measure was, no doubt, irrevocable as to the army which it might raise, and to them the good faith pledged was irrevocable; but still it was not an irrevocable measure, but one which might be abandoned at any time. It was necessary to keep in view the reasons

for, as well as against such a step. There must be involved in every measure something like a sacrifice, something to be given for something else to be received.

It had been said, that the present measure was not pressed on us by necessity; that we were hazarding an experiment which we were not called on to make; that we were parting with men when we were not obliged to do so. All agreed that we would not willingly part with men in time of war, but the question was how we should most effectually induce men to enter into a service where they would be useful during war? We were not ignorant that advantages were not to be procured without proportionate sacrifices. And would any man say that we were not at this moment in a situation in which we were pressed to the adoption of some extraordinary remedy? Look at the measures which had been adopted for fifteen years last past, on this very subject; one would have thought us an extraordinary set of projectors, on observing this scene. Look at our projects since the beginning of the late war, or rather take a period somewhat earlier. It was resolved to increase the militia, by means of calling out the supplementary part of them, to 100,000 men. If the ordinary recruiting had answered the purpose, it is not to be supposed that a mode of procuring men, so oppressive to individuals, and so prejudicial to the future interests of the service, would have been resorted to. But it was tried, however, and tried till it could do no more. And yet it did not fully effect its object,

for it stopped short at about 80,000 men, and further it could not be carried. Peace ensued. After which, the war came, and found our military establishments low; and this scheme was again resorted to, with an addition which rendered it still more oppressive than before, and that was the quarterly penalties which were imposed on the counties. This was a measure of a most compulsory nature, and yet, notwithstanding this, the effect was, that it did not altogether attain its object, while it very materially injured the ordinary recruiting service. Then came the Army of Reserve act, with the same compulsion, and in the same form, with this aggravation, that the penalty was raised from 10l. to 20l. a man. Now, this measure was not adopted merely in preference to the militia. The Right Honourable Gentleman over the way (Mr. Yorke) had indeed said, that this would have the additional advantage of providing men for the regular army; but still it was not adopted on that account, but because the former measure had failed. He would not say that this Army of Reserve act had totally and completely failed. It certainly did do something, the effects of which we experienced at this moment. But yet it fell considerably short of what it was intended to produce; and then it was at an end. It went as far as it could, and indeed it did not even profess to be a permanent measure. It advanced to a certain point, and there it stopped. The ballot was perfectly worn out, and could do no more till a certain interval had expired. There we were left when the Additional Force act came into operation.

Now, he would not say of the authors of that scheme what had been said of the present, that it was brought forward because the administration stood pledged to bring forward something, though certainly, if a pledge could be supposed in either case, it was much stronger in their case than in ours; for the former administration had been removed on the pretence of the inefficiency of their military measures. But we were said to be guilty of adhering to our former opinions, and put in mind that we were now the sworn servants of the crown, and therefore that we ought to set aside our former notions, and adopt others. But the Right Honourable Gentleman was not the sworn servant of the crown, and yet he claimed the privilege of not adhering to his former opinions. This might be very well, but consistency was more necessary in our case than in his, where the witness was not sworn [a laugh]! Now, on the principle stated by the Right Honourable Gentleman, however, we were not pledged to any thing; but the former administration certainly was pledged to do something; and indeed the scheme with which they came forward looked very like one which had been rashly framed, without much consideration. He mentioned this, not with the view at present of entering into an investigation of the nature of that scheme, but merely in order to shew that that administration properly enough considered themselves as pledged to do something — they must either go backwards or forwards, as the former measure was at an end. They must either have resorted to the ordinary recruiting, backed by such aids as must

make it more productive, or they must have found out some original scheme, as they in fact did. And it was rather a whimsical thing that the gentlemen on the other side argued, that, if this measure was not continued, something ought to be substituted in its stead. But here they said there was nothing. This was very odd. Was there not the ordinary recruiting? "Yes," said they, "but then that is nothing; and therefore if you take away this measure, you leave nothing." Why, you left the original foundation clear, and had the old mode of recruiting. This was something; that it was not sufficient he readily allowed; for though it could not be called absolutely nothing, yet it had been brought much nearer to nothing by these measures. But still it was something, and it was on account of its not being altogether sufficient in the old way, that he was now proposing some variations in it which might render it more efficient; but most of the late measures were professedly in their nature temporary, and some of them, such as the Additional Force act, which had been represented as permanent, was, in fact, temporary, or, at any rate, inefficient. He would not now draw that measure from the grave, "its frailties from their dread abode," although he might discuss it at present on the same principle that they had resorted to such a variety of topics when engaged in the discussion of it. He only referred to it merely as having failed to answer its purpose, with a view to shew that we were left exactly as before, and therefore that there was a necessity for something new. An Honourable and Learned

Gentleman (Mr. Perceval) had said, that if he (Mr. W.) had read the act, he did not understand it. He would have been satisfied with understanding it without reading it, if that were possible; but the Honourable and Learned Gentleman seemed satisfied with reading without understanding it. He maintained what he had before stated, that the nature of the act was such that its quota would be reduced to 9000 men; and, when it came to that, the whole that it would do would be to supply the casualties upon this number. He had, indeed, heard of 58,000 men annually; but in eight months it had only produced 15,000 men. It was constantly falling in arrears, and in this way lost ground as it advanced. It was like those racers which, the further they ran, the more they were left behind. It began with a deficiency of 16,000 men, and ended with a deficiency of 26,000. Even supposing, however, that it had completely succeeded in doing all that in its nature it was capable of doing, still it would have failed to answer the purpose intended by it. In the production of a Right Honourable Friend of his (Mr. Sheridan), whom he did not see in his place, it was stated, "That a constitution that was always ailing, and yet never was positively in very bad health, sometimes lasted longer than one which was strong and robust." This remark might be applied to this act. It would soon come to its *minimum*, which was the quota of 9,000 men; and then it would go on supplying the deficiencies on this quota, and leading men through this gate to the regular army, at a bounty of six guineas more than could

be obtained by the ordinary recruiting. It would do little itself, and would prevent other means from doing what they might otherwise do. Men would naturally wait till they could get into the army through this gate, and this mode would be attended at the same time with an additional expence, and with great injury to the interests of morality, and to the ordinary recruiting.

This measure, then, was completely inefficient. But if the Right Honourable Gentlemen could prove that it had done all that was requisite, why, then, he must confess that there was no use for the present plan, or for any other; but, if he could not prove this, and if the measure was utterly inadequate to the purposes intended, then let it not be said that there was no necessity for any thing further. Now, in this case, the question was, what were we to do? Why, some aid must be given to the ordinary recruiting, or had any body any new scheme to propose? But any expedient which would exhaust the future resources of the country, was one which he would not recommend. When the gentlemen on the other side said, that we were not to confine our views to the present moment, but were to look to the future consequences of measures, he was very glad to hear all this, although it came rather oddly from those whose projects had been almost all of a temporary nature, and who were even now calling out for some temporary scheme. He had no confidence in these projects however. He had no similar project of his own to offer, and thought that the good sense of the thing

lay in a very small compass. The only option we had was, either to procure men by voluntary or forcible means, or we might have a combination of the two. The forcible means might procure us some men for the present, but then it destroyed our future resources. Yet force might on some occasions assist and quicken the operations of the bounty. This was the case in our navy, but here the man himself was taken. But in the land service this was impossible, and such means only raised the bounty to forty or fifty guineas, or perhaps to more, by the competition which it excited. Such was the effect in the case of the provisional cavalry, of the supplementary militia, and so forth. Seeing then, no good either in the theory or the practice of such schemes, but finding that they rather operated like ardent spirits, opium, or substances of the like nature, which roused the constitution at first, but afterwards relaxed its power: allowing that though they were in themselves bad, there might be cases in which they might be proper; having stated this so often before, and been charged with stating the exact contrary, he would now say, that such schemes ought not to be resorted to till every other possible means had been tried and found ineffectual. He therefore would now try the effects of voluntary enlistment, and would use no means but that of making the article of proper value to the purchaser. All that could be done was, to bring the advantages of the service home to the feelings and understandings of those who might be disposed to engage in it. If, after all this, after making the con-

dition of the soldier thus eligible, men could not be found, then there was no alternative but to have recourse to compulsory means, with all the evils attending upon it. Now, it might be made a question, whether it was possible to make the situation of a soldier eligible in comparison with the situation of other classes in such a country as this? It was true, you could not change your population, but then you might change the nature of your service. This was certainly in the power of government. But there were things which you could not do even in the service. You could not make the situation of a soldier a very safe, a very comfortable and easy, or a very profitable one. But there were advantages which might be offered to the soldier, advantages which, in every age and nation, had been offered with success. In the present plan, he would remove an impediment to the recruiting service, by limiting the service to a shorter period than a man's life, and leaving his discharge somewhat independent of the person who employed him. But then a question had been asked, if a service is eligible for seven years, why should it not be eligible for life? There might certainly be men who would choose to serve for life, but at the same time could it possibly be contended that men, generally speaking, would not be much more willing to enter into the service when they were assured that, in case they did not like it, they might leave it at the end of seven years? If they did like it, they might still continue in it till they had served twenty-one years. He should think that there was scarcely any

one who would insist much upon that argument when it had so often been the practice to give men this option with a view to induce them to enter the service. The thing was consonant to the feelings of mankind. The change in the terms of the service must, in the nature of things, have a most powerful effect in rendering the condition of the soldier more eligible, and consequently in inducing men to enlist. It might, therefore, be confidently expected that this measure would produce men.

Now, an Honourable General (Sir James Pulteney) had argued that, as we had already a mixed kind of force, we must procure more men than if there was only one single kind: and this, he said, no one could deny. He did, however, deny it. For though you might get men between the two, whom you could not get for one sort of service, it did not therefore follow that you could get more. He said that the soldier, by means of our mixed force, had an option given him either to engage for limited or unlimited service; and that thus every one who chose to serve at all, might do so in either of these ways most agreeable to himself; and, consequently, that many were induced to engage who would never have entered the service at all, had there been no such option. He said, that we offered the man one sort of service, limited both as to time and place, and another sort, unlimited in both cases. Did he consider this as all we had to offer? The men might say that they liked limited service in point of time, but that they did not like one limited in point of space. Unless men disliked

limited service in point of space, what induced them to enter the regular army at all? Yet men did enter the army, and that too from the service said to possess so many attractions. Yet it might be said, why does the person who would wish a limitation in point of time, dislike a limitation in point of space? Why, he might think it disagreeable to stay at home. He might wish to go abroad; he might wish to be a real soldier, to engage in such actions as those of which he had heard so much, and to see those heroes who entitled themselves to the applause and the gratitude of their country. But, though he desired no limitation in point of space, yet it might be a most valuable object to him to have a limitation in point of time, instead of entering upon a service of which he could not see the end. He might eagerly desire to come back to his own country, after a certain term of service, in order to describe what he had done and what he had seen, in order to talk of "Antres vast and deserts idle." He might have some rustic Desdemona, to whom he would wish to detail his "hair-breadth 'scapes i' th' imminent deadly breach," his "moving accidents by flood and field," while Desdemona, the daughter perhaps of a village landlord, after hastening to serve a customer with a tankard of ale, would return, and "with greedy ears devour up his discourse." This was a natural inclination, and the service would by this means be rendered much more attractive to multitudes. Why, then, when you had these motives to offer, it was in the highest degree impolitic to stop and counteract their operation,

by rendering the service, which was unlimited in point of space, also unlimited in point of time. The Honourable General would, therefore, perceive that his alternative was deficient, for unlimited service in point of space might be a boon, while unlimited service in point of time was a check. The effect of this plan, then, sooner or later, would be to rouse that feeling of ardour and heroism, which undoubtedly existed in great numbers of the people of this country. It was our duty to put no bar in the way of the full effect of this spirit, by rendering the service unlimited as to time; for the ardour of many must be very much damped by the circumstance that they can see no end to their service.

He would not dwell any longer on this point, which must be so plain and obvious to every one. Of the effects of this plan of limited service in point of time, he had the fullest and most confident reliance, as a permanent resource for procuring supplies of men for the army. Then, the next point was to enquire into the inconveniencies and evils which it had been said would attend this measure. These might be comprised under three general heads: first, the effect which it would produce on the character of the army; secondly, its effects with regard to the colonial service; and thirdly, the loss of those numbers that would be discharged at the end of the terms.

As to the first of these heads, namely, the character of the army, it was one to which we must be disposed to listen with seriousness and attention, not

from any belief that there was any thing in the argument, but merely on account of the high importance of the subject. After a view of all the services to which his attention had been directed, and of the particular distinctions in the character of this country, he must say, that the objection, as to the effects of this plan on the character of the army, had no foundation. But then, how did this couple with the other objection relative to the discharge of the men during a war? The expedient to cure this was to make the men serve for a term of years, or during the war. But how did this relate to the character of the soldier? If a man knew that he was to be discharged at the end of seven years, it appeared he could not be a proper soldier; but if he served five years, or during the war, he might retire at the end of the five years with the character of the most efficient soldier! But the fact was, that this uncertainty, for which some were contending, was the thing which would strike at the very root of the military character. In considering limited service, as it had existed among different nations, the Honourable General had left out the monarchy of France. Now, why a monarchy should be omitted, which had lasted 1400 years; which existed in a military and populous country; which, in point of military regulations, had been a model to Europe; he could not conceive. If he left that out of the account, it put an end to all authority on the subject. The effects of the institutions of that monarchy were as well known as if the French revolution had not put an end to it. That it enlisted

for a term of years, there was no dispute. The only question was, whether it enlisted men with a view to serve during the continuance of a war? Now, he was prepared to say, that he had no doubt whatever that the men were to be discharged even during war; and when they were not discharged, it was prevented by a direct order issued by the government; and of such an order, an arbitrary government might readily enough avail itself on particular occasions. This had been done during the American war. Now, he had always thought that a breach of a law was an evidence of its existence. Before the year 1765, the term of the French service was six years. In that year, the term was increased to eight years. No mention whatever was made of peace or war, and so it stood on the ordonnance. But when war came, the government said that it wanted soldiers, and the men were retained. Though this abuse had been occasionally resorted to by an arbitrary government, yet, from the nature of the regulation, it appeared that the retaining of the men during the war was not considered as essentially necessary. But as far as the regulation went, it distinctly confirmed the statement which had been made by him. That the government followed its convenience in breaking through its engagements, as many governments did, but as our government could not do, was certain. Now, as to the discharge of the soldier during a war, nobody could deny that this must often be inconvenient. So likewise it was often inconvenient to pay money at the exact time at which it was due, and some would not

pay at all; but it would be very odd if persons were to argue from this that there ought to be no regulations for enforcing the payment of just debts. The whole experience of the European services was against the Honourable General, and those who thought as he did. In the Austrian service there were various modes of recruiting, and at short periods. He would ask whether Gentlemen had ever heard of such a people as the Swiss? There never were better troops, and yet all the regiments were engaged only for a term of years, and were discharged even in time of war. What then became of all that we had heard about the military character? But then the Gentlemen argued in a curious way, for they said that the Swiss were not English; and if the instances had been taken from the French or the Swedes, or any other people, they would have exactly the same objection. They said that we were theorists. If they understood the term theory, as applying to any thing which had never before, under exactly similar circumstances, been tried, then all governments must be theorists, more or less, in every thing that they did. If, indeed, he had been talking of the Chinese, the Tartars, or the Negroes, they might then, with some justice, say that the instances did not apply; but in the great family of Europe, where the degrees of civilization were nearly equal, and where the military character was nearly the same, the difference was not so great as to prevent the justice of the comparison from being sufficiently striking. If they called this theory, they must call every thing

so where the example was not exactly similar in point of circumstances, situation, and every thing else. But the truth was, that the resemblance was sufficiently obvious to answer all the purposes here intended. He must therefore say, that the whole experience of the different military regulations in Europe was against their notions of the effect which limited service would have on the character of the soldier. He might, therefore, consider that point as set completely at rest. He had many direct authorities in his favour on this point, which, however, he would not at present particularly mention.

As to the inconvenience that would attend the discharging of men during war, he could not help complimenting the Gentlemen on the other side on the extension of their views in the contemplation of distant evils; because when he looked back on their measures, he found them all of a temporary nature. He would ask, whether they were not merely calculated to answer the purposes of the moment without any regard to the future? Compulsion might, perhaps, have been proper in the circumstances of the case. He meant to say nothing as to that; but certainly the expedients were entirely temporary. He could not look back without recollecting how often he had lamented in that house the evident disposition which constantly appeared in it to adopt temporary shifts and expedients. Its language had been, "Oh! save us just now, save us from this present danger, and pay no regard whatever to the future, let that provide for itself." This was imitating certain philo-

sophers who enjoyed the present too much. But now the Gentlemen said, "For God's sake! take care that your measures do not prove mischievous seven years hence." They abandoned their former feelings, and were now wondrously apprehensive of what might happen in future; but at all events posterity could not be injured by this plan; because, among the advantages of it, one was, that in this view the possible evil could only arise in exact proportion to the actual good. If many men were not got, then there would be but few to discharge—[a laugh from the opposition]. This was a proposition so plain, that he could not conceive what the Gentlemen found in it so highly diverting. And here he had heard very singular reasoning, which shewed the nature of the objections and the want of consideration on the part of the objectors. This was particularly apparent in the arguments used respecting the effects of the periodical discharging at the end of seven years. The fact was, that this would have no effect that could justly cause the smallest alarm before a very distant period, so that he could scarcely give the Gentlemen any credit for their fears. What did they suppose we should lose by this plan? Fifteen years must elapse before we lost one-twelfth of these men, supposing that they took their discharges as early as possible. From this he had gone with his calculation to twenty-eight years, and this period must elapse before the loss could amount to any thing that was at all alarming. He might have calculated farther, as this was a mere matter of calculation; but having taken so con-

siderable a portion of a century, he thought it very needless at present to carry the calculation any farther. This he said on a supposition that the period was to be seven years only; but when we took in the additional guard which was now provided on this point, they must be very anxious indeed who could feel any apprehensions. Now, he had said before, and would say again, that the discharge of the men at the end of these periods, must be considered as a sacrifice. This was following the improvements of modern life. As reason and civilization advanced, men saw the advantages of such sacrifices. All the improvements in our agriculture, in our commerce, and in many other things, proceeded upon this principle. What distinguished the merchants of this country from others? What distinguished our agriculture from others, but that enterprising spirit which taught them to sacrifice a present advantage for the hope of a greater future one? The opinions of military officers had not so much weight with him in this case as in many others. An officer looking at his fine regiment, his grenadiers, with none under five feet ten in the front ranks, could not, perhaps, bear to think of parting with them, and this feeling would be stronger in proportion to his attachment to his profession. The same feeling, too, would be felt by a planter, when he saw the axe applied to some of the finest plants, though this was absolutely necessary for the benefit of the grove. If an instance might be taken from agriculture, he might mention that of the turnip husbandry, which, though introduced at the

beginning of the last century, had made very slow progress, and even as yet was by no means general, because it involved a sacrifice on the part of the owner. The advantages, however, were ten-fold greater than the sacrifice. First feelings, therefore, on this subject were nothing. What had prevented the rapid progress of this husbandry, and many other improvements, was the vulgar maxim of saying, "Get all you can, and keep all you get." This was the conduct dictated by first feelings, till experience and more extended knowledge taught mankind, that by keeping all they got, they did not get what they might. This was precisely the state of the present question, and he exhorted Gentlemen not to look to what we lost only, but to consider also what we might gain, and that this measure was substituted instead of those temporary efforts, under the evil effects of which this country was at this moment labouring. He advised them to consider the nature of the limited service, and the extent of the periods; but he exhorted them to take counsel from those who favoured the doctrine of limited service generally, rather than from those who were enemies to it altogether. It was impossible that the terms could be absolute during the existence of any war; for the fact was, that wars now came so fast in succession, that arrangement on these terms would scarcely be any boon to the soldier at all. If there was no limit to the service but that contingency, it would be impossible for the soldier to calculate upon any time for his discharge, and on going abroad he would be

almost as much deprived of the hopes of returning home as he was at present; and upon this principle the plan would do nothing, for the advantages to be derived from it would be lost. But now, by fixing the discharge at a certain period, the advantages would be clear, and the danger, even supposing that all who were entitled to it should demand their discharge at the earliest period, so inconsiderable, that the sacrifice would be prodigiously overbalanced by the benefits to be derived from it.

As to the other point, which was that of the colonial service, the inconveniences here would not, by any means, be so great as might be supposed. This point might be reduced to a narrow compass. The inconveniences might be met by different regulations for that service, by appointing troops of a different description for it, and by other means. The danger was trifling, while the period was only seven years, as it was before; and when, as now, the period might be ten years, the danger was greatly diminished. Here the instance of the East-India Company's troops was peculiarly applicable, and it was of the strongest sort, on account of the distance to the East being so much greater than that to the West-Indies: besides, in that service the men were only enlisted for five years. The most perfect good faith was kept with them, and the India Company found the benefit of recruiting for this period. They continued enlisting troops on this condition, till the government put an end to it on account of its interfering with the ordinary recruiting of the

army. Had he not experience on his side then? Could he despair of success in an instance, where the adverse circumstances were not by any means so strong? These were the heads of the inconveniences that were set against the hopes which might, upon the soundest principles of reason, be drawn from this measure. This was the only change from which he could see the least chance of procuring the proper numbers to supply the army. This change too would so much enhance the value of the service, that multitudes who would not before have entered the service, would now resort to it. The character of the service would thereby be raised, and a prodigious facility given to our recruiting. The great objection to the army, amongst persons who had a regard to character, or to the respectability of their situations, was, the people of which it was in some measure composed, in consequence of our recruiting it with convicts and persons of bad repute. It had been asserted that distress principally drove men to our ranks; but this was a resource which it was unfit for this country to depend upon. By these things the army had been brought into disrepute, and the person who had engaged as a soldier, was considered as having degraded himself, and as gone for ever. From the description of people that was introduced into the army, the discipline was necessarily more severe: and this very severity itself prevented respectable people from enlisting, when otherwise they would have done it. These were the evils that called loudly for remedy. The experience of our own

service was against the Gentlemen on the other side, when they said that limited service would lower the character of the army, for they might have witnessed many instances to the contrary. As to the inconveniences, therefore, of the colonial service, these ought not for a moment to be put in competition with the advantages which would be derived from the plan of limited service.

Then came the parting with them in time of war. He had, by calculation, clearly found that the inconvenience in this respect would be very trifling; besides that the evils, small as they were, must be at a great distance. These were the considerations which had induced him to resort to this plan; and he was, in some measure, driven to it from necessity, by the failure of all other expedients. We could not change our population, but we might change the nature of our service; and this was what was proposed. Now, one word as to the present situation of the army. It would be observed, that this plan was only doing that generally, which partially had existed for many years back. He protested against the argument, that because little effect was produced on this small plan, little could be expected on a larger. The plan of limited service, as it stood at present, had little effect, merely because it was partial. The effects to be expected from such a measure as this must arise from its notoriety and solemnity. It must be rendered generally interesting and impressive, and, in order to be so, it must be universal. We are not to consider whether each individual is to calculate accurately for

himself what may be the advantages of the service; the point is, in what estimation the service may be held by others. At present the soldier was sometimes considered as a person gone, as one who was completely lost. Now, the point was to raise the character of the soldier and of the service; and in order to do this, in addition to the limited period of service, it might be matter for future consideration, whether some civil privileges might not be granted to the soldiers who had served a certain time. Even the elective franchise, though it could not properly be given them in boroughs, or in the counties in Scotland, which were much on the same footing as boroughs, might be given them in the counties in England. Individuals, perhaps, might not calculate on these advantages, but then all these things went to raise the character of the army in the general estimation; and this would always be a powerful inducement to enlist. He had only stated these advantages and disadvantages very generally. It was first to be considered that the character of the service was to be raised, in order to procure the proper supplies for it. He had stated how this was to be done. He had then adverted to the necessity of discharging the men at the end of a certain period, even during a war, and had mentioned the instance of the East-India Company's troops, which proved that there was no great danger in this, nor in the influence of this plan upon our colonial service. He thought this of no great magnitude. The whole, in short, proceeded upon the enlightened principle of sacrificing a smaller

good at present, in order to receive a much greater at a future period. It proceeded upon that enlightened avarice, if he might say so, which overturned the whole maxim, to which he had before alluded, and taught us that, by keeping all we got, we did not get all we might. Having thus generally stated the nature of the object in view, and the means which it was proposed to employ, he would conclude with moving, that the clause be added to the bill.

The introduction of the clause was opposed by Sir James Pulteney, Mr. Yorke, Mr. Canning, and Mr. Perceval; and supported by Colonel Craufurd, General Loftus, and Mr. Hlx. The Committee then divided, on bringing up the clause:

For the clause - - - - -	254
Against it - - - - - -	125
Majority - -	129

VACCINE INOCULATION.

July 2, 1806.

LORD HENRY PETTY (*Chancellor of the Exchequer*) *moved*, "*That an humble address be presented to His Majesty*, "*praying that he will be graciously pleased to direct His Royal* "*College of Physicians to enquire into the state of the Vaccine* "*Inoculation in the United Kingdom, and to report their opi-* "*nion as to the progress which it has made, and the causes* "*which have retarded its general adoption.*" *Dr. Mathews seconded the motion. Mr. Wilberforce concurred with the two former speakers, in bearing testimony to the beneficial effects which had resulted from Vaccine Inoculation; but suggested, as a preferable and more practicable course of procedure, the appointment of a Committee of the House of Commons, and another of the House of Lords, who should enquire into the actual state of the disease, and receive evidence as to its progress and effects.*

MR. SECRETARY WINDHAM. — "The only point, Sir, in which it appears to me, that we differ in opinion, as to the subject under our consideration, is, as to the mode that ought to be pursued in effecting the object we have in view. Upon this point I must

say, that I am rather inclined to give the preference to the plan which has been suggested by my Noble Friend, who brought forward this motion. The proposition which has been just now made by the Honourable Gentleman on the opposite side, seems to be merely a commutation of that which has been suggested by the Noble Lord near me. The whole difference turns upon the question of substituting the Report of a Committee of this House for that of the College of Physicians. The Honourable Member seems to think, that an investigation and report, proceeding from a Committee, would have more weight and authority with the public, than a report issuing from a body of Physicians. In this particular, however, I must beg leave to differ from him, as I think a Committee of this House would be less competent to form a correct and sound judgment upon the subject, than medical men would be. Their incompetency would be felt and considered by the public, and consequently an opinion from them, as to the good or bad effects of the Vaccine Inoculation would have much less weight on their minds. It would not tend to allay their suspicions, nor administer a guidance for their future conduct. Far different, however, would be the effect of a Report proceeding from that learned and respectable body, the Royal College of Physicians, most formally called upon by Parliament. By the Noble Lord's plan, I think the authority and influence of Parliament would come in just in the way in which it ought to come. It will

add a superior degree of solemnity to our sanction of what we deem a most useful and highly-beneficial discovery. In the one case the House would be grounding their procedure upon the opinion of a Committee, founded perhaps upon fallacious principles, while in the other they will proceed upon the surest grounds, upon the sentiments and opinions of men of experience, in a learned profession, which enables them to judge with superior accuracy and acuteness upon subjects connected with that profession. To Committees of this House the common adage might be applied, '*Ne sutor ultra crepidam;*' for it is a well-known fact, that a man is always a more competent judge of matters relating to his own profession, than another who is a perfect stranger to such subjects. On the whole, I think, that the plan of my Noble Friend would have infinitely the best chance of overcoming the public prejudices, and of giving validity to the opinions of those best able to judge of the real merits of this valuable discovery made by Dr. Jenner. Perhaps, indeed, these prejudices may be found already too deeply rooted in the minds of some few individuals to be extirpated by the combined efforts both of the College of Physicians and of Parliament, if we were to judge from the failure of our former sanction, in accomplishing the utmost of our wishes. This, however, I sincerely trust will not be the case, as I am one of those who, convinced of its superior efficacy by its success in foreign countries, have only to deplore that it has not met

with better encouragement in our own. The Honourable Gentleman who spoke last recommends a certain species of compulsion, and indeed I think it is such a one as the legislature of any country may, in certain cases, be well entitled to adopt, in order to prevent contagious maladies from spreading among society. Such compulsory measures ought, however, not to be adopted except in cases of the most urgent necessity. If it really can be shewn that compulsory measures are requisite upon the present occasion, then is Parliament blameable for not having adopted them sooner. It is now common to be scandalized at seeing the wretched and miserable objects, who are afflicted with this baneful disorder, carried about in the public streets, in the arms of their anxious and afflicted parents, mingling with society, as if no such infectious disease existed. I know well, however, that the moment any kind of compulsion is adopted upon subjects of this sort, that moment there is a greater degree of hatred excited in the public mind against what may be judiciously prescribed; and I therefore should be exceedingly unwilling to resort to such a measure. The mild, solemn, and considerate recommendation of Vaccination by Parliament being what they judge the most prudent plan to be pursued, will no doubt go infinitely further than any constraint whatever. Had the question this day related solely to the quantum of reward which Parliament ought to bestow upon the discoverer of this most efficacious and beneficial prac-

tice, I should not have objected to the appointment of a Committee in the manner the Honourable Member proposes, namely, for the purpose of leaving the business entirely to their discretion. That subject, however, will be more fit for future consideration, when this previous point is properly ascertained to the satisfaction of the public. Then will be the time to remunerate and encourage that meritorious individual to whom society in general owes the utmost gratitude and favour, and who, I cannot help thinking, has not yet been sufficiently rewarded for the expence and trouble this discovery has cost him. (A loud cry of hear! hear! from all parts of the House.) Such are the grounds upon which I think it my duty to support the Noble Lord in the motion he has made, and the reasons which would make me exceedingly unwilling to resort to compulsory measures under any circumstances, except those of the most urgent and dangerous necessity." (A cry of hear!)

The motion, having been supported by Mr. Bankes and Mr. William Smith, was unanimously agreed to, and the address was ordered to be presented by such members as were of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council.

N.B. For the report of the above speech, as well for that of another on the same subject, which will be found in the subsequent volume, the Editor is

indebted to an useful publication by Charles Murray, Esq. Secretary to the National Vaccine Institution, entitled, "Debates in Parliament respecting the Jennerian Discovery," and containing some important documents and statements relating to Vaccine Inoculation.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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